Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2

895.20/11–1849: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Seoul, November 18, 1949—noon.

1407. Subject: MDAP for Korea.

References:

a. Warx 90992¹

b. Warx.92292²

c. Emdes 570, September 16 (chief KMAG letter September 13 to DA)³

d. Embtel 1295, October 19

e. Embtel 1376, November 8

f. Warx 96392⁴

g. Emdes 714, November 10.

It appears from reference f pricing and availability of items necessitate reduction number of items possible to include within $10.23 million framework.⁵ I feel constrained point out that such a reduction seriously jeopardizes entire US effort in Korea by weakening material and military support to Korean security forces below a safe minimum. Failure provide proper and adequate military aid will leave ROK open to aggression by steadily expanding Communist forces in North Korea.

Specifically, suggested reduction in ordnance spare parts would be seriously crippling because expenditure such spare parts by KSF due road conditions, fewer vehicles per unit strength and substandard maintenance make it imperative ordnance spare parts be supplied at greater than US rate of replacement. Reduction by 50 percent of all types priority two items probably most damaging and dangerous cut. In view large number of troops training with each individual and crew-served weapon, it is imperative that ammunition be supplied at greater than US rate of supply per weapon. For example, in view of shortage of calibre 30 machine guns for ROK army of 100,000 now in existence, and in view of quick wear-out due lack ordnance spare parts mentioned above, many more crews train on each weapon than in US Army. Thus lack spare parts and ammunition snowballs into an intolerable shortage. All of this is of course entirely aside from real danger to ROK of having insufficient ammunition on hand or on call in case serious emergency—which might arise at any time.

Complete elimination priority three and four items also creates impossible situation. Korean forces now seriously checkmated owing lack normal replacement factor for major items. It effectively kills possibility of additions to Coast Guard which as now constituted is wholly incapable of carrying out mission and is approaching state of lying dead in water. See reference d.

It stated US policy to support KSF with equipment for army of 65,000. If equipment for additional 15,000 not fully supplied and if normal replacement for major military items is not made, US is in effect reducing support set forth in NSC 8/2.⁶

I strongly recommend that pricing and availability policies be reviewed and adjusted to give Korea at least modest minimum requirements outlined in original MDAP estimated (reference c), which are considered an irreducible minimum if US interests in Korea are to be given barest protection. In addition to those recommendations reference g sets forth certain additional military aid being necessary to furnish Korea with balanced ground forces in view of increased strength now appearing north of parallel and in conformity with provisions of reference a. Pricing policies employed by DA would evidently increase cost of this proposed supplementary program from about 18 million to about 30 million dollars. However, in view of directives to KMAG to submit detailed recommendations for continuation of military assistance to Korea, it strongly felt here such additional aid is essential to maintain KSF in a respectable posture of defense against growing threat from north. Chief KMAG concurs in this message.

Muccio

1. Not printed. This message, sent to General Roberts on July 1, outlined the terms of reference for KMAG, namely, “to help the Republic of Korea, within the limitations of the Korean economy, to develop internal security forces by advising and otherwise assisting the South Koreans in organizing and training their Army, Coast Guard, and National Police and to ensure that U.S. military assistance was used effectively.” (Quotation from Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 57.)
2. Not printed; see despatch 569, September 16, from Seoul, p. 1079.
3. Neither the despatch nor the letter is printed. The despatch reported on the visit to Korea of the Far Eastern Survey Mission of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. On September 9, this Congressional group, along with Ambassador Muccio and General Roberts, met with some high Korean officials who transmitted to the Congressmen two documents requesting further military aid from the United States in the form of specific items for the Korean Army and Navy. Ambassador Muccio indicated that both he and General Roberts had been unaware that the Korean officials intended to present these requests. In the letter dated September 13 to Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolté, Director of Plans and Operations, Department of the Army General Staff, General Roberts said that KMAG did not endorse and was not responsible for the Korean requests. (033.1100/9–1649)
4. Not printed.
5. The difference between the $10.23 million figure mentioned here and the $10.97 million referred to in the editorial note under date of October 6, p. 1086, represented packing and shipping costs.
6. Dated March 22, p. 969.