740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–1249: Airgram
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 21—1:20 p. m.]
A–35. It has come to my attention that Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall held an off-the-record press conference at the American Embassy on February 6, 1949. In response to questions by American news correspondents, Mr. Royall advanced and developed the thesis that in case of war with the Soviet Union, or even during the period of the so-called cold war, Japan is, in fact, a liability, and that it might be more profitable from the viewpoint of United States policy to pull out all troops from Japan. He is further said to have discussed the greater strategic advantages of Europe in comparison with that of the Pacific in so far as a possible Soviet-United States war is concerned.
One statement attributed to Mr. Royall in this conference reads to the effect that the United States has no moral obligation towards Japan, that we are not in Japan at our request, and that even though it was our duty to disarm Japan it is not our responsibility if someone else cuts Japan’s throat as a result.
Surprisingly, at a press conference on February 7, the morning following the previous press conference, Mr. Royall was quoted as having said that there is no difference of opinion between his views and Washington on the one hand, and General MacArthur on the other.
From personal knowledge, I know that General MacArthur does not share the views voiced by Mr. Royall at his off-the-record conference. His statement of agreement of views between himself and General MacArthur would therefore appear to be a deliberate attempt to mollify rumors of disagreement, or an effort to align General MacArthur with his own views. General MacArthur, upon several occasions, has told me of his concern over certain views apparently held by responsible officers of the three Services in Washington. He has repeatedly stated that the concept of concentrating American military power in the Mediterranean area is strategically unsound and that its implementation might well lead to disaster for the United States. Conversely, he feels strongly that the Pacific island chain from Kamchatka southward, to and including the Philippines, must by all means be held as the westernmost line of defense of the United States. He feels that any breach of this island barrier by a hostile power would result in the front line of United States defense being swept back to our west coast.
[Page 649]The Royall statements at his off-the-record conference are all the more remarkable in view of the conditional release, “not for attribution” and “not to be released prior to February 12, 1949”.
It is my opinion that Mr. Royall’s off-the-record press conference and the resultant plethora of speculative press articles based thereon will strike a heavy blow to America’s prestige in Japan and possibly in the Far East generally. It would appear that no remarks could have been better designed to revive Japanese interest in the possibility or desirability of an orientation towards the Soviets, particularly in the light of recent events on the continent of Asia.