750G.00/11–2351
Memorandum of Conversation, by Leonard Unger , United States Political Adviser to the Commander of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste ( Winterton )1
| Participants: | Admiral Robert B. Carney |
| Mr. Leonard Unger |
At the Headquarters of Allied Forces in Southern Europe, November 8, 1951
Subject: Trieste
At the beginning of our discussion Admiral Carney commented on the responsibility of the military forces in the Trieste area. He realized that their first mission must be the evacuation of Allied dependents, but he did not accept that the forces themselves should evacuate the Free Territory after accomplishing this mission. He said that he was strongly impressed by General Sebree’s description of the strategic possibilities in the Slovenian region, between the Alps and the head of the Adriatic. For the defense of Western Europe on its southern flank he regarded the region of the Ljubljana gap as a priority area—if it could be held by Allied soldiers, in cooperation with the Yugoslavs, the prospects for defending northern Italy would be immeasurably improved. He appeared to be well aware of the political difficulties in the way of Italo-Yugoslav military cooperation in that area. Admiral Carney added that he had already put his staff to work to study this question in more detail.
With the foregoing considerations in mind Admiral Carney feels that contact must be made between his command and the Yugoslav military so that joint plans may be worked out to assure that the critical area in Slovenia will not be abandoned by the Yugoslav army in the event of invasion from the East. So far he has been unable to make such contact because of his instructions from the SHAPE Command. He appeared to feel that the British were principally responsible for obstructing such an approach at this time, but he said that he was continuing to urge General Eisenhower to change his instructions on this matter. The Admiral said that if hostilities were to break out at the present time and he had not managed to establish contact with the Yugoslavs in order to take [Page 262] advantage of the strategic possibilities of the Ljubljana gap, he felt he would be open to the severest censure and charges of neglect of duty.
In discussing the relationship of Trieste to the NATO Command Admiral Carney appeared to be fully aware of the fact that, for the time being, any relationship must be on a covert basis. He mentioned his desire to visit Trieste, although he recognized that in some quarters this was considered undesirable because of his position as NATO Commander, and he wondered whether he might not go there quite inconspicuously, e.g. on a personal visit to General Sebree. As CINCNELM he could go there, just as US Admirals under his Command regularly visit Trieste. The possible political consequences of his visiting, even as an NATO Commander, have been over-emphasized in his opinion. He asked for my views on this matter and I stressed the fact that at the present time and in the coming months we were intent above all on bringing the Italian and Yugoslav Governments together to reach a bilateral settlement of the Trieste question. For this reason we were especially anxious to avoid anything which might stir up debate or agitation and thus impede such a settlement. I agreed that his coming to Trieste logically had no direct connection with an Italo-Yugoslav bilateral settlement, but he appeared to accept my point that logic plays little part in the Trieste situation and to agree that he would not come to Trieste as long as the present situation prevailed.
We then discussed the possibilities of a Trieste settlement, and I outlined to him the situation so far as I knew it as of that moment. There also arose the question of whether Allied troops should remain in Trieste if there should be a settlement. Admiral Carney expressed no views pro or con on this matter although his earlier statements about the great military importance of the area between the Alps and the head of the Adriatic would appear to imply that he would wish to see American troops somewhere in the region so that, in the event of an emergency, they could move into the strategic areas in Slovenia.
Finally, Admiral Carney said that he felt the need of someone in the capacity of a political adviser who would work with his planning officer, Brig. General Stokes.2 He said that in the course of mapping out plans for the Southern Command information and advice in the political field were continually required and he felt that it would be of great value if some Foreign Service Officer, not of the top echelon, were to be assigned to work with Stokes and assist him in this way. The Admiral said that he had raised this [Page 263] question already with Undersecretary of State Webb and in other quarters as well. Although he did not ask me for a reply, the Admiral seemed to be sounding me out as to my interest in such a job. I did raise with him one difficulty I saw in such a position, namely that in his international capacity it would be difficult for him to have only an American political adviser. He recognized this but replied in the first place that the exact functions of such an individual would not be too openly identified and that, in any case, he could be attached to the Admiral in his capacity as CINCNELM rather than as a NATO Commander.
After our conversation, Admiral Carney asked me to stay for lunch where he also had as a guest Italian Major General Gandin. In introducing me to the General he did not identify my position.
- Transmitted as an enclosure to a letter from Unger to Byington, Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, November 23. The second enclosure, a memorandum of conversation between Unger and Maj. Gen. Edmund B. Sebree, dated October 31, is not printed.↩
- Brig. Gen. John H. Stokes, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Allied Forces, Southern Europe.↩