His British Majesty’s Ambassador kindly supplied me with a copy of
his own covering letter which I am also enclosing for your
information.1
My personal interest in this matter will have appeared from my
telegram No. 392 dated February 15, 1949, 10 a. m. A special reason
for this interest is my expectation that any such program in
Southeast Asia will have favorable reactions for us in China. It is
also worth remembering that, except for Burma, the principal
Communist agents in that whole region are Chinese.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum Submitted by the Ambassador in
China (Stuart)
secret
[Date not
indicated.]
The possibility of a Communist dominated Government in China has
created a new situation in Southeast Asia. The immediate effect
of the Communist victories in China has been to change the pace of events in the adjacent regions,
reducing to the minimum the margin of time available for a
peaceful transformation of the economy of these countries. The
problem arising from the juxtaposition of a Communist controlled
China with the semi-colonial economy of the Southeast Asian
countries may be stated as follows.
2. Till now the dominant issue in all the countries of Southeast
Asia was the recovery of freedom. This was essentially a
political issue and with the independence of India and Burma,
the principle may well be said to have been established, though
the last chapter in this phase of history still remains to be
written in Indo-China and
Indonesia. But it is accepted even by the Dutch and the French
that their colonies will soon have to gain independence.
3. The achievement of independence does not however solve the
problem which these countries have to face, which is one of
transforming the typically “oriental” civilizations of these
areas held together by anachronistic social bonds and based on a
starvation economy into modern communities, organized on
principles of social justice and economic freedom. In short,
these countries have to compress into a short
period of time, the whole process of a century of
European evolution, adopt the technology of mid-twentieth
century to societies which are still living in the
pre-industrial revolution era but with new
[Page 1121]
and destructive ideas sweeping
their minds. The resulting condition is essentially
revolutionary, both in its process and in its consequences, for
it is seeking to force developments and not allowing the slow
process of evolution to work.
4. If it is accepted that the situation is revolutionary in its
content, then the question immediately follows as to how it can
be brought under control and guided into proper channels, for if
we do not bring it under control, the Communists with their easy
solution of “Land to the Tiller” and “Power to the Worker” will
step in and take charge.
5. In the circumstances of Southeast Asia, the Communist solution
has an immense appeal. The situation has been foreseen by the
Communist thinkers who recognize that the transition from
feudalism to communism is in a way easier, as the resistance
offered will be by classes which have ceased to be socially
useful and represent no productive principles in society—the
landlords and those who depend on them. In other words the
anti-communist element furnished elsewhere in the world by the
middle class is completely lacking. That is one of the reasons
why Communism is more aggressive in Asia and seems to be less
actively resisted by the masses.
6. Any idea that the Southeast Asian countries could be persuaded
to resist the inroads of Communism by arming its opponents and
encouraging the reactionary elements to band together in defense
of “the four freedoms” or the new slogan of free competition is
foredoomed to failure for the simple reason that an economic and
social revolution is already in being throughout the whole
area.
7. How then are we to act? Clearly by accepting the revolutionary
content of the situation and providing a solution to the major
issues which the revolution is seeking to solve. If the same
objectives can be gained with greater safety in a reasonably
short time, through a non-Communist solution, then there is
every reason to think that Communism can be resisted in this
area.
8. It might of course be argued that the alternative to the
Communist revolution is really what is being done in India—the
attainment of the same objectives by parliamentary methods—that
is a revolution controlled by parliament and effectuated through
legislation. But the circumstances of Southeast Asia do not seem
to warrant any hope of successful action along these lines,
primarily because there is no established principle of obedience
in these countries and secondly because leadership requires an
effectuating machinery—a highly trained efficient and loyal
service—which notoriously does not exist in these countries.
9. What then is the alternative? The ultimate solution seems
clear: a confederation of Southeast Asia with a planned and
integrated economy, creating out of the small units in this
region a viable State following a progressive economic and
social policy. In the immediate
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future such a solution would perhaps be
impracticable, if only for the reason that the States which are
struggling to acquire their independence like Indo-China, and the States which
have only recently acquired independence like Burma, will not
even consider anything which may limit their political
independence. But the situation created by the existence of a
Communist colossus in the North may possibly prove sufficiently
dynamic to bring about a change in their attitude very much in
the same manner as the Western European States which are so
intensely nationalist have come together in similar
circumstances.
10. While this should be the objective, towards which our
activities should be directed, it is obvious that since this
solution is not capable of immediate realization, we should have
a short-term policy which could be put into effect with the
least possible delay. A permanent Consultative Council of the
States of this area which will work out common policies and
provide for an integrated economy capable of resisting the
pressure of Communist economic doctrines would seem to be the
answer. But in order to bring into existence such a Consultative
Council, it is necessary as a first step that Indo-China and Indonesia should
acquire their political freedom and Malaya should have a
constitutional set-up which will enable her at least to
participate in economic policies.
11. Such a Consultative Council when brought into being should
have before it an economic and social programme which
realistically deals with the special problems of their backward
societies. Such a programme will have to provide (a) for the
liquidation of unproductive systems of landowning and for a
reorganization of agriculture with aid of the most modern
technology for the purpose of increasing production (b) for the
absorption into industries of large masses of people now living
on land without contributing to the increase of national production (c) for the integration of the
economy of the region so as to avoid wasteful inter-regional competition (d) for large-scale medical
and sanitary facilities which will eliminate the enervating
effects of the climatic conditions of the ‘monsoon belt’, and
(e) for a common system of education which will provide a
background for democratic development: in short a programme of
planned economy.
12. The first step, which should be taken now, is to utilize to the best advantage the time
available before a settlement is arrived at in Indonesia and
Indo-China and work out a
programme for this region. This can only be done after a careful
analysis of the prevailing social and economic conditions. Such
a survey should cover not merely the present morphology of these
societies, but should be primarily directed towards the shape
they should assume in the future, that is, it
must formulate the principles on which the New Society in
Southeast Asia should be fashioned.
[Page 1123]
13. An enquiry of this nature conducted by a group of what are
called in America “social engineers” would provide us with an
alternative programme which may blunt the appeal of Communism
and tame and regulate the revolutionary process in Southeast
Asia.
14. The powers most immediately and directly interested in doing
so are U.S.A., U.K., Australia and India and if the enquiry is
entrusted to a small Committee of four or five high level
political and economic thinkers from these countries, who have
some experience of practical problems, men of the calibre of
Lord Hailey who did the African Survey, then a workable and
forward looking programme would be available for approval by the
Governments concerned.
15. It seems likely however, that the Governments of Southeast
Asia, even when working through their own permanent consultative
Council would not be able to take full advantage of the
programme without material assistance and technical advice. It
might therefore be advisable to form some kind of advisory
committee parallel to the permanent consultative Council and
working in close collaboration with it, composed not only of the
four Powers mentioned above but also of France and the
Netherlands whose continuing economic interest in Southeast Asia
must be considerable. This Committee would be responsible for
determining, when invited to do so by the permanent consultative
Council and in concert with that body, the amount and the kind
of assistance required and its procurement.2
