740.00119 Control (Japan)/5–1349
The Chargé in Australia (Foster) to the Secretary of State 1
No. 35
[Received May 31.]
Subject: Japanese Participation in International Affairs
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s restricted circular telegram of April 22, 1949, 9 a. m., and the Embassy’s confidential [Page 745] telegrams in reply no. 85 of April 28, 10 a. m., and no. 102 of May 12, noon,2 concerning the above subject.
There is transmitted herewith a copy of the note3 addressed to me on May 11, 1949, by Dr. John W. Burton, Secretary (and in the absence of Dr. Evatt acting head) of the Department of External Affairs, in reply to a note I sent him on the basis of the Department’s circular telegram of April 22. It will be noted that the essence of Dr. Burton’s note is that the Australian Government “considers that adequate provision already exists under existing policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission for such limited participation by Japan in international affairs as is necessary at the present time”.
I regret that in this and other recent matters relating to Japan the Embassy has been unsuccessful in its efforts to persuade the Australian Government to accept the United States viewpoint and policies. I have in mind the Department’s circular telegrams of September 23, 1948,3 and February 11, 1949,4 and its telegram no. 33 of March 2, 19493 concerning most-favored-nation treatment for Japanese commerce; and its circular telegrams of March 11, 1949,3 regarding Japanese accession to the ITU, and of May 8, 1949,5 concerning Japanese reparations and level of industry. I know the Department appreciates, however, that the problem of Japan’s status and international position is a peculiarly difficult one here. From the point of view of the Australian people generally and the Australian Labor Government in particular it is only a few years since Japan was their mortal enemy bent upon invading their continent.
It is perhaps understandable that they still feel a lingering hatred and fear of the Japanese together with an instinctive opposition to any measure which might tend to restore Japan’s prewar military, political, industrial, or commercial power. They feel that a self-supporting Japan of 80,000,000 people even though no threat to the United States would inevitably constitute a menace to the security and economy of Australia’s 8,000,000 people. Many Australians will admit the logic of the United States thesis that from the American point of view the Japanese economy must be reconstructed at least to the level where the country can support itself and can resist the inroads of communism. But Australian emotions nonetheless continue to override the logic of the situation.
There are of course other factors which complicate the situation. The Australian Labor Government is, as the Department well knows, extremely jealous of the independent position of Australia, suspicious [Page 746] of what it regards as American economic imperialism, and determined not to be pushed around.
Couple all these things with the fact that Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, who makes the country’s immediate foreign policy almost single-handed, follows a highly academic approach to international problems, and there exists ample basis for an almost automatic opposition to United States proposals and policies in connection with the future of Japan.
More specifically—and these are perhaps symptoms rather than causes of the Australian attitude—the Australians insist upon the primary position of the Far Eastern Commission as against the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. They insist also in urging the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty ahead of other considerations. They are fearful of Japanese commercial competition especially in so far as this might hurt the foreign trade of the United Kingdom. Again, this is an election year, and a bitter campaign is already under way for the Commonwealth Parliamentary elections scheduled for December; this naturally does not predispose either the Government or the electorate toward a dispassionate view of international problems.
Behind all these considerations lies the fact that generally speaking the Australian people and their Labor Government continue to share the complacent assumption that when the next war comes, if it does, the United States will bail them out just as it did last time. Nevertheless, this complacency has been somewhat shaken by the withdrawal of United States defenses to the west coast of North America, the collapse of China, and the deteriorating situation in southeastern Asia, and there is evidence of a dawning realization of the dangers of Australia’s isolated position. This, however, has the effect not of converting the Australians to our policies with respect to Japan but of causing them to feel that until the present situation is clarified no irrevocable steps should be taken which might even partially restore Japanese power.
Respectfully yours,