740.00119 Control (Japan)/1–749

The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 11

Sir: I have the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch no. 800 of December 22, 19481 and to previous correspondence in regard to meetings of the Allied Council for Japan, and to forward as enclosures five copies each of the Agenda and Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the seventy-seventh meeting of the Council held on January 5, 1949.1

There was one item on the Agenda, “Regarding the Japanese Police Forces,” submitted by the Soviet Member, Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko.

The Soviet Member opened discussion by reading a prepared statement, the main points of which were that Japanese police forces now exceed the authorized limit of 125,000 men, that these police forces are being organized into military units with a central headquarters, and that secret police are now being extensively used in Japan.

Statistics, mostly based on press reports, were adduced to show that there are now a total of 141,206 police in Japan. Reference was also [Page 615] made to statements attributed in the press to Lieutenant General Eichelberger recommending an increase in the size of Japan’s police forces up to 275,000 men.

The Soviet Member then cited further press reports to show that the Japanese police were being formed into armed units by the director of the national police and that a centralized police administration had been established to control all Japan’s police.

Finally, he quoted labor union petitions and press reports to show the prevalence of “secret police” used to break strikes and interfere with civil rights.

The Soviet Member concluded by recommending to the Supreme Commander that Japanese police forces be limited to 125,000 men, that no revision of existing legislation be permitted which would increase the size or strengthen the armament of the police, and that secret police organizations be dissolved.

In reply, I described the actual size and organization of Japan’s police forces, noting their complete conformity with Allied policy requirements, and then took issue with several of the more egregious allegations of the Soviet statement.

I noted that the criteria for police reorganization as defined by the Supreme Commander were decentralization and establishment of the principle of local autonomy, adding that Japanese legislation embodied these standards and, as directed by the Supreme Commander, provided for a total police force of 125,000 men.

Proceeding to the body of the Soviet statement, I stressed that it was part of a coordinated Soviet campaign to undermine the policies of the Occupation, the Far Eastern Commission, and the United States Government, and I expressed concern that the Allied Council was again being used as a sounding board for Soviet propaganda. In order to refute specific charges, I pointed out that Japanese police carried only small arms or sticks, that the Maritime Safety Board had only 1,979 men with police authority rather than 10,000, that General Eichelberger is no longer a member of the Occupation, and that I had no knowledge of secret police in Japan.

I stated that I had no comment on the Soviet Member’s recommendations for the reason that they were too self-evident to require comment.

The British Commonwealth Member referred to the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan approved by the Far Eastern Commission and stated that no contravention of this policy had been shown. He stressed that it was important that General Eichelberger did not speak as a member of the Occupation and added that it was necessary to remain vigilant lest the police become a breeding ground for principles that should be eradicated.

The Chinese Member commented on Chinese concern over the progress [Page 616] of the new Japanese police system and emphasized that General Headquarters must maintain close supervision.

As rebuttal, the Soviet Member alleged, with no amplification, that the facts which he had submitted had not been disproved and that he confirmed his recommendations.

In order that the true facts might be made clear, I invited the Members of the Council to make an inspection of police establishments, and I asked the Soviet Member if he would accept the invitation. No action was taken on this invitation, the Soviet Member stating that he would decide later.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald
  1. Not printed.
  2. Not printed.