Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2

740.00119 Control (Japan)/3–449

Draft Memorandum Prepared by Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton, of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs¹

top secret

[Washington,] March 2, 1949.

State Department Assumption of Control of Non-Garrison Aspects of Military Occupation of Japan: Full Implementation of NSC 13/2

Except for the period immediately following cessation of hostilities, the appropriateness of civilian control of non-garrison aspects of military occupation of foreign countries is usually admitted. There is therefore no need to argue this. The questions that arise are practical ones.

Is the State Department Qualified To Assume the Responsibility and Would the State Department Thereby Have Placed Upon It an Enormous Administrative and Operational Burden?

Since hostilities with Germany and Japan ended, consideration has been given from time to time to the State Department’s taking over control of non-garrison aspects of military occupation. Such consideration has usually revolved around Germany. Little attention has been given to Japan. Now there is a fundamental difference between the situations in Germany and in Japan. It is believed that this distinction has not been sufficiently emphasized. The distinction is that in Japan we have a constitutional government established pursuant to the Potsdam decisions and the Terms of Surrender and functioning effectively throughout the whole country. That is an objective in government toward which we are working in Germany. If we had it, the problem of control there and the direction of that control by a suitable United States civilian authority would be infinitely simpler.

The Japan problem should therefore be approached with this consideration in mind: There is in Japan a government established under policies and procedures laid down under the occupation. That government has been functioning successfully throughout Japan. As to its capability of exercising virtually complete administrative responsibility in Japan, two years ago General MacArthur said that the time was ripe for a peace treaty and a year and a half ago the State Department proposed a conference to draw up a peace treaty. International developments, principally Soviet Russia’s aggressive policy of expansion, caused indefinite postponement of peace treaty negotiations.

With an effective and fully responsible Japanese Government, experienced in administration, there is no need in Japan for a large civil affairs occupation staff. Only a skeleton staff, numbering from 10 to 20 high grade experts, with subsidiary assistants numbering not more than several scores, would be required.

What is envisaged is the kind of situation we would have if a peace treaty had been concluded and put into effect, with an added provision that United States forces remain in Japan. SCAP would remain as the supreme authority. He would, however, exercise his authority only through supervisory control and through intervention, when necessary. Under this general authority, the Japanese Government would assume and exercise full responsibility for administering Japan.

Under this concept the transfer to the State Department of the control of non-garrison aspects of military occupation of Japan would entail little administrative or operational burdens.

The principal reform measures introduced into Japan under the occupation have been largely completed. It is not expected that there will be further reform measures. General supervisory observation of Japan’s continuing to carry out the reform measures is all that is needed. This can be done by a very small staff of high grade experts, perhaps one in each major field with small supporting staffs.

The other aspect of occupation policy, control of which would be transferred to the State Department, is the program of Japanese economic recovery. If the concept of placing full responsibility on the Japanese Government is applied here, only a very few United States experts would be needed in Japan for supervisory observation.

The procedure of creating special ad hoc missions, small in size and recruited from United States Government Departments and qualified civilians, which would go to Japan to perform specific tasks on a temporary basis would meet new needs as they may arise.

The Far Eastern geographical office in the Department of State would be adequate, with perhaps a very small increase in personnel, to take over responsibility in Washington for nongarrison aspects of military occupation in Japan.

Would Broad, Overall Occupation Objectives be Served by Transfer to Civilian Authority?

NSC 13/2, approved by the President October 9, 1948, states the broad, overall occupation objectives of the United States for Japan. The underlying concept of this document is that more responsibility should be placed upon the Japanese Government, that occupation pressures upon the Japanese Government and people should be relaxed, that the Japanese Government and people should be permitted to assimilate the reform measures already introduced; and that emphasis should be placed upon economic recovery to the end that Japan become self-sustaining. This document was initially drawn up a year ago. In important respects, events in Japan have caught up with its provisions. The irritations and counter impulses attendant upon military occupation have steadily developed.

The placing upon the Japanese Government of full responsibility for administration in Japan, subject only to overall supervisory control by occupation authorities, the removal of the large civil affairs occupation staff in Japan and its replacement by a small corps of United States experts are fully in line with the concept of NSC 13/2. As to attainment by Japan of economic self-sufficiency, this will result only if the Japanese Government and people themselves assume full responsibility.

In line with civilian United States authority becoming prominent in the military occupation of Japan, it would be helpful if the psychological impact of the occupation upon the Japanese people could be improved by the return to Japanese use of as many as practicable of office buildings in Tokyo and other industrial centers. This could be accomplished by transferring the headquarters of CINCFE to some point outside Japan and by transferring military occupation personnel to the points where their garrisons are situated.

The transfer to the State Department of control of non-garrison aspects of military occupation of Japan would thus be fully in line with broad, overall occupation objectives. In fact the time has come when we jeopardize fulfillment of those objectives by not proceeding along the lines indicated in this memorandum. A Japanese desire to learn democratic ways and to be friendly disposed toward the United States, and avoidance of development of a Japanese desire for revenge can be brought about only by Japan’s being afforded opportunity to move definitely toward independence and self-respect as a nation.

As will be apparent the issues discussed in this memorandum concern political timeliness, political psychology. They do not affect military security in Japan or other military factors which would remain unchanged.

An outline of a specific program follows:

1. Effective July 1, 1949 control of all non-garrison aspects of the military occupation of Japan would be transferred to the State Department.

2. Instructions to SCAP on all non-garrison aspects of military occupation would be issued by the State Department. SCAP would make reports to the Secretary of State regarding the carrying out of such instructions and regarding all non-garrison aspects of military occupation.

3. The civil affairs functions of SCAP would be discontinued. The staff engaged in such functions would be withdrawn. The staff would be replaced by a small corps of from 10 to 20 outstanding United States experts in various economic, financial and other fields. Such experts would be members of SCAP’s staff and would be headed by the United States Ambassador who would have general administrative supervision (whether these experts should be paid by the Department of State or the Department of the Army is not of great importance. The amount involved would not be large.). SCAP would ordinarily turn instructions received from the State Department over to the United States Ambassador and the corps of United States experts for implementation.

4. State Department representation in Japan would be strengthened by the President appointing a United States Ambassador. The Ambassador would have a dual capacity. In one capacity, he would be attached to SCAP as the senior adviser. In his second capacity, he would have a public affairs function and constitute the symbol of United States civilian authority and representation in Japan. He would be regarded as such by the Japanese Government and people, by American civilians in Japan and by foreign government officials. He would have the responsibility of reporting directly to the Secretary of State on all political and economic matters in Japan and on all matters affecting American interests in general.

5. Special ad hoc missions, consisting of a few experts recruited from appropriate United States Government Departments and from civilian life, would be sent to Japan as occasion might arise to implement specific projects or to investigate particular situations. For instance, United States experts could be sent to Japan to inspect Japanese expenditures of GARIOA and similar funds along the lines of the procedure governing expenditures by foreign governments of ECA funds.

6. Special Japanese missions could be sent to the United States to substantiate requests for GARIOA and rehabilitation appropriations, and for any other appropriate purpose.

7. All garrison and security aspects of the occupation, such as ensuring that Japan remained demilitarized, would continue to be exercised by SCAP pursuant to instructions by the Defense Department.

8. The United States Embassy would be returned to United States civilian use. This is important as a symbol and psychologically. The Japanese would regard it as an important sign that civilian United States authority had become more important in the occupation, that a return to more normal international conditions had occurred, that the disabilities of military occupation were lessening. The United States Ambassador would be placed in a position analogous to that of the British Ambassador who occupies the British Embassy, of the Soviet Ambassador who occupies the Soviet Embassy and so forth.

It would probably not be desirable to take this step as long as General MacArthur remains in Japan as SCAP. It should be realized, however, that United States civilian representation in Japan will operate under a handicap until this is put into effect. Pending that time, the United States Ambassador should be provided with an appropriate, separate, official establishment, residence and chancery, and these should be known as the United States Embassy.

9. The use by United States Army occupation personnel of office and other buildings in Tokyo and other metropolitan centers should be reduced drastically. As far as practicable garrison personnel should be located at the appropriate garrison point.

10. The officer holding the position of CINCFE should not be stationed in Tokyo. This would permit moving the headquarters apparatus functioning in Tokyo to some other point where its impact on Japanese life would not be so great. Buildings used in Tokyo could be vacated and returned to Japanese use.

11. The Department of State should send a small group to Tokyo to study at first hand details connected with implementing the foregoing program of taking over by the State Department of control of non-garrison aspects of the occupation and to make recommendations concerning the types of experts who would be needed in Japan after July 1.

12. If the foregoing program should be adopted, it is recommended that the President order General MacArthur to Washington for consultation, at which time the President would inform General MacArthur of the new program. If General MacArthur were agreeable, he could continue as SCAP. He could remain in residence at Tokyo, or he might take up residence at some point such as Honolulu, paying periodic visits to Japan and turning over immediate charge there to his deputy, a high-ranking military officer. Should General MacArthur prefer to resign, it is suggested that consideration be given to appointing as his successor Major General Maxwell Taylor, a graduate Japanese language officer with an outstanding combat record.

1. Submitted with covering memorandum of March 4 to the Director of the Office (Butterworth) as a “first draft of a memorandum on a subject which Max Bishop and I have been giving special thought to for some time. Max has not yet seen this draft and I am sending him a copy”. Mr. Hamilton had the rank of a career Minister.