740.00119 Control (Japan)/6–1649
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State 1
[Received June 23.]
Dear Mr. Secretary: I have been rather disturbed recently over recurrent Washington datelined press dispatches reflecting a trend of thought in official circles that a change in the regime of control in Japan, patterned after the plan now being implemented for the United States Zone of Germany, would not only be a desirable development but susceptible of accomplishment with no less difficulty. This trend of thought either fails to understand or ignores the structural set-up which, largely under your skillful guiding hand, was fashioned in Moscow during late 1945 and the basic distinctions which otherwise exist between the situation in Germany and that existing in Japan.
I know that you are deeply preoccupied with the difficult European problems which confront you and have probably prevented much thought being given to this relatively quiet sector in Japan, but against the possibility that the Japanese problem might suddenly be brought up for serious consideration I thought that I should give you my views and estimates thereon. Much of what I have to say will be well known to you but it is difficult to discuss so broad a subject piecemeal without showing the connections between inter-related parts.
Here there is no military government functioning in the administration of Japanese civil affairs, as throughout the Occupation I have permitted the Japanese civil government in all of its branches and sub-divisions to function, subject only to the close observation and inherent authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to intervene at any time as in his judgment necessary to support Allied objectives. No military government has been established here which, incidentally, eliminated the call upon United States manpower which otherwise would have been required. Such United States personnel as are required to carry on the civil phase of the Occupation consist for the most part in specially qualified civilians recruited in Washington. Thus, in the SCAP Headquarters organization, out of 2,798 persons on duty, 2,443 are civilian.
The situation here is thus entirely different than that prevailing in the United States Zone of Germany where Mr. McCloy is about to enter upon his duties as High Commissioner. There the American forces have actually governed through an established and functioning military government, with a civil German government only just about to be inaugurated. In addition, the United States has maintained unilateral [Page 779] control over policy and administration from the start in its zone of Germany. Here in Japan, to the contrary, such unilateral control was yielded at the Moscow Conference in late 1945 when an Allied set-up was agreed upon by the United States, in concert with the other major powers, for the administration of the Occupation. This set-up embodied a civilian agency, termed the Far Eastern Commission, composed of representatives of the eleven Pacific powers, sitting in Washington, to formulate policy; the Allied Council for Japan, composed of the United States, British Commonwealth, China and the Soviet, sitting in Tokyo, to act as an advisory and consultative body to the Supreme Commander; and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, acting as the sole executive authority for the Allies in Japan. Since then the international character of the Occupation has expanded through the organization of the Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan, the Separations Technical Advisory Committee, and other Allied civilian agencies, in the implementation of Far Eastern Commission policy. For general security purposes the Supreme Commander has under him American Occupation Forces, under the immediate command of CINCFE, the British Commonwealth Forces, and all Allied ground, Naval and Air Forces in Japan.
The United States could, with respect to the American zone of Germany, alter the regime of control at will, but by the express terms of the Moscow Agreement, any change in the regime of Occupation control in Japan there agreed upon was specifically reserved to the Far Eastern Commission. It so happens that the CINCFE is also the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, pursuant to agreement reached among the four major Allied powers in consultation at the time of the cessation of hostilities. While such action was taken before the regime of control was determined upon at Moscow and the eleven Pacific nations vested with the policy-making power, specific confirmation at such conference was given to the appointment and authority of the Supreme Commander. Change in that regime of control to permit the State Department to assume a position in Japan analogous to that it is about to assume in Germany would, in accordance with the terms of reference of the Moscow Agreement, require the consent of a majority of the Far Eastern Commission, including the United States, Britain, Russia and China, each of which possesses the veto power on that body. It is most unlikely that such an agreement would be forthcoming as the nations involved would thereby be required to partially yield their influence in the future orientation and control of Japan. By no stretch of imagination, moreover, could such a change be regarded as a transfer from a military to civil administration. It is merely an incident that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers here is a military officer. He has functioned entirely as the executive head of a civilian administration. The few military personnel [Page 780] which SCAP has borrowed from CINCFE are merely to supplement the paucity of civilian personnel otherwise available to him.
But apart from this, and of infinitely greater importance, no move could be more calculated to destroy the remaining prestige of the United States in the Far East than a serious effort toward such a change. Nothing would give greater impetus to the Communist drive to bring all of Asia under control. Oriental reactions differ widely from occidental reactions, and a drastic readjustment in the regime of control here would certainly be interpreted as indicative of an Allied weakening in their determination to further the objectives enunciated in the surrender terms. It could not fail to be regarded as a decisive step toward yielding in the face of Communist successes in China and as a tacit acknowledgment of our inability to maintain our position, support our responsibilities and defend our rights and interests in the Far East. This is no mere conjecture. I have seen the convulsions here which accompanied every serious suggestion which has been made with any color of authority that American policy might be reoriented toward a weakening of the American position in the Pacific, such as former Secretary Royall is reported to have made on his trip to Japan and as has freqently been the purport of press dispatches from Washington, mostly speculative, but some bearing the stamp of seeming official authenticity.
The United States has emerged through three and a half years of a predominantly American Occupation to occupy a unique position in the hearts of the Japanese people. It is a position of respect bordering on reverence and veneration. This has largely been brought about by the character of the Occupation and its guiding philosophy. It has been a military Occupation only in a formal sense and because inherent in it lies the ultimate authority of military force. Essentially it has been administered along civil lines. To some Japanese the presence of troops, with its connotations of order and discipline, has had greatest appeal and most far-reaching influence. But to most, the benign qualities of the Occupation policy and administration, the bestowal and safeguard of human rights, and the social reformation to enhance individual dignity have made a penetrating and lasting impression. But the combination of both has brought to the great masses of the Japanese people a sense of confidence and faith and a feeling of complete security in the American effort and purpose. This is the strong spiritual front which has been erected here in Japan against the Communist advance in Asia.
To speak of civilianizing the Occupation is to speak in riddles. It is, and always has been, civilianized. It is merely incidental that its chief administrator came from the military ranks. On the other hand, experience has clearly demonstrated that even public speculation of such a change is widely interpreted in the oriental mind as pointing to [Page 781] a relaxation of the firm anti-Communist stand we have taken here, with the view of an ultimate withdrawal from our position in the Far East. This but fertilizes the field for Communist conversion and expansion and tends to undermine and sabotage our efforts at this and other strategic Pacific areas to contain the Communist advance and preserve a front safe for democratic growth, without offering the slightest basis for hope that advantage might result from such a change, even if possible of implementation.
I cannot too strongly urge that, pending developments with the Soviet which would make a peace treaty possible, every effort to effect a change in the regime of control such as has been suggested, foreshadowing a weakening of our purpose to maintain invincibly our position, be sharply resisted. The scales are far too delicately balanced recklessly to experiment with doubtful change in an area from which has emerged a pattern of general success. To tamper unduly with such a situation is but to prejudice the security of our position and hazard every gain made in the course of the Occupation and otherwise invite catastrophic consequences throughout Asia.
The estimate I have made is so conclusive in evidenciary support that I earnestly hope that before any such change becomes a potential reality you will advise me in order that I may lay my views before you in much fuller detail, as well as before the President.
We are still hoping that the burdens upon you from Europe will abate sufficiently to permit you a visit to this area of the world. I cannot but repeat that such an eventuality would have a profoundly beneficial effect upon the morale of the Asian peoples.
Faithfully yours,
- A copy was transmitted in a Personal letter of the same date to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan), not printed. Mr. Acheson wrote an acknowledgment on June 28 and said he hoped to be able to reply “shortly”.↩