Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2

740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–1649

The Special Representative in Korea (Muccio) to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee)

Seoul, April 14, 1949.¹

My Dear Mr. President: I have the honor to confirm the statements I made to you this afternoon that American diplomatic officers have been authorized to communicate to governments to which they are accredited that the present position of the United States Government with respect to Korea is as follows:

1. It is the United States view that the United Nations has already made substantial progress toward restoring freedom and independence of the Korean people and that in the General Assembly Resolution of December 12 it has a formula for pursuing that progress to fruition.

2. The United States believes consolidation of existing gains and success of further United Nations efforts in Korea will depend in large measure on firm and unwavering support by United Nation member states of December 12 Resolution and endorsement of Government of Republic of Korea contained therein.

3. In this connection the United States feels every assistance and facility should be afforded the new United Nations Commission on Korea established under the December 12 Resolution in its efforts to help the Korean people and their lawful government to achieve goal of free and united Korea, a goal to which the United States is convinced an overwhelming majority of Koreans of both north and south wholeheartedly aspire.

4. United States position on troop withdrawal is based on the view that to withdraw its occupation forces prematurely or to permit their retention on Korean soil for any longer than is necessary would in either case be to jeopardize attainment of United Nations objectives in Korea. Accordingly, and in keeping with the spirit of the General Assembly Resolutions on Korea, the United States has during the past several months effected substantial reduction of its occupation forces in Korea. Such United States forces as still remain do so at the request of the Korean Government pending further development of its own rapidly improving security forces and, in accordance with the December 12 Resolution, will be withdrawn “as early as practicable”, hopefully in a matter of months, subject to consultation with the United Nations Commission.

5. In addition to supporting procedures set forth in December 12 Resolution, and quite apart from question of troop withdrawal, it is the United States intention to continue to provide economic, technical, military and other assistance regarded as essential to economic and political stability of the newborn Republic.

6. The United States is convinced the main burden of responsibility for the failure of United Nations efforts so far to achieve final solution of Korean problem must be placed on the Soviet Union and its evident determination to subordinate legitimate aspirations and welfare of the Korean people to its own objective of Communist domination of the entire Korean peninsula. The United States believes further this obstacle can be overcome only through united support of United Nations decisions as envisaged in paragraph 2 above.

I would appreciate an expression of Your Excellency’s views regarding the United States position on troop withdrawal as outlined in paragraph four above.

I may add that as the United States regards the Korean problem as one of international concern, and in line with the general policy of keeping the United Nations Commission on Korea fully informed of any action that may affect its activities, I am furnishing that Commission with a copy of this letter.²

Sincerely yours,

John J. Muccio

[Enclosure]

Draft Letter From the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Special Representative in Korea (Muccio)³

top secret

[Seoul, April 14, 1949.]

My Dear Mr. Ambassador: Recent press dispatches from America reporting the proposed withdrawal of the United States security forces from Korea on or about July first of this year seem to have caused considerable concern. I realize that under the terms of international agreements now in effect, no such withdrawal will take place without prior consultation with the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Commission on Korea. The Korean people, cognizant of the menace of armed Communist power in the north and of the inadequacy of equipment and preparation for national defense in the south, naturally feel that both their national security and their individual safety is at stake.

We will feel strong enough not to have to count on support by an American security force when we have sufficient weapons for a standing army of 65,000 men and for an armed and equipped reserve force of 200,000 men. As you know, Mr. Ambassador, we are far from having reached that point now.

You have been good enough to bring confidentially to my attention what the United States is going to do for Korea, and I feel highly encouraged by the policies adopted by the Government of the United States and signed by the President. There is, of course, no question in my mind as to the sincerity of the United States officials in their intention of carrying out these plans. Rather, there is the practical question that the United States, being a democracy, cannot carry out any policies except as they are understood and supported by public opinion. It is for this reason that confidential assurances by Government officials, however sincere and earnest they are known to be, cannot solely be depended upon. There always remains the fundamental necessity that the public has been thoroughly informed and is fully aware of the obligation which such an understanding would place on the nation.

The American people, with their high sense of national honor and prestige, would never renounce any of their national obligations. They realize full well that the United States has committed itself concerning Korea, by various international agreements, open as well as secret, and by creation of the two occupation zones held respectively by Soviet and American troops. It has been this sequence of developments that necessitates the maintenance of a United States military force in Korea, as has been so cogently stated in an editorial in the New York Times of April 3, 1949.

This being the situation, it may be considered timely for the United States Government publicly to re-affirm the pledge contained in the amity clause of the Korean-American Treaty of 1882.⁴ When such an understanding is sufficiently publicized, the American people will come to know that the United States is committing itself to the extent of helping Korea whenever a predatory or aggressor nation deals unjustly with Korea, and they will know that this is done not only for the security of Korea but also for the security of the United States. Such a declaration is entirely in accord with the United States policy of collective security, as demonstrated in the Atlantic Pact.⁵ When such an understanding has been promulgated will be proper time for arranging for the withdrawal of the security troops.

I think you will agree with me, Mr. Ambassador, that the withdrawal of American troops without such a preliminary undertaking as I have suggested would be open to serious misunderstanding in Korea, in the United States, and in other countries, and might, therefore, have disastrous consequences. The provision of arms and other military equipment in sufficient supply, and the re-affirmation by the United States of its pledge as contained in the amity clause of the 1882 Treaty will, I am confident, make any further troop support unnecessary.

With renewed assurances of my highest regard, I am.

Sincerely yours,

[

Syngman Rhee

]

1. This letter was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 223 from Seoul, April 16 (not printed), wherein Mr. Muccio stated that the letter was handed to President Rhee at noon on April 16. Despatch 223 was received in the Department on May 9, but Mr. Muccio had informed the Department of the transmittal of the letter in telegram 403, from Seoul, April 16, not printed (711.952/4–1649).
2. The text of this letter from Mr. Muccio to President Rhee, along with a covering note, also dated April 14, from Mr. Muccio to the Chairman of UNCOK (Magana), is printed in U.N. document A/936/Add.1, p. 38.
3. This draft letter was also transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 223 (not printed) in which Mr. Muccio said that President Rhee seemed satisfied with the letter which had been handed him (above) and no longer proposed to send this draft letter to Mr. Muccio.
4. See telegram 246, to Seoul, April 15, infra.
5. For documentation on the North Atlantic Alliance and the NATO Agreement, see vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.