895.30/4–2649: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
447. To Dept of the Army, info CINCFE Tokyo, from AmEmbassy Seoul to State. ReDeptel 268, April 21. I submit following comment on paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. Other paragraphs will be commented upon subsequently.
[Page 996]1. Vessels now operated by Korean Coast Guard comprised principally of 16 former US Navy YMS and 11 former Jap mine layers all in various states disrepair. These vessels designed for mine sweeping and mine laying in protected harbors and channels. Such vessels not suitable for off-shore patrol duties because of slow speed (9 or 10 knots) and unseaworthiness. US Navy YMS were received here without armament, spare engines and vessel parts and tools. Moreover for more than three years no marine supplies such as paint, engine and vessel parts were received. Consequently condition of vessels has steadily deteriorated. In many cases wood hulls of YMS have been damaged by marine borers and rendered virtually useless.
2. Coast Guard responsible for prevention hostile infiltration by sea and for prevention piracy, smuggling, enforcement shipping laws, conducting rescue work in marine disasters, et cetera. These duties necessitate patrolling of 1687 miles coastal waters, 17 major and 400 small islands. To perform these functions effectively Coast Guard needs vessels able withstand heavy weather, possess speed of 15 to 19 knots, adequate fire power, easy maneuverability, adequate cruising range and economy of operation.
3. I think it obvious from foregoing that Korean Coast Guard craft, and that as now constituted Korean Coast Guard is absolutely incapable of carrying out effectively any part of responsibility assigned it—whether that be defense of South Korean coast against hostile invasion or preventions of smuggling which rampant today. See mytel 34 [15], January 7.1
4. In my opinion if we are to achieve our objectives here Korean security forces cannot be left helpless in any important respect. For weakness of any one element, in this case Coast Guard, could easily bring about disruption of our whole military, economic, and political program. We cannot risk being penny wise and pound foolish.
5. After most careful consideration, including consultation with General Roberts2 and available naval and former naval personnel, strongly recommend following craft be made available Korean Coast Guard before departure remaining US troops: (1) 4 patrol craft; (2) 16 subchasers; (3) 10 picket boats. Above vessels should have speed ranging up to 18 knots and should be equipped with standard Navy armament, possess all spare parts and tools and radio equipment.
6. In conclusion, I wish to add unless I am able offer above absolute minimum in Coast Guard assistance, I shall find it exceedingly difficult [Page 997] persuade President Rhee to go along voluntarily with us on question US troop withdrawal.3
- See footnote 3, p. 987.↩
- Brig. Gen. William L. Roberts, Commanding General, U.S. Armed Forces in Korea, and Chief of the Provisional Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea.↩
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The Department’s reply to this message was contained in telegram 297, April 27, to Seoul, and read as follows:
“Re $200,000 marine maintenance items and spare parts mentioned para 3 Deptel 268, Army states supply such items now assured. No estimate delivery date but will expedite. This info may be given Rhee.
“Dept. continuing as matter of urgency investigate possibility obtaining additional craft requested para 5 urtel 447 but present prospects not encouraging.” (895.34/4–2749)
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