740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–3049
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State
In your meeting with Mr. Voorhees today, you may wish to have in mind the following considerations favoring an early peace treaty:
- 1.
- The occupation some time ago passed its peak. Its popularity with the Japanese has diminished and will diminish further if the natural desire for a treaty, making adequate provision for Japanese security, is thwarted. If the cooperation which the Japanese have afforded the occupation should cease, our position in Japan would become untenable and the occupation accomplishments would be imperilled.
- 2.
- Japan’s friendly orientation toward the United States cannot be compelled but must arise from the feelings and considered interests of the people, which can be better appealed to through a liberal peace settlement than through continuation of an increasingly unwelcome occupation.
- 3.
- The Japanese are unlikely to display requisite responsibility and initiative and otherwise to work with maximum effectiveness for the solution of their nation’s pressing economic problems until restored to treaty status. With full responsibility for their own affairs the traditional energy and initiative of the Japanese can be expected to reassert themselves, while without it the tendency to lean on the occupation will continue.
- 4.
- The British, French, Australians and most of our other Allies strongly desire a treaty. Their unwillingness to approve piecemeal restoration of Japan to a normal international status obstructs revival of Japan’s foreign trade and its reorientation as a peaceful member of the family of nations.
It is believed of primary political importance that the U.S. be in a position of favoring and attempting to obtain a peace treaty, for the following reasons: (1) the desire of the Japanese for a treaty; (2) the desire of our Allies for a treaty; (3) to avoid a situation where the Soviets are for and we against a treaty; and (4) to obtain the full support of the American people and the people of the Far East in the event we have to go ahead without Soviet concurrence.
It is important in the light of these factors, of your understanding with Mr. Bevin, and of the short interval remaining before the Commonwealth Conference scheduled for January 9, that the Defense Department, in accordance with the understanding with the President, proceed urgently with the determination of U.S. security requirements to be incorporated in a draft peace treaty. The NSC and the President can then decide whether we should proceed with discussions with friendly FEC powers to determine whether or not a peace conference should be held on the basis of this draft treaty, notwithstanding the [Page 908] probability that the USSR and Communist China would not participate.