740.00119–PW/4–1249

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Bishop) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)1

secret

The attached comments on our Japanese reparations position (Tab A) were handed me by General McCoy on Saturday, April 9. I recommend that you read them and, if you agree, that you sign the attached letter in reply to General McCoy (Tab B)2 and then forward General McCoy’s comments with copy of the letter to the Secretary for his information under cover of the memorandum at Tab C.3

[Annex 1]
top secret

Comments of General McCoy on the U.S. Policy for a Reparations Settlement With Japan

1.
I appreciate the thoughtfulness of the Secretary of State in sending me a copy of the draft of the United States policy for the settlement of the Japanese Reparations issue. I assume that the Secretary wishes any comments which I may care to make from the point of view of the United States Representative on the Far Eastern Commission.
2.
The merits of this proposed settlement, viewed from the economic and financial angle, are to be judged by the Department of State, and I have no thought of expressing a personal opinion regarding them. The draft U.S. policy, however, may affect the interests of the United States in and with regard to the Far Eastern Commission; and I should like to invite the attention of the Secretary of State to certain aspects of this settlement which may affect these interests.
3.
The query may be raised whether this settlement is in harmony with the broad, basic United States policy of settling international problems by international cooperation and with the specific United [Page 705] States policy, expressed in the Moscow Agreement of December 1945, of settling or attempting to settle the postwar problems of Japan by international cooperation within the Far Eastern Commission.
4.
Our colleagues in the FEC may view this U.S. statement on Japanese reparations as evidence that the United States, in disregard of the spirit of international cooperation, is attempting to use its controlling position in Japan and its veto in the Far Eastern Commission to force upon the other states in the Commission a settlement which is basically different from that previously agreed to by the U.S. and all other states concerned.
5.
The United States Government is obviously justified, legally and ethically, in changing its views regarding the reparations settlement in Japan. When it does so, however, the Secretary of State might consider whether it would not be in the interest of the United States, in view of its adherence to the principle of international cooperation, especially as this principle is embodied in the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission, to afford to the other members of the Commission an opportunity to express their views regarding the proposed settlement and to take these views into consideration, before the United States makes this settlement definite and final.
6.
Some months ago I was informed—and this has been my understanding until I had the privilege of reading the pending U.S. draft settlement—that the United States Government, after it had tentatively adopted a reparations policy, would (1) present this policy to and discuss it with representatives of the other states on the FEC in bilateral conversations conducted by officials of the State Department; (2) consider the possibility of modifying the United States position in view of the expressions of opinion by other states; (3) submit the U.S. policy, possibly modified, to the Far Eastern Commission with the understanding that the United States would take into consideration the views expressed in the discussion; and (4) determine the final United States position, either the original policy or that policy amended in the light of discussions, and put this policy into effect, if necessary, by an interim directive.
7.
In my judgment, it would further the interests of the United States in the group of states represented on the Far Eastern Commission and would fulfill the obligations of the United States to support the principle of international cooperation, if the Secretary of State could find it possible to modify the present draft U.S. policy so that the proposed reparations settlement would be presented (1) in diplomatic bilateral conversations to representatives of the states on the Far Eastern Commission for an expression of their views which the United States would take into consideration, and (2) to the Far Eastern [Page 706] Commission for discussion, with the same understanding that the United States would consider the opinions of the members. Whether or not the United States Government modified its policy as a result of the views expressed, it would be a matter of great importance that the other states in the Far Eastern Commission had been given an opportunity to consider and to discuss the United States proposed settlement of Japanese reparations before it was made definite and final.
8.
I recognize that the U.S. plan envisages some discussion within the Far Eastern Commission of various aspects of the U.S. policy, since in paragraph 5, page 2, of the draft letter to the Secretary of the Army,4 it is stated that the United States should submit to the FEC proposals for the rescission or amendment of existing and pending FEC resolutions and policy papers “so as to bring them in as close conformity as possible with U.S. policy.…”5 If, however, it should not be possible to bring these FEC policies into “close conformity” with U.S. policy, what then? I see no provision for any possible modification of the U.S. plan in view of and in deference to any persuasive statements of our colleagues, since the last clause in this same paragraph says that the United States should “prevent action by the FEC contrary to U.S. policy.”

[Annex 2]
top secret

Comments of General McCoy on Some Details of the U.S. Policy for a Reparations Settlement With Japan

1.
In the U.S. plan for a reparations settlement with Japan, I note no reference to the possibility of reparations from current production, which some of the FEC states are still advocating. I assume that the United States will continue to be opposed to reparations from current production, although the question may be brought up at a peace conference.
2.
I also note no reference to the use of Japanese precious metals a [as] reparations, nor to a United States commitment on the subject. In the FEC policy paper on “Interim Import-Export Policies for Japan,” paragraph V, 16c. (The Far Eastern Commission: Second Report by the Secretary General, p. 33), it is stated: “Stocks of gold, silver, other precious metals, precious stones and jewels of clearly established Japanese ownership ultimately should be disposed of as reparations.”

  1. Notation by the Deputy Director (Allison): “This all seems OK to me but I believe you will wish to read it in full. JMA”.
  2. For letter dated April 15, see p. 707.
  3. Dated April 14, not printed.
  4. See letter dated April 9, p. 700.
  5. Omissions as indicated in the source text.