750G.00/9–1251: Telegram
The Chargé in Yugoslavia ( Beam ) to the Secretary of State 1
344. Embtel 335.2 We hope that Tito’s Navy Day speech September 10 concludes Yugo reactions to Yugo-Ital relations in general and Trieste in particular. Emb feels that Yugo note to Itals and Vlahovic’s press commentary (Embtel 326),3 paper given by Mates to me (Embtel 325)4 and brochure re Anglo-American espionage (Embtel 333)5 shld be considered as having a common purpose, i.e., an attempt however inept by Yugos to strengthen position before possible Trieste negots. As we see it from here each successive explanation of Yugos position re Trieste following Tito’s to Ambassador has tended to narrow area within which Yugo is willing to bargain. Some of these maneuvers may undoubtedly be explained by desire FonOff officials who will be concerned with negots to estab initial bargaining position. On other hand because tripartite declaration on Trieste Yugos do regard us as partisan and in response our efforts have them estab willingness negot with Italy they naturally have taken advantage extreme position adopted certain quarters Ital Govt and press. FonOff has provided Emb excerpts most virulent Ital press articles and while this gratuitous offer may be resented as practice adopted totalitarian states, nevertheless it is easy to realize sharp reaction provoked here by an article such as that published in Il Popolo September 1.
FonOff aware we have been dealing separately with Itals just as we have done the same with Yugos without informing either Itals [Page 248] or Yugos of each others positions. On Yugo side this has been done at their request and they understand need of secrecy. Their suspicions however seem to be aroused by leaks from London concerning motives in postponement Trieste elections. One cannot escape feeling Yugos on defensive due to De Gasperi’s visit with Western Fon-Mins and their sense being left out accounts in part their renewed stridency and toughening of their position re Trieste. Yugos undoubtedly get certain amount Commie ideological satisfaction out of their self-imposed policy of isolation, but as practical politicians they cannot ignore advantages accruing to Italy from De Gasperi’s close association with US-UK-French. If any progress can be made with Itals in getting them enter negots in reasonable spirit, some kind communication to Yugo Govt wld doubtless be helpful after De Gasperi talks. Each day that Itals delay approaching Yugos will increase latter’s suspicions.
As adjunct creation proper polit atmosphere we wld like suggest re-emphasizing to both sides military urgency of Yugo-Ital understanding. Tito gave us opening in Navy Day speech when he stressed free countries all in unsatisfactory world situation together and shld be careful avoid weakening common position by irresponsible unilateral actions. Parallel line perhaps be undertaken by leading military figure such as Gen Eisenhower along fol line. Appreciate one result may be increased demands for US arms but point cld be made re futility provision arms for common purpose against background continuing serious rift in necessary joint front. In this context, there may be point in negots where it will be necessary for us to try persuade Yugos increase concessions to Italy.
- Repeated to Rome, London, Paris, and Trieste.↩
- Telegram 335 summarized Tito’s speech which was devoted principally to current Yugoslav-Italian relations. (768.11/9–1151)↩
- Telegram 326 summarized press statements in Yugoslavia that condemned “Fascist elements” in Italy for their anti-Yugoslav campaign. (665.68/9–1051)↩
- Telegram 325 transmitted the text of an informal summary of Yugoslavia’s position which Mates gave Beam on September 8 outlining a more rigid stance than previously held. (750G.00/9–951)↩
- Telegram 333 informed the Department of State that Mates had given Beam a brochure allegedly documenting U.S. and British intelligence agencies in Trieste involvement in conducting hostile espionage campaigns against Yugoslavia. (750G.00/9–1051)↩