890.00/4–2249
The British Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State 1
South East Asia
The Russian threat to South East Asia for some time to come is unlikely to be a military one. But there is a distinct danger that, as measures are developed for the security of Europe and the Middle East, pressure upon South East Asia will increase. Conditions there are generally speaking favourable for the spread of Communism, and if the general impression prevails in South East Asia that the Western Powers are both unwilling and unable to assist in resisting Russian pressure, the psychological effect may be that local resistance is weakened, with the result that the process of undermining the systems of government in that region will succeed to the extent that eventually the whole of South East Asia will fall a victim to the Communist advance and thus come under Russian domination without any military effort on the part of Russia.
If this general concept is correct, it would seem to follow that we must try to take steps to stiffen the will to resist on the part of South East Asian territories simultaneously with our efforts to strengthen the defensive position of Europe and the Middle East. It may be argued that even the resources of the United States, joined with the still very limited resources of Europe, are insufficient to undertake commitments in South East Asia as well as in Europe and the Middle East. But our preliminary examination of the position suggests that no vast resources are required, and that at any rate in the initial stages the question is one of political and economic effort rather than of large-scale outright aid. The alternative to such effort would appear to be the abandonment of the whole position with consequences which can only react adversely upon the political and economic situation of the world and give great encouragement to the world-wide spread of Communism.
If South East Asia is to be built up as an area of resistance to Russian expansion, no purely Western approach is likely to succeed unless the various Asiatic Governments are persuaded of the necessity to build up this resistance and are willing to take upon their shoulders the principal burden involved. Any attempt, for example, to create an area of resistance in the Indian sub-continent without the full co-operation and even initiative of India and Pakistan would be doomed to [Page 1136] failure. On the other hand, if these and other governments in South East Asia can be pursuaded of the necessity, in their own interests, of building up an area of resistance which Russia would hesitate to attack, and if a serious effort is made by the Governments concerned to stabilize the position in South East Asia, then the Western Powers, including the United States, may be able to contribute towards the fulfilment of this aim, even though only to a limited extent, by technical assistance and advice, by the provision of capital goods and even by the comparatively small-scale provision of armaments.
It is recognised that a number of major difficulties will have to be overcome before the countries of South East Asia are in any position to band together in a common resistance against Russian expansion. The friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the North West Frontier Province; the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India: the conflict between the Burmese Government and the Karens in Burma; the uneasy political situation in Siam; the conflict with the Viet Minh in Indo-China; the Communist attacks in Malaya; and, finally, the Indonesian situation; all militate against the creation of a common front. Nevertheless, if a realisation of the real significance of the Communist menace can be brought home to all these territories, this may encourage the settlement of local disputes, and all our efforts are already being directed towards doing everything that can be done in the diplomatic field to bring about such settlements.
The United Kingdom is in a special relationship with South East Asia by virtue of the Commonwealth relationship which now exists with India, Pakistan and Ceylon as a result of the attainment of independence by these countries. There is also the treaty relationship with Burma; our position in the Western Union results in close contacts with the French and the Dutch; we have a close relationship with Siam; and finally, there is our own position in Malaya, in Borneo and in Hong Kong. The surge of nationalism which has manifested itself in South East Asia since the war, however, renders all these Asiatic countries very suspicious of anything which savours either of imperialism, or of dictation or domination by the West. Nor are the South East Asia countries likely to be at all attracted by the possibility that closer relationship with the West will involve them in hostilities with Russia on a European issue, with which they would regard themselves as having no concern. In these circumstances, South East Asia territories are only likely to be willing to unite in a common front against Russian expansion if they regard it as in their own self-interest. It follows therefore that their own self-interest should provide the inspiration for the unity which is necessary if Russian pressure is to be resisted successfully.
It might be argued that such unity in South East Asia might create a fresh danger of a pan-Asiatic union hostile to the West. But provided [Page 1137] that friendly and close relations are maintained, and provided the South East Asia countries realise that mutual co-operation between South East Asia and the West on a basis of equality and of mutual self-interest is necessary for the maintenance of peace and stability in South East Asia, this danger should not arise.
The above, in broad outline, is the general direction in which we think we should go. Many difficulties remain to be overcome, and many susceptibilities will have to be taken into account. Above all, any suggestion that the United Kingdom or the United States seek to dominate the situation in South East Asia must be avoided. The fully sovereign governments of South East Asia must be prepared to take the initiative themselves, but we might hope to prompt that initiative. We also hope they can be brought to realise that our co-operation for the attainment of their own ends will be necessary, at any rate for many years to come. If a common front can be built up from Afghanistan to Indo-China inclusive, then it should be possible to contain the Russian advance southwards, to rehabilitate and stabilise the area, and to preserve our communications across the middle of the world. A stable South East Asia may also eventually influence the situation in China and make it possible to redress the position there.
Conclusion
The conclusion is therefore that, while the strategic necessities of Europe and the Middle East are greater and should have priority, the requirements of South East Asia, though in a different category, are of vital importance.
We should therefore, parallel with our efforts in Europe and the Middle East, do our utmost to encourage a spirit of co-operation and self-reliance in South East Asia with a view to the creation of a common front against Russian expansion in that area.
- Memorandum left by Ernest Bevin with Mr. Acheson during his visit to the United States: copy transmitted by the Department in its covering instruction of April 22 to Saigon, also to Bangkok, Batavia, and Singapore, and to the Burmese and Indian Embassies.↩