Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2

740.00119 FEAC/5–449

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)

secret

[Washington,] June 8, 1949.

Subject: Rights of Employees of Japanese Government Enterprises

Problem

To determine the position of the US Government on the labor rights of Japanese Government enterprise workers—a problem currently under consideration in the Far Eastern Commission.

Discussion

Last summer, as a result of serious abuses of power by organized Japanese Government workers, SCAP recommended and, under the direction of occupation officials, the Japanese Government passed several laws restricting the rights of Japanese Government employees. The USSR and the Japanese Communists condemned SCAP’s action in toto. The FEC countries and United States organized labor have criticized the restrictive provisions of these laws as excessive. The United States Government (State, Army, Labor) has informed SCAP privately that it regarded certain phases of the laws defective and has unsuccessfully attempted over the last nine months to have certain minor corrective measures taken. At the same time, the United States Government has opposed the passage of any FEC policy decision which would publicly reverse SCAP on this highly delicate issue.

The issue presents itself today in the form of an Australian Resolution before the FEC which provides that:

“Bearing in mind that it is a matter for the occupation authority in Japan to decide when strikes and other work stoppages should be prohibited as directly prejudicing the objectives or needs of the occupation, the FEC decides as a matter of policy that the provisions of FEC 045/5 (principles for Japanese Trade Unions) should be applied to workers in Japanese Government enterprises.”¹

Despite repeated attempts by the United States Government to have this resolution defeated or tabled, the Resolution was passed by the Steering Committee on May 31 by a vote of 6 to 1, the United States alone opposing and the USSR, China, Netherlands and Philippines abstaining. It is now before the Commission and will probably be voted upon within the next few weeks.

The United States is therefore confronted with an immediate choice between three courses of action: (1) not voting against the resolution (which would permit its adoption), (2) voting against the resolution (which would in effect mean use of the veto), or (3) further seeking the withdrawal or tabling of the resolution.

The first course of action is highly inadvisable. The controlling FEC directive (FEC–045/5), to which this resolution refers, is a broad statement of principles for Japanese trade unions, which does not state to which specific groups it does or does not apply. SCAP acted within his proper administrative discretion in interpreting the directive as he saw fit, and his interpretation of the directive has been translated by the Japanese Government into a series of laws known as the National Public Service Legislation. The effect of the Australian resolution, if adopted, would be to require a major rewriting of these laws, which in turn would undermine the position of the present government, unquestionably produce political turmoil in Japan and jeopardize the stabilization program. Furthermore, the passage of the Australian resolution, being a reversal of the position publicly taken by SCAP, would result in a serious loss of his prestige.

The second course of action, while definitely preferable to the first, has the disadvantages of (1) requiring that the United States use the veto to defeat a resolution which no other FEC countries oppose, (2) affording the USSR an opportunity publicly to present the United States as being alone opposed to the “rights” of Japanese labor, (3) not settling the overall controversy in the FEC concerning the rights of Japanese Government workers.

The third course of action is therefore preferable if at all possible. However, several attempts have already been made by officers of the Department to secure withdrawal of the Austrialian proposal, but all have proved unsuccessful. The Austrialian Delegation is acting under firm orders from the Australian Labor Government and it has the active support of all the other Commonwealth countries. Clearly, the Australian Government will not accede to any request that it table its resolution unless the United States has a definite counter-proposal. This has been intimated to us on a number of occasions.

What Australia and the other countries have repeatedly sought from us is an expression of what, in our opinion, should be the principles governing Japanese Government workers. So far we have taken the position that FEC–045/5 is a broad statement of principles for Japanese trade unions which does not indicate the specific categories to which it applies or does not apply. This position is obviously unresponsive to the question raised by the other countries as well as by important segments of opinion in this country, and has rendered more imperative the need for the United States to take more than a negative, evasive stand on this question.

For this reason, State–Army–Labor wired SCAP in April² informing him that it is our view that, as a matter of principle, full collective bargaining rights, including the right of mediation and arbitration but not of strike, should be extended to all non-executive full-time employees of Japanese Government enterprises. We told SCAP that if the United States Government were in a position privately to assure the Australians and other friendly FEC countries that the United States and SCAP supported this principle and that full effect would be given to it by SCAP as soon as he deemed practicable, the long and unhappy controversy over the National Public Service legislation could almost certainly be laid at rest. Our proposal was designed to spare SCAP any embarrassment. It did not require that he undertake any immediate or difficult action. It merely required that the same rights of mediation and arbitration that are now enjoyed by the Government railway and monopoly workers be extended to the only other group of Govt. enterprise workers, namely, the employees of the telecommunications services.

SCAP has refused to go along with the proposal. His reasons for doing so as well as FE’s analysis of these reasons are attached at Tab A.³ Suffice it to say here that FE does not find in SCAP’s arguments sufficient substance to be dissuaded from the wisdom of the proposal which State–Army–Labor put to SCAP last April. This proposal, which we continue to support, would merely require that the Telecommunications Ministry become the National Telecommunications Corporation. Its 143,000 workers would continue to be denied the right to strike. They would continue to be subject to strong punitive measures. They would, however, acquire the right of having their grievances adjudicated by an arbitration court (Labor–Management–Government) rather than continuing to have them decided by the National Personnel Authority. We see no security risk involved in such an undertaking.

It must also be emphasized that our proposal is not advanced in a spirit of appeasement to the views of other countries and interested groups. From a substantive point of view we believe that it would be consonant with and confirm the otherwise logical distinction made in the National Public Service legislation between public enterprise workers and regular civil servants. Failure to extend mediation and arbitration facilities to the telecommunications workers is an apparent discrimination against a particular group of workers that may do more to promote than to curb Communist influence among them. The proposal, if carried out, would also serve to combat Communist influence in the Japanese trade union movement by showing SCAP’s genuine concern for the rights of Government workers, particularly at a time when the Government workers are suffering, perhaps more than any other group, the brunt of the stabilization program.

FE and E therefore continue to be of the firm opinion that SCAP should be induced, provided the internal security problem can be met, to agree to carry out the principle stated above. SCAP’s contrary view—which has now been supported by the Department of the Army—leads me to the conclusion that if the course of action we recommend is to be carried out, there must be established a high-level United States Government position on this matter which is then brought fully to bear upon SCAP. In so doing SCAP should be warned that a United States veto of the Australian resolution might well lead to an FEC resolution along the lines of the principle to which we subscribe; that if this were to happen, the United States would be placed in the deplorable position where it could not afford to oppose an FEC directive compelling SCAP to do what we believe he should do on his own initiative.

In order to obtain Army agreement in this matter, a personal high-level approach to Mr. Johnson is suggested, since lower echelons of the Army now appear adamant in their support of SCAP’s position.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

(1) The Acting Secretary endeavor to secure the agreement of Secretary Johnson and Secretary Tobin⁴ to the sending to SCAP of the attached message (Tab B)⁵ enjoining him to take steps to provide that all non-executive full-time employees of Government enterprises in Japan be accorded full collective bargaining rights, including the right of mediation and arbitration, but not the right to strike.

(2) That this be done whether or not the Australian resolution tornes to a vote, though if this is done promptly the United States should be in a position to persuade the Australian Government to withdraw or table its resolution.

(3) That the United States oppose the Australian Resolution when and if it comes to a vote.

Concurrence

Mr. Thorp Concurs.

1. For FBC–045/5, December 6, 1946, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. viii, pp. 369 and 370; also, Department of State publication 2888, Activities of the Far Eastern Commission (1947), p. 91.
2. War 87868, April 28, not printed.
3. Telegram C 69705, May 1, and memorandum of May 4, neither printed.
4. Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor.
5. Not printed.