740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–949: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea
us urgent
330. Recent course your discussions Pres Rhee on troop withdrawal and mil assistance and public statements Pres and other officials ROK, since former’s statement Apr 18,1 culminating in press release reported urtel 506 May 7 have made it increasingly clear certain clearcut decisions required concerning implementation NSC decision troop withdrawal. Urgency this matter underlined by recommendations set forth [Page 1015] CINCFE’s CX 69750 May 32 and by letter addressed SecState May 4 by Sec Defense, pertinent portions of which quoted in immed fol tel.3 To this end Dept sets forth fol observations:
1. While earnestly sharing your desire ensure adequate provision security and stability ROK as envisaged NSC 8/2,4 Dept convinced acquisition additional vessels enumerated urtel 447 Apr 26, and aircraft requested urtel 483 May 3 prior to or within reasonable time after June 30 withdrawal date absolutely out of question by virtue non-availability both equipment and funds with which to purchase it. Dept under impression this fact generally recognized at time adoption NSC 8/2 and that pre-withdrawal transfer provided for in that paper not intended include such items.
2. Dept has received impression that Rhee, perhaps prompted by Oliver or other of his advisers, has been attempting during past few weeks progressively to raise price his concurrence in order extract every possible concession from our withdrawal. While appreciating critical nature Korea’s requirements for mil assistance Dept believes it should be made amply and unmistakably clear to Rhee that capability this Govt provide mil aid to Korea is severely limited, not by any reluctance on our part to help ROK but by simple fact US confronted with worldwide demands for mil assistance which far exceed its capacity to fulfill. (For your own strictly confidential info figure for Korean mil assistance under pending global program has been reduced by Executive decision to $11 million including transportation costs, as compared more than $200 million estimated value mil, naval and air materiel so far requested by ROK.) Mil assistance must be viewed, however, in light proposed ECA and KMAG programs, as merely one aspect overall US support. If above-mentioned impression correct Dept believes Rhee should be disabused of impression we willing pay any price his concurrence and that he be informed forthwith our intention complete troop withdrawal on or about June 30.
3. Dept assumes necessary groundwork already laid with UNCOK.
4. If on other hand urtels 447, 461,5 483, 498,6 etc. reflect fundamental revision your own estimate of circumstances under which we can and should withdraw US occupation forces from Korea, this would appear call for re-opening entire question withdrawal and re-appraisal Conclusions NSC 8/2, which would definitely mean postponing June 30 withdrawal date.
5. Request your comments soonest, bearing in mind Army’s urgent need declassification authority if withdrawal plan is to proceed as provided [Page 1016] NSC 8/2 and necessity supplemental appropriations if withdrawal to be substantially postponed.