740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–449
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)
Apropos of our conversation this forenoon, I quote below the pertinent paragraph of a memorandum of the Secretary’s conversation with Mr. Bevin1 of April 2:
“As regards Japan, I said the Far Eastern Commission had become useless, since it had become a forum for Soviet complaints. However, we will let it go its way. Since the U.S. is spending about 900 million dollars a year in Japan, MacArthur has been told to take more vigorous steps toward recovery. While reparations in themselves are not much of a drain, they are a confusing factor in the Japanese economy and we shall let them fall into oblivion. There was small chance of a treaty being concluded, and as far as I knew, no work was being done along these lines at present.”
There is also transcribed below paragraph 9 of the National Security Council’s policy paper with respect to Japan which received the approval of the President on October 7, 1948:
“9. Far Eastern Commission. The United States Government should ensure for its own part, and urge upon other FEC member Governments, that proposals considered by the FEC be confined strictly to policy matters directly related to the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender, and be couched in broad terms leaving questions of implementation and administration to SCAP. The position of the United States should further be based upon the fact that these surrender terms, as envisaged by the Potsdam Declaration, have been substantially implemented. On matters still within the purview of the FEC, such as civil aviation policy in Japan, the United States Government should seek to establish as promptly as possible firm United States positions and then adopt an aggressive and positive attitude, by direct discussions with FEC member Governments and by forceful backing in the FEC of policies desired by the United States. In matters of urgency, where it has become evident that, after efforts to achieve maximum international support, agreement cannot be promptly reached, we should not hesitate to use the interim directive. SCAP should also be encouraged to make greater use of his authority as sole executive for the Allied Powers, asking where necessary for the United States Government’s views. On the other hand, the United States Government should not hesitate to render assistance to SCAP by elucidating its interpretation of previous directives and general policies, notably those appearing in the “Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan”.
- Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was on a visit to Washington.↩