750G.0221/11–2351
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense ( Lovett )1
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to Acting Secretary Foster’s letter dated November 23, 1951, forwarding to the Department an exchange of correspondence between the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff regarding the future of British and United States troops in Trieste, should possible forthcoming Italo-Yugoslav talks arrive at a political settlement of the Trieste question.2 I note that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no overriding military objection to the removal of these troops from the Free Territory of Trieste under international agreement, provided there remains no political objection to their removal.
The British Embassy has requested on behalf of the Foreign Office our views on a proposal that the United States and British Governments assure the Italian Government that upon settlement of the question of Trieste, allied troops would be withdrawn from the Trieste area. The British Embassy states that the British [Page 265] Chiefs of Staff have informed the Foreign Office that they have always understood that the troops would be withdrawn when the future of Trieste is agreed and that they have sought the views of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Embassy states further that the British Foreign Office considers that it would be politically desirable to give the Italian Government the assurance suggested. It is the Department’s policy to facilitate insofar as possible negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia for an agreement settling the Trieste question, without entering into the negotiations. Assurances of the nature suggested by the British Government may facilitate and in any event would not impede Italo-Yugoslav negotiations.
Accordingly, the Department of State considers that:
- 1)
- the United States Government should concur in the British proposal that joint assurances be given the Italian Government that Allied troops will be withdrawn from Trieste in the event of an Italo-Yugoslav settlement of the Trieste question; and
- 2)
- in giving these assurances, the United States and British Governments should indicate that they will be guided by the views of the Italian Government on whether they should be made public.
I should appreciate it if you will indicate whether the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur.3
Sincerely yours,
Deputy Under Secretary
- Drafted by Greene and cleared with Williamson, Bonbright, EE, and S/P.↩
- Attached to Foster’s covering letter was a memorandum to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff from the British Joint Services Mission in Washington in which it was stated that the British Chiefs of Staff “look upon the stationing of the British Force in Trieste as a most unsatisfactory military commitment. This commitment entails, for political reasons, the stationing of British troops in peace in a theatre which on the outbreak of war is not a British responsibility. … The British Chiefs of Staff consider, therefore, that the Allied Forces in Trieste should be fully withdrawn as soon as the political situation allows.” The response from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, also attached to Foster’s letter, noted their agreement with the British position. (750G.0221/11–2351)↩
- In a letter dated January 18, 1952, Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster replied that he and the JCS concurred in the Department of State recommendations. (Department of Defense files)↩