895.20/11–1049
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
No. 714
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 569, dated September 16, 1949, with which I transmitted the recommendations of the Chief, KMAG, for additional military assistance to the Republic of Korea for the fiscal year 1950, pursuant to the terms of the Department of Army’s telegram Warx–92292. I stressed, in my despatch, the fact that the recommendations of the Chief, KMAG, had been prepared within the framework of an expenditure of $10 million, exclusive of transportation charges, and I pointed out that in certain contingencies this sum would be inadequate to insure the military security of the Republic of Korea.
I therefore requested the Chief, KMAG, to institute a careful overall survey of the general security situation, having particularly in mind persistent reports of the recent strengthening by the Soviets of the North Korean security forces. The Chief, KMAG, has now submitted his supplementary recommendations, copies of which are attached.1
I concur fully in the recommendations made by the Chief, KMAG. I feel it is necessary not only to carry out the policy set forth in NSC 8/22 to equip fully a Korean army of 65,000 (we have thus far so equipped an army of 50,000 except for the supply of an additional 15,000 M–1 rifles) but to take early steps to strengthen certain weaknesses which are evident in the Korean security forces. As brought out in the Chief, KMAG’s recommendations, the Korean security forces urgently require strengthening in the following categories: (1) more and heavier artillery, (2) limited aid to the Korean Air Force, and (3) further strengthening of the Korean Coast Guard (Navy).
In my opinion, implementation of the Chief, KMAG’s recommendations—preferably at the earliest possible date—would enormously strengthen the security of the Republic of Korea and would serve to remove the constantly growing threat implicit in the steady increase by the Soviets of the military power of their North Korean puppets.
It is to be remarked that the cost estimates used by the Chief, KMAG, in connection with his recommendations are based on new United States’ procurement costs. It will be obvious that if the recommended aircraft and coast guard vessels could be obtained as surplus at low prices, the cost figures would be greatly diminished. It is my [Page 1096] earnest hope that the recommended equipment can be so obtained for the Korean security forces.
I wish to point out that the basic requirements of the Korean security forces, set forth in the enclosure to my despatch no. 569 of September 16, 1949, should continue to have first priority. In this connection, it would appear that the funds to be allocated to the Republic of Korea under the Military Assistance Program will be largely if not wholly exhausted in filling those priority needs. If so, it is hoped that funds will be found in some other quarter to meet the supplementary needs of the Korean security forces here discussed. In this relation, it is respectfully suggested that consideration be given to utilization of a portion of the $75 million appropriated for use “in China and the general area” for the further strengthening of the Korean security forces.3 It is felt that such use of a portion of this appropriation would be in keeping with the intent of Congress and would assist materially in the attainment of United States’ objectives in respect to Korea and the Far East.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed; the supplementary recommendations called for additional military assistance to the Republic of Korea in the amount of $18,137,638, with the following general break-down: Ordnance—$7,017,154; Engineer—$299,810; Signal—$2,483,874; Navy—$6,080,000; Air Force—$2,256,800.↩
- Dated March 22, p. 969.↩
- This appropriation was contained in section 303 of P.L. 329, 81st Congress, October 6, 1949 (63 Stat 716); see also the editorial note under date of October 6, p. 1086.↩