Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2

890.20/7–1549

Memorandum by the Policy Information Officer of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Fisher) to the Director of the Office (Butterworth)

secret

[Washington,] July 15, 1949.

Subject: Chiang-Quirino Proposal for a Pacific Union

[Here follows section on “chronology and developments.”]

Analysis

Apart from 1948 Chinese semi-official suggestions for an anti-Communist alliance among China, Korea and Japan, the Pacific Pact concept appears to have been originally an instinctive “me too” reaction to announcement of the North Atlantic Treaty. Individual countries and leaders have then developed ideas about the nature of such a pact in terms of their own situations and pressing needs, with US moral and/or material support in each case being assumed as the eventual cornerstone of the structure.

Korea, fearful of attack from Communist-dominated north Korea and seeking arms and a US military guarantee of its frontiers, has been most vociferous in advocating a pact with US participation. Direct appeals for large supplies of arms and a US military commitment having failed, Rhee is heartily endorsing the Chiang–Quirino move, presumably hoping to attain his goals indirectly.

Similarly Chiang Kai-shek doubtless discounts the possibility of his being able to secure a US military commitment and large supplies of arms directly. Like Rhee he probably believes the Philippines and other states in the proposed Pacific Union might be utilized as instruments to bring further pressure on the US for aid, most of which might be expected to accrue to China at present. Chiang and Rhee apparently desire that Quirino take the lead in “pulling their chestnuts from the fire”, and Quirino seems to have responded to their flattery.

The views of the Philippine (and Australian) leaders are obviously colored by the domestic political requirements of imminent national elections. There is every indication Quirino has fallen in with Chiang’s (and Rhee’s) flattering suggestion that he take the lead, not only from genuine concern for Philippine security, but because his emergence as an Asian leader would improve his political prospects, and because of resentment of real or fancied slights by the US. Romulo’s shrewd memorandum apparently reached him after he had made a commitment to Chiang. Romulo has advised us he has since told Quirino the maneuver was a blunder. According to Romulo, Quirino has responded by saying he wants Romulo to return, repair the damage and bail him out.

Determined opposition to the maintenance of “European imperialism” may be expected to emerge as an important factor in the attitudes of India, Indonesia, the Philippines and perhaps other countries, as Romulo points out.

Concern for their security in any global conflict is apparent in the attitudes of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. Concern for immediate military assistance predominates with Rhee and Chiang.

Secretary Acheson’s May 18 statement caused sharp changes in approach in most countries. Australia and New Zealand emphasized that consultation and planning was all they envisaged at present, acknowledging that the North Atlantic Treaty took precedence. Filipino and Korean spokesmen began to stress that Asian nations must take the lead and organize on their own. Quirino and Romulo began to define the union they had in mind as being political, economic and cultural in nature, at least at first, where previously they had let it be assumed the mere words “Pacific Pact” meant primarily military alliance. Chinese newspapers and spokesmen simply decried America’s “short-sighted” neglect of the problem of stopping Communism in Asia. The UK welcomed the US statement.

In effect Chiang and Rhee have succeeded in getting Quirino committed to a Pacific Union with themselves as charter members. Their inclusion will vitally affect the nature and aims of the proposed union. Chinese Nationalist membership saddles the union from the start with an almost hopeless cause and makes it more difficult for the US and possibly other western powers to give their support. It may also be expected to alienate other south Asian countries, particularly India. Thus the charter membership roster may be expected to inhibit the development of any alternative structure for a viable Asian union or association of non-Communist states, since India is essential to such a grouping.

Suggestions

The U.S. would welcome the development of an effective association of non-Communist countries in south and east Asia, which might develop into an active anti-Communist front. The January New Delhi conference and the Chiang–Quirino meeting are evidence that steps toward Asiatic cooperation will be taken with or without our support or advice. The Chiang–Quirino meeting suggests that a primary aim of this movement is to force our hand.

The Chiang–Quirino–Rhee basis for a Pacific Union does not seem to be the beginning of an effective structure, since Chiang’s inclusion saddles the embryonic union with a military problem it cannot hope to solve, and will probably repel other countries essential to an effective association of non-Communist countries. The present maneuver, if it crystallizes, may well split Asian countries into non-Communist and anti-Communist segments, increasing the problems of Australia, New Zealand and the western powers.

Two more promising approaches to the problem have already been made by Asians: 1) Nehru’s somewhat vague suggestions for an Asian Union, and 2) Romulo’s specific suggestions to Quirino in his telegraphed memorandum of July 7 (Tab “A”).¹

Quirino has summoned Romulo to Manila, reportedly to help work out the details, to contact other countries and to make arrangements for the next formal conference which would presumably crystallize the proposed union. Romulo does not propose China as a charter member. These circumstances indicate there may be opportunity and time for intensive diplomatic and propaganda activity designed to help Quirino overcome what Romulo calls his “blunder”. Our objective would seem to be to wean Quirino from the Chiang plan and influence him to espouse the “Philippine Plan” as outlined by Romulo. If Quirino would prolong the interval of diplomatic discussion and preparation before the second general conference, politely stalling Chiang, the problem of China’s membership might resolve itself. It is possible that within a few months Nationalist China will either prove itself viable as a re-vitalized and able segment of China able to carry on resistance as a worthy partner in the enterprise, or will be so clearly doomed that the other necessary member countries will avoid entering a hopeless alliance. Publication of the White Paper will probably affect this aspect of the problem.

We have several useful avenues to Quirino: the Embassy, with Ambassador Cowen² soon to return; Romulo himself, due to return next week; and Consul General Abbott³ in Saigon, a personal friend of Quirino who is going to Manila within a few days and expects to call on Quirino. The first step would appear to be to persuade Romulo to tell Quirino he has shown us his July 7 memorandum, and to report we had reacted most favorably. We should immediately send the full text of this memorandum to New Delhi and other key points. (Infotel outlining it already sent.⁴)

Supplementary activity with Nehru, with the UK, the Netherlands, France, Korea, Australia and New Zealand would seem indicated. We should make it clear to all that we consider that the development of healthy and increasing economic and political ties between non-Communist countries in the area essential to the growth of a strong community of independent Asian and Pacific nations; that such an association of Asian and Pacific nations offers the best means of protecting and advancing the interests of individual Asian and Pacific countries; that settlements in Indonesia and Indochina are essential first steps; that increased, mutually beneficial trade within the area, resulting from taking full advantage of the potentials of Japanese and Indian industry and the productive resources of the other countries, is another; and that in our view the movement and any structure which might be evolved must have inherent strength in Asia, and not appear to be an instrument designed primarily to extract and channel U.S. or other western aid.

As Romulo suggests, Nehru is the key. We should be most adroit. Perhaps we should not broach the subject to him at all, leaving that to Romulo and Quirino, but remaining ready to respond to any inquiries in the sense of the paragraph immediately above.

Our public information and propaganda policy will be most important. To avoid the “kiss of death” effect, it might prove best for us publicly to maintain our present public coolness to the whole idea, creating the impression of an Asiatic development real and hardy enough to start and grow despite our obtuse aloofness. Romulo, Nehru and Quirino might prefer this. On the other hand, or at the same time, we might well emphasize our interest in contributory developments, such as outlined above, without mentioning them as contributory toward a union.

Adroitly handled, we might find this whole development an added instrument of pressure for accomplishment of our specific aims in Indonesia, Indochina, Japanese-Asian trade, etc.

[Annex 1]

Telegram to Quirino From Romulo

7/7/49

Code

President Quirino

Manila (Philippines)

826 Secret. Having read excerpts from your recent address in the New York Times advocating Pacific Union, I wish to submit the following memorandum for your consideration:

The time has come when the people of Asia should begin taking steps in their own defense. It is obvious that the present American administration will give no support to those resisting Communism in China until the Chinese show some aptitude for that task. As in Iran in 1946, so in China in 1948: “No assistance without resistance.” Until now, the various independent governments of Eastern Asia have been concentrating on the need of eliminating the remnants of European imperialism in our area rather than in stopping the growing Communistic imperialism of the Soviet Union.

It is said that since the United States, which alone could provide the military force to stop the Communists, is not now disposed to do that in Asia, nothing at all can be done. I do not share this view. I believe that in the next six months, during which it will probably become apparent how much resistance to Communism free China can provide, the free states of Southeast Asia could profitably take the following steps:

(1) Korea, the Philippines, Siam, New Zealand, Australia, India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia should organize themselves into a political and economic union. The purposes of this union should be public and its formation should be an act of solidarity against any encroachment on the freedom and independence of the signatory governments. It should be aimed at the Russo-Ohinese Communists while at the same time repudiating the maintenance of European imperialism. For this latter reason, it would seem, at least in the first stage, that Britain, France, the Netherlands as well as the United States should be excluded from the pact.

(2) Once the union is proclaimed, the same governments could make a common offer of economic cooperation with the United States under the Truman Point-Four program. The United States Government might be asked to send to that area an economic mission headed by a well-informed government official but including two or three outstanding American industrialists.

These two steps taken would, I think, change the political climate in all Eastern Asia. They would help destroy the notion that Communism is in any sense the “wave of the future” which must be accepted passively. They would show that the objections to Chinese Communism will by no means be an exclusive American worry or a stratagem of the European colonial powers.

Finally, within perhaps a year after it had become apparent that there was some chance of limiting the spread of Communism from China to the rest of Southeast Asia by force, the nations signatory to the union could then consider whether it is to their best interests to appeal collectively to the United States for military assistance. It is possible that assistance might, in the meanwhile, have been given to the Chinese resistance group provided they show willingness and capacity to use it effectively.

Tentative moves have been made by the British Commonwealth members in the region to establish a security organization among themselves. Economically they are already bound together by imperial preference. Obviously this smaller unit must give way to a larger one if the idea of regional union is to prevail.

It is equally obvious that no such Asian group could get very far without the full support of the government of India. Recent internal political developments in India may have started to shake Nehru’s former belief that India can by herself alone stand as a third force between the United States and Russia. Therefore, before any step is taken to form this union, I would recommend that you take up directly the whole question with Nehru as soon as possible and discuss all its implications.

Such concrete action on your part would remove the question from the realm of wishful thinking and pure speculation. It would prove to the United States that an important development is afoot in Asia that it could not ignore, and your hand would be strengthened when you come to Washington as reported in the press and of which so far I have no official knowledge.

Romulo

[Annex 2]

July 12 Editorial in “Christian Science Monitor”

Pacific Parley

The Chiang–Quirino talks looking toward an anti-Communist Pacific front invite the good wishes though not the jubilant expectations of Americans. Any degree of understanding between anti-Communist elements in Asia is to be welcomed, though it must be carefully evaluated as a bid for American military support.

There has been much talk of a Pacific pact to match the Atlantic defense treaty. It may be thought that an agreement between the Philippines and the Chinese Nationalists, with the probable addition of South Korea, could serve as the nucleus of a larger international agreement. Yet it is improbable that a Pacific pact will develop in just this way.

The forthcoming White Paper on China which is being prepared in Washington should make clear why most students of the Far East put little faith in the “retired” president of Nationalist China as the leader of a new and enlarged crusade against communism. The reasons which have argued against America’s underwriting of further military misadventures by the Nationalists are unlikely to be altered appreciably by any agreement Generalissimo Chiang may reach with Presidents Quirino and Rhee.

Other elements of more importance to a Pacific pact than the Chiang rump regime are a final Dutch–Indonesian agreement, the integration of Japanese economic recovery with Asian development as a whole, the continental leadership of Prime Minister Nehru and the effective cooperation of India with other members of the British Commonwealth, the economic strengthening of South Korea and the Philippines. So far as American policy can forward these ends, it should bend every effort to do so.

1. See Annex 1, below. The text was sent by circular airgram to 18 posts abroad on July 22, 8:25 a. m., for the information of mission chiefs.
2. Myron M. Cowen, in Washington from Manila.
3. George M. Abbott.
4. Not printed.