Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2

895.20/12–149: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

Seoul, December 1, 1949—2 p. m.

1447. Replies to questions posed Deptel 994, November 28 as follows:

1. Lists in enclosures Embdes 570 September 16¹ were hastily prepared by Korean security authorities, without our knowledge or concurrence, expressly for visiting congressional group. In our opinion those lists cannot be regarded as proper or formal Korean request for MAP assistance. We believe chief KMAG recommendations submitted with Embdes 569, September 16 set forth essential requirements except for coast guard and air force. Be coast guard, we believe recommendations made in Embtel 1295, October 19 continue to constitute minimum sound needs this branch BOK security forces. Be air force, we believe recommendations made in chief KMAG telegram Bob 449, October 7² should be reviewed and revised in light General Randall’s recommendations to President Rhee (see Embtel 1436, November 25).³ In this connection Rhee has not yet sent me request for air support based on Randall’s recommendations. Our request for air assistance is predicated solely on threat to ROK security brought about by Soviet strengthening of North Korean air force.

2. While 10.23 figure is patently inadequate to cover all contingencies specifically an all-out attack from north supported by Soviets and Chinese Communists, we are strongly of view risks involved are not inacceptable. While Soviets are gradually increasing North Korean military power, we are by no means convinced Soviets willing take risk of unleashing all-out war, ramifications and course of which are highly unpredictable. In our view Soviets will instead continue present tactics of subversion and sabotage in hope of building up indigenous guerrilla movement in south. Remarkable progress made by ROK Army in past few months, both in training and in suppressing North Korean infiltrated guerrillas, is further potent factor leading us accept risk. An additional factor is gradual improvement in government administrations and a materially improved economic situation, especially in fields of agriculture and industrial production. Under no circumstance should MDAP for Korea be abandoned. Such a step would constitute utter reversal of a consistent policy toward ROK, would subject us criticism and ridicule in UN and elsewhere, and would utterly destroy faith and confidence of Koreans and virtually all other Far Eastern peoples in professed determination of US to combat Communist aggression and enormously facilitate Soviet penetration and conquest of all Far Eastern areas. Further justification for acceptance of risk lies in probability ROK will utilize some of its foreign exchange to supplement military aid supplies by US under 10.23 program.

3. In our view assumption by MDAP of POL and lumber expenditures for remainder fiscal year 1950 would not involve inacceptable risk. However, it manifestly desirable ECA continue assume this burden so MDAP funds can be used to fullest extent for more needed military equipment and supplies. For Department’s information ECA mission here working on assumption ECA will finance POL, lumber, leather, etc., through remainder fiscal 1950. Moreover, it contemplated ROK will finance POL from own foreign exchange next fiscal year.

4. In our opinion ECA can best bear cost POL and lumber. In view much larger budget and flexibility ECA program, ECA obviously best able assume this responsibility.

5. We believe visit by Colonel Lawson at earliest possible date would be most helpful and useful.⁴

In considering whole question I wish invite attention mydesp 714, November 10 transmitting recommendations chief KMAG for military assistance ROK supplementary to those incorporated in mydesp 569. If program recommended in mydesps 569 and 714 could be implemented, in our view ROK would have little to fear from north. In submitting those recommendations I had entertained hope funds would be found in some quarter, perhaps from 75 million for China and general area, to meet program. I still hope this avenue will be fully explored by Department, since keeping South Korea free of Communist occupation can conceivably influence profoundly future course of Far Eastern developments, including US security.

In light Warx 96392⁵ and Deptel 994, KMAG is reviewing recommendations transmitted under cover Embdes 569. When completed these will be transmitted to Department.

Muccio

1. See footnote 3, p. 1099.
2. Not printed; see telegram 1376, November 8, from Seoul, p. 1094.

3. The pertinent portion of this telegram read as follows:

   “… Randall has now completed and handed his recommendations to Rhee, leaving copy with Embassy. Briefly Randall’s recommendations (based on US aid) envisage 99–plane air force made up of 8 L–4’s, 21 L–5’s, 30 AT–6’s, 3 C–39’s, 6 G–46’s, or 47’s, 6 B–25’s, and 25 F–47’s or F–51’s. As Koreans now have 14 L–type planes and 10 AT–6’s under procurement, 75 planes would have to be acquired. Under Randall’s plan, of these planes 9 would be acquired by April 1950, another 33 by July, another 14 by October, and remaining 19 by end 1950.

   “Randall’s recommendations would also provide for US air advisors to be attached KMAG. These would include 10 officers, 18 airmen and 1 secretary.

   “In all probability, Rhee will accept all or large part of Randall’s recommendations and incorporate them in formal request to US Government through me.

   “Should US Government reject Rhee’s request for air aid, it appears Randall prepared submit substitute proposal for 59-plane Korean Air Force with planes to be procured from Korean foreign exchange. In this event, possibility exists Rhee would employ Randall as chief air advisor and authorize him recruit a number of air advisors and airmen from private life to train Korean Air Force. …” (895.248/11–2549)

4. See telegram 1033, December 9, to Seoul, p. 1107.
5. Not printed; see telegram 1407, November 18, from Seoul, p. 1099.