750G.00/8–951: Telegram
Leonard Unger , United States Political Adviser to the Commander of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste ( Winterton ), to the Secretary of State 1
174. With respect to proposal Deptel 605 to Rome, August 4,2 concur wholeheartedly in our taking aggressive action to secure Ital-Yugo accord in Trieste. As noted mytel 93, July 243 situation here very likely grow worse as time lapses, to detriment AMG and good relations among Itals and Yugos, US and UK. Therefore believe pressure on Ital Govt to face realities Trieste problem and come to agreement is best reply to De Gasperi plea (Rome’s tel 586 [596], August 3).4
Electoral law issue appears to be another smoke screen behind which Ital Govt, while avoiding main issue, is seeking to appease extremists on Trieste. Law, when used 1949 and reenacted last Feb, was identical with Ital law—can hardly be represented now as rejection Italianita. Yielding on this issue would only logically invite Itals exert even stronger pressure on cassation issue which certainly offers greater scope for agitation and embarrassment to AMG. Parenthetically, re De Gasperi comment re campaign (para 2 reftel), am persuaded no matter what law adopted that Ital Govt will not stand by without injecting itself into election situation and that Italianita will necessarily be campaign issue.
Shld Dept’s proposal be adopted, before US and UK Govts instructed to announce deferral elections here urge that they make sure that sincere and sustained effort being made by Itals and Yugos to reach agreement. Otherwise there is every likelihood that, to achieve deferral, Itals will give easy assurances which will bring no more results than earlier stated intentions to negotiate (e.g. assurances to Brit FonMin March 1951 in London). In that case AMG will, to no avail, have stirred up considerable agitation [Page 233] here and brought upon itself pressure and criticism for playing politics from independentist elements and Cominform and will have damaged seriously its moral position before public. US and UK Govt would inevitably share in criticism.
Specifically, believe that in replying to Itals, we should state we do not consider it appropriate alter electoral law, adding we also have fundamental doubts about deferring elections. We might be prepared to consider latter, however, if we had clear evidence that Italy was making concrete progress toward reaching agreement with Yugo. We could then report Mates conversation with Emb Belgrade (Dept infotel August 6)5 to Itals and state that we are prepared also to press Yugos to negotiate now and, if desired, would seek to propose common basis as point departure for discussions. In this connection I call Dept’s attention to “terms of reference” earlier discussed with Ital FonOff and mentioned Rome’s tel 83, May 10, 19506 as such a possible basis.
Another reservation re Dept’s proposal is that it would inevitably put spotlight on Ital-Yugo negotiations and produce ferment here, speculation, agitation and pressures in Italy and usual reaction in Yugo. Have always considered that most auspicious atmosphere for negotiations settlement Trieste question would be absolute secrecy with public presentation of agreement only at conclusion.
Foregoing observations entirely personal. Zone Commander unavailable until week-end and I cannot predict his views concerning deferral election. However, he shares my conviction that problem bound to grow worse and bilateral settlement is only means of finally removing sore.
Wish emphasize that foregoing reservations not meant to discourage our taking positive action if in judgment Embs Rome and Belgrade Ital and Yugo Govts can be persuaded follow through promptly with determination to settle problem and willingness to present solution to their people.
In view imminence elections promptest action required. Foregoing written in ignorance contents Belgrade’s 144 August 27 and Rome’s 603, August 3.8
- Repeated to Belgrade, London, Paris, and Rome.↩
- Document 101.↩
- Document 99.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 4, Document 101.↩
- This telegram reported the position of the Yugoslav Government that once bilateral agreement could be reached between Yugoslavia and Italy on territorial and reparations issues, then Yugoslavia would have no objection to revision of the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty. (700.00(S)/8–651)↩
- The telegram under reference cannot be further identified.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 101.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 3, ibid.↩