895.00/3–2849: Telegram
The Chargé of the American Mission in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State
308. On eve Muccio’s return1 I venture offer few personal observations, impressions and recommendations re Korea.
After shaky start Korean Government now settling down. Cabinet appreciably strengthened2 and government efficiency though low by western standards is improving gradually. Rhee remains dominant force in government and retains large measure popularity he enjoyed at time inauguration. National Assembly, though remarkably independent of Executive, will, it is thought, support Rhee in any crisis. Training of security forces making good progress. Screening of subversives from Korean Army well along and it felt repetition scale Sunchon–Yosu uprising no longer probable.3
Economic conditions now on upgrade with increased coal and power production assured during next few months. Increased power output will in turn result in accelerated industrial production. While grain collection program failure, food stocks believed adequate tide over coming months. Inflationary spiral slowed, prices remain stable and currency circulation steadily declining.
There remain many weaknesses, greatest of which perhaps persuasive [pervasive] official corruption and inefficiency, but progress being made and with improved economic conditions and more experience these deficiencies can be remedied.
[Page 980]UNCOK saddled with insuperable task of achieving unity promises little in concrete accomplishments. Still its presence exercises stabilizing influence vis-à-vis north Korea.
Korea’s present progress and future dependent in large part, of course, on continuing US aid for without such aid Korean Government would almost certainly collapse and South Korea come under Soviet domination. However with adequate and judiciously supplied economic and military aid, backed by sound and firm advice, it believed Korean Government has good chance to survive and grow in strength. It believed conditions may soon be such that US troops can be withdrawn without jeopardizing future of Korean Government, but it felt this should be accompanied by increase of KMAG personnel and careful review and reformulation of program for development Korean security forces.
- See footnote 1, p. 958.↩
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In telegram 282, March 24, from Seoul, Mr. Drumright had made the following observations on recent Cabinet changes:
“New Minister Defense Sihn [Sung Mo] impresses us as man of ability and integrity. In our view his new appointment will give Rhee more effective and loyal control of security forces than had been case Lee Bum Suk. Sinn’s appointment should also bring in time better organization of army, reshuffling of top military officers to promote efficiency and lessen cliques former under Lee Bum Suk’s administration, closer cooperation between army and police, improved relations between KMAG and Ministry of Defense and more emphasis on strengthening navy which hitherto orphan Korean security forces.
“By virtue new appointment Sihn in position control both army and police. This together with fact he enjoys fullest confidence President Rhee, makes him second most powerful official in Korean Government.
“It appears Lee Bum Suk has taken loss Defense Ministry with good grace and is prepared carry on as Prime Minister.” (895.002/3–2449)
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In telegram 307, March 28, Mr. Drumright had reported on South Korean military operations against Communist guerrillas in the following terms:
“Korean Army units supported by police continue punitive activities in Chiri Mountain area, South Cholla Province, and on Cheju Island with satisfactory results. Guerrillas not only on defensive but have suffered substantial loss of arms and manpower. However, it now apparent guerrillas though small in number are well entrenched in mountain fastnesses and persistent long sustained operations will be required root them out entirely.” (895.00/3–2849)
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