740.00119 PW/l–2749
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas ( Saltzman ) to the Secretary of State
top secret
[
Washington
,] January 27, 1949.
With reference to the memorandum of this date submitted to you by Mr. Nitze and Mr. Butterworth,1 I recommend: (1) that if you find it possible to make a decision on this matter today, you adopt Mr. Nitze’s proposal; (2) that if you do not find it possible to make a decision today, you inform Mr. Royall before his departure that you entertain very serious doubts that this Government can justify the retention in Japan of primary war facilities.
My reasons for these recommendations are as follows:
- (1)
- As indicated in the memorandum from Mr. Tate,2 attached to Mr. Nitze’s and Mr. Butterworth’s memorandum, there appears to be no escape from the legal obligations which the United States has entered [Page 640] into in the Far Eastern Commission for the destruction or removal of primary war facilities, except those which SCAP may retain for the needs of the occupation pursuant to FEC policy;
- (2)
- It is not evident that primary war facilities in excess of those which SCAP may in any case retain under FEC policy are needed for the Japanese peacetime economy. All previous studies indicate that, primary war facilities apart, there is considerable surplus in the industries involved above any possible production in Japan in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the machine tools in question can undoubtedly be put to use elsewhere in the Far East and can assist the economic programs of the countries receiving reparations. In addition, such recovery in other countries of the Far East will be helpful in promoting Japanese recovery for both economic and psychological reasons;
- (3)
- I cannot agree with the suggestion that the denial of any reparations program other than primary war facilities will produce as bad a political reaction as the denial of the reparations program altogether. It seems to me that the latter, in view especially of our legal commitments, will not only be unwelcome to the other interested countries but would also tend to show a complete disregard of their views and interests.