The Mission has now given further consideration to this problem. The
Mission has now reached the conclusion that substitution of a High
Commissioner for a Commission composed of delegates of sovereign
states2 would be
unsatisfactory and probably inimical to the interests of the United
States. The reasons for this change of position are set forth in
enclosure no. 1 to this despatch.
Since it is United States policy to support the Republic of Korea
diplomatically, economically, and militarily, I consider it of prime
importance that the United Nations, and specifically the General
Assembly, should remain seized with the Korean problem and that
either the present Commission, or a new one, should remain in Korea.
It is my view that the United Nations should continue to be involved
in the Korean problem to such extent as is possible. The tendency to
view the Korean problem, even in the present United Nations
Commission, as a U.S.–U.S.S.R. conflict not of basic concern to
other nations should be discouraged and checked.
Apart from evidencing the moral responsibility of the United Nations
to Korea, the primary value of the United Nations Commission is to
serve as a barrier to communist aggression. The fact that a United
Nations Commission is in Korea, and that the General Assembly has
given its blessings to the Republic of Korea, has exercised a
profound influence on both sides of the 38th parallel. It seems that
the Soviets and their Korean puppets would hesitate to commit
themselves to overt aggression against the Republic of Korea so long
as there is a United Nations body observing and reporting on the
situation in Korea. In my opinion, the Commission on Korea, whether
the present or a new one, should be given responsibility for
observing and reporting on military activities as a primary term of
reference.
The chief reasons for this opinion are: (1) Recently increased
military activity in the vicinity of the 38th parallel and the
possibility of
[Page 1069]
the
outbreak of serious incidents at any time; (2) in the event of such
incidents, the value of neutral reporting on such occurrences in
obtaining support of world opinion and friendly governments for U.S.
policy in Korea; (3) the pessimism, often amounting to hostility, of
the members of the Commission and its Secretariat, because of their
inability to carry out the present terms of reference regarding
Korean unification; (4) the unanimous conviction of the delegates of
the present Commission as expressed privately that such a
responsibility should become a major term of reference for the
Commission in the resolution to be adopted on Korea at the Fourth
General Assembly.
I should like to urge that the United States delegation at Lake
Success be instructed to support a proposal looking to continuation
of the present Commission, or the establishment of a new Commission
along similar lines, and to oppose any proposals that might be made
looking to the creation of a High Commissioner, responsible to the
Secretary General of the United Nations. Such a proposal is being
pressed actively by the UNCOK
Secretariat. However, such proposal does not appear in general to
have the support of the UNCOK
delegates.
It is my considered opinion that the major value of the Commission
lies in its representation not only of the General Assembly but of
the several sovereign governments to which the delegates report
directly. In both the UNTCOK and in UNCOK, the Secretariat has been a major problem. In
many instances the Secretariat has supported policies and theses
inimical to United States interests in Korea. It may be pointed out
that a High Commissioner would presumably be responsible solely to
the United Nations Secretary General, while no sovereign government,
apart perhaps from the United States and the U.S.S.R., would
continue to have an immediate interest or responsibility in Korea.
The opportunities for an unfriendly Secretariat responsible solely
to the High Commissioner or to the United Nations Secretary General
to do harm to United States interests would seem to be greater than
when they are at least partially controlled by delegates
representing sovereign states largely friendly to the United States.
The situation in Korea, as relates to the function of a UN
Commission, seems more analagous to Greece than to Palestine.
If the Department were able to persuade a friendly Government
represented on the Commission to appoint a man of outstanding
ability and experience to serve in Korea, in my opinion this action
would contribute materially to the success of the next Commission
and to support of United States interests. In all probability such a
man would be elected permanent chairman of the UN Commission, giving
it leadership and continuity of program and action, both of which
have been markedly missing in the present Commission. The
Secretariat, furthermore, could be expected to be subordinated to
the views and leadership of the Permanent Chairman, instead of
exercising leadership itself.
There are enclosed for the Department’s information and
consideration, the following papers:
[Enclosure]
Memorandum
Subject: UNCOK
and U.S. Policy at the Fourth General Assembly
- 1.
- The UNCOK report on
Korea is drafted much more poorly than the previous UNTCOK
report. This seems partly due to the passivity of Dr. Liu,
China, and M. Costilhes, France, as compared with the
activity of Dr. Liu and Messrs. Paul-Boncour and Manet, both
of France, in UNTCOK.
- 2.
-
UNCOK seemed never to have
had a clear understanding of the General Assembly Resolution
on Korea of December 12, 1948, although two members, Dr. Liu
and Dr. Luna, were present in Paris. The careful wording of
that Resolution in paragraph 4, “Having in mind the status
of the Government of the Republic of Korea as herein
defined, and in particular to: (a) lend its good offices …
in accordance with the principles laid down by the General
Assembly in the Resolution of November 14, 1947; and (c) be
available for observation and consultation in further
development of representative government . . . .” has had
little effect in keeping UNCOK from attempting to interfere in Korean
internal affairs. According to Mr. Jamieson, Australia, it
never occurred to UNCOK
that the reference to the Resolution of November 14, 1947
was a call for UN supervised elections in North Korea.
Instead UNCOK viewed it as
a 1948 call upon UNCOK to
mediate between the North and South Korean Governments. He
implied that this was particularly due to the
interpretations supplied by the Secretariat, since the
delegates lacked adequate instructions and interpretations
from their own Governments.
The limiting phrase (4c) be available was
not understood and was ignored by UNCOK, which proceeded to inquire into the domestic
affairs of the Korean Government without invitation or sanction
by that Government.
[Page 1071]
The Commission made earnest efforts to establish contact with Kim
Il Sung’s regime, and they feel aggrieved and distressed by
their failure. A part of this disappointment they possibly
reflect in criticism of the Korean Government for its failure
practically to assist in a solution of the unification
problem.
Unlike the conclusions of UNTCOK reports, the conclusions of the
UNCOK report seemingly are
not such that the USDel could
usefully vote to approve of them separately as a tactical move
to avoid approval of adverse material in the main text, as was
done in Paris in 1948.
The conclusions consist of a five-paragraph preamble, largely of
generalities, and five numbered paragraphs of conclusions.
Two paragraphs (no. 3 and 5) are not helpful to the U.S.
position. No. 3 attributes the underlying difficulties in Korea
to U.S.–U.S.S.R. antagonisms. “Without a new effort by these
powers to reach an agreement . . . . on Korea, no substantial
progress . . . . can be made.” Acceptance of this thesis would
throw the problem back to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. instead of
the UN continuing to be seized of the problem, as it has been
since November 14, 1947. The U.S. can hardly accept this thesis.
Paragraph 5 states that the “.… situation in Korea is now no
better than it was at the beginning and . . . . (the Commission)
. . . . has not been able to facilitate the objectives set by
the General Assembly.” Elsewhere the report tells of the
successful establishment and functioning of the Korean
Government, democratic tendencies in the National Assembly and
the like, but this flat denial in the conclusions of any
improvement from the beginning is harmful.
M. Costilhes, France, has said privately that this paragraph
referred to unification. The language of the paragraph however
does not clearly show this, and therefore lends itself to
adverse interpretations. It can be expected that the Russians
will exploit it fully.
Paragraph 1 states, accurately, that the prospect of unification
becomes more and more remote. Paragraph 2 is critical of the
U.S.S.R. and is therefore helpful to the U.S. position.
Paragraph 4, while grudgingly admitting the difficulties facing
the Republic of Korea, including uprisings and border clashes,
expresses the view “.… that a broadening of the Government’s
political base would allow it to meet these difficulties more
successfully.…” This appears both to be a rendering of judgment
outside the terms of reference of the Commission, and a charge
so vaguely made that it can be well used by the Soviets.
At Lake Success, the USDel
should be prepared to expand on certain subjects reported on in
the UNCOK report and to
challenge some statements. Nevertheless, for tactical reasons,
it would seem necessary to accept the whole report, in the
Resolution. Otherwise the U.S. would be in a position of
attacking UNCOK wihch would
seem to be tactically unsound.
[Page 1072]
Certain parts of the report, prior to the conclusions, are
strongly worded criticisms of the Soviet-Communist positions (IV
paragraphs 3, 6, 7, 8, 20, 2d part; 21, 26, 27, 29). They can be
exploited to good effect in debate, and in drafting a Resolution
on Korea.
Most of the paragraphs of Chapter 4 not listed above are either
not helpful or are actually damaging to the U.S. position on
Korea. Chapter 3, chiefly a factual account of events, is
largely written in a sympathetic manner and could be used with
good effect by the USDel to
offset the damaging material in Chapter 4.
One reason for this poorly drafted report was the lack of strong
leadership in UNCOK. Last year
such leadership was exercised by both the Chinese and French
representatives. It would seem highly desirable that in
connection with the next Commission efforts should be made to
persuade a government friendly to the United States to send a
first class man to Korea. The proposed draft Resolution attached
hereto calls for a permanent UNCOK chairman. It is hoped that such a man would
secure election by virtue of his recognized abilities.
The Secretariat headed by Dr. Ranshofen-Wertheimer and assisted
by Mr. Sanford Schwarz, has had exaggerated ideas of its
importance. The same was true of the UNTCOK Secretariat, but M.
Paul-Boncour was able to keep in check the Principal Secretary,
Dr. Schmidt, until his replacement, Mr. Binnertz. No one has
been able to keep the present Secretariat in check and their
influence on the Commission has been out of proportion to their
proper functions. A recent minor illustration of the successful
claims of the Secretariat occurred at the August 15 ceremonies,
when Mr. Schwarz, Deputy Principal Secretary, was seated to
outrank all Commission members including the Chairman.
Excepting M. Costilhes, France, all members of UNCOK seem disturbed and
dispirited at their complete failure to bring about unification
of Korea. Even Dr. Liu and Dr. Luna, who were well aware at
Paris that the three sponsoring governments did not expect
UNCOK to be successful in
bringing about unification but rather were desirous that there
should be a Commission in Korea as a moral obstacle to Communist
aggression, seemed distressed at their failure. The delegates,
through separate conversations with an officer of this Embassy,
have urged that the new Resolution should not contain any terms
of reference which patently could not be carried out. They think
it would be especially harmful to call upon a new Commission to
bring about unification. When it was suggested to them that the
paramount UN interest in Korea is to bring about independence
and unification, and the failure to include such provisions in
the terms of reference would mark a UN retreat, they remained
unconvinced, M. Costilhes, France, suggested that they be
included in a preamble but not be made a part of the terms of
reference.
[Page 1073]
All Commission members agree that the primary duty of the new
Commission should be observation, and reporting on military
activities hostile to the Korean Government, including armed
subversion. They believe such functions would justify a new
Commission in its own eyes, would keep it busy and could be a
real contribution toward preserving the peace or at least
informing the world on Communist activities in Korea.
The Secretariat is anxious to have the Commission abandoned and
replaced by a High Commissioner appointed by and responsible to
the Secretary General. Their argument appears to be that the;
Korean problem is a contest between two antagonistic governments
which a UN High Commissioner can best mediate, as Dr. Bunche
mediated the Arab-Jewish conflict. It is believed, however, that
the Secretariat would expect to have a freer hand in a UN SYG body than in one made up of
representatives of several sovereign states. Although some
delegates have been impressed with the arguments of the
Secretariat, no one seems to have committed himself to support
the proposal, while the representatives of France, Philippines
and El Salvador are flatly opposed.
Since U.S. interests seem best served by the continued interest
of the largest number of governments in Korea, the substitution
of a High Commissioner, no matter how distinguished, responsible
only to the UN Secretary General, would seem to be contrary to
U.S. interests. Furthermore, the U.N. Secretariat in Korea is
frequently more hostile than helpful both to U.S. interests and
the Korean Government, Without governmental representatives to
check the Secretariat, it might do great harm.
There seems no possibility of successful mediation between North
and South. In fact, such mediation, if possible and successful,
might be very harmful to U.S. interests by preparing the way for
communists to enter the Korean Government. The situation in
Korea is analagous to Greece in which UN observers report on
aggressive activities of guerrillas and the neighbors of Greece
but do not serve as mediators between the Greek Government and
the communist rebels.
UNCOK has suffered by the
absence of the Syrian delegate, Mr. Mughir who only remained in
Korea about six weeks. (In 1948, Mr. Mughir absented himself
from the Commission in May.) The purpose of the 1948 Resolution
to have an odd numbered Commission, seven, for voting purposes,
was defeated thereby. Mr. Mughir, before leaving, delivered a
speech before UNCOK severely
excoriating the Korean Government. While nominally suppressed,
it seems likely that the Soviets will obtain a copy of his
statement. By the conduct of its representative in two
successive conferences, Syria would seem to have forfeited any
claim to a position on a third Commission. If Turkey
[Page 1074]
is still willing to
serve, as she was in 1948, it would seem desirable to replace
Syria with Turkey on the next Commission.
For other reasons, it seems desirable that El Salvador should be
replaced by a larger Latin American country, such as Brazil or
Mexico. El Salvador lacks sufficient experienced Foreign Service
personnel and, in addition, because of the country’s small size,
the views of its delegate do not receive the attention shown
those expressed by the representative of a larger Latin American
state.
The criticisms of the Korean Government in chapter 4 are largely
offset by the report in chapter 3. The criticisms are chiefly
that: (1) the Korean Government is hostile to the idea of
unification, (2) it looks upon the 1948 Resolution as a support
to its claims over all Korea; (3) it leads a divided people; and
(4) it would face its problems better by broadening the base of
the government. None of these criticisms seem very cogent. In a
few days, the Korean Government is expected to send a letter to
UNCOK urging it again to
try to act under the Resolution of November 14, 1947 as called
for on December 12, 1948, to determine representatives in a UN
supervised elections in North Korea who may be seated in the
National Assembly. The letter will reiterate the great anxiety
of the Korean Government for unification under UN auspices.
However unrealistic this request may appear to be in the light
of present circumstances, this letter nevertheless should be
helpful in meeting the charge of hostility to unification.
At Paris, the Korean representative stated in Committee I that
his Government considered all Korea the territory of the
Republic. The position of the Korean Government since the
arrival of UNCOK, therefore,
is not new. It seems to be the privilege of the Korean
Government to advance such a claim and of the General Assembly
to ignore it.
The claim that the people in South Korea are divided is
unsubstantiated. Currently the only practical tests seem to be:
the May 10, 1948 elections; the loyalty of officials, police and
the army to the Government; and the new elections which will be
held next year.
Pending the 1950 elections, it would seem improper for UNCOK or the General Assembly to
pass judgment on the broad or narrow base of the Korean
Government. By the same token, the selection of a government
under the Korean constitution would seem a matter solely for
Korean determination. In any case, this phrase regarding a
broadened base seems to lack any precise meaning.
Having completed its report, UNCOK has turned itself into a Working Committee
and will be prepared to report on new developments up to October
1. Considerable effort will be made by the Korean Government to
supply UNCOK with evidential
material on the nature of North Korea directed sabotage,
subversive and other communist activities, in the hope that
supplementary material or reports by UNCOK will give a clearer picture to the General
Assembly of the
[Page 1075]
difficulties facing the Korean Government in the face of threats
to security directed and emanating from the North.
