894.00/1–449
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Acting Secretary of State
No. 4
[Received January 26.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch No. 813 of December 29, 19481 concerning left wing political realignments in Japan, and to transmit herewith a memorandum2 of conversation between an officer of this Mission and Mr. Ichimada Hisato, Governor of the Bank of Japan, and Mr. Ishikawa Ichiro, President of the Japan Economic Federation.
Mr. Ichimada expressed considerable concern over what he believes is unnecessary intervention in Japanese politics by General Headquarters during the third and fourth sessions of the National Diet. Mr. Ichimada said that he is fully aware of the right of General Headquarters to intervene at any length in Japanese affairs under the terms of the Instrument of Surrender, but he expressed the belief that the manner in which intervention has been carried out in recent months has been ill-advised and tends to slow down the desirable development of democratic processes in Japan.
Mr. Ichimada referred particularly to General Headquarters intervention in connection with the wage bill, where apparently Headquarters support of the Cabinet’s proposed 5,300 yen base wage was suddenly withdrawn near the end of the last session of the Diet in favor of a 6,300 yen base advocated by the opposition parties and favored by the National Personnel Authority. This action, according to Mr. Ichimada, was taken without warning and left Prime Minister Yoshida in a most untenable position in which he was compelled to reconsider at the last moment complicated budget estimates in order to meet the demands of the higher base wage. Mr. Ichimada cited other examples in which he feels the Cabinet’s position has been adversely affected by intervention in connection with the drafting and passage of the National Public Service Law, and the question of the dissolution of the Diet and the holding of a general election.
[Page 606]In Mr. Ichimada’s opinion, democratic, parliamentary government cannot develop satisfactorily in Japan if parliamentary processes are frequently subject to outside interference. If it is necessary to take such extreme measures because of critical or emergency conditions, Mr. Ichimada expressed the belief that it might be better in the long run and certainly more efficient to suspend temporarily parliamentary processes of government and govern Japan solely through General Headquarters directives. Not only does outside intervention retard democratic development, but Mr. Ichimada also pointed out that such action tends to discourage able and responsible men from participation in political activity. Mr. Ichimada stated that he is convinced that recent acts of intervention were deliberately intended to weaken Prime Minister Yoshida’s position because of his unpopularity with some sections of General Headquarters and his allegedly reactionary views.
Mr. Ichimada expressed himself with unusual frankness for an official in his position, which is believed indicative of the degree to which he has become concerned over this matter. Mr. Ishikawa fully shares Mr. Ichimada’s views, and it is believed that most responsible Japanese leaders in government, finance, and business are equally concerned over this question. The role of a political force operating outside the constitutional framework of the government is not new to Japan. The Japanese are thoroughly familiar with the operation of extra-constitutional political pressures, and one of the fundamental lessons the Occupation has attempted to teach the Japanese is the serious extent to which such outside pressure jeopardizes the growth of real democracy. While there can be no denial of the supreme position of General Headquarters under the terms of surrender, it would seem desirable that the exercise of this supreme power be directed in a manner best calculated to promote democratic government rather than in a manner which appears to many Japanese to be identical with the undesirable extra-constitutional pressures experienced before the surrender. As Mr. Ichimada emphasized, the situation may be critical enough to warrant direct intervention, but if this is necessary, an effort should be made to clarify the need for such intervention, to regularize its application so as to avoid the confusion which has been occasioned by different sections of General Headquarters making conflicting demands, and to avoid giving the impression that we merely desire the form of democratic government without its actual substance.
It is also believed that another serious aspect of this question is the manner in which outside intervention has tended to discredit and undermine the position of the present government. It appears more than coincidental that the frequency of such intervention has increased during the tenure of the Yoshida Cabinet, for there is little doubt of Mr. Yoshida’s unpopularity among some sections of General Headquarters. [Page 607] The Prime Minister’s conservative attitude, his refusal to participate in a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party in 1947, his insistent demands for an election, and his general effort to resist advice and pressure from General Headquarters have made Mr. Yoshida unpopular and the subject of criticism. Intervention, however, not only undermines Mr. Yoshida’s position, but in the present political situation primarily benefits the extreme left. As discussed at length in this Mission’s despatch No. 813, the broad socialist middle group, from which we believe it would be desirable for a genuine labor party to emerge, is at present disintegrating. Much of this disintegration is represented by an increasingly large movement of left-wing socialists into the communist party. The extreme left wing in Japanese politics is therefore gaining strength at the expense of the more stabilizing middle element, while the conservative forces are being undermined by the intervention of General Headquarters.
While discounting certain of the points reflected in Mr. Ichimada’s comments, this Mission does wish to emphasize its concurrence in the view that Headquarters’ action vis-à-vis the Yoshida Government in a number of instances may well work to our long-term disadvantage. It is our belief that the most desirable and practicable pattern for democratic development in Japanese political life rests in a change of governments between a conservative party and a labor party as their majorities fluctuate in the National Diet, with the communist groupings at the extreme left remaining always a small minority. At the present stage of Japanese political development, however, there appears a tendency toward alignment between the extreme right and the extreme left. The more conservative elements are endeavoring to form a single conservative party, while the communists are exerting formidable leadership to organize an extreme leftist group. The important middle political area, from which a future labor party should develop, is unfortunately in a state of disorganization and disintegration.
In these circumstances, the intrusions by General Headquarters into Japanese politics can cause a particularly undesirable effect. Without the presence of a strong, sound labor party to serve as a political balance wheel to the conservative forces now represented by the Democratic-Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, we should avoid weakening the conservative position at a time when the only element which can profit by this action is the extreme left under communist leadership. Such intervention therefore is thus far having the effect of building up a communist-organized left as the only effective counterweight to the conservative right.
Respectfully yours,