847.20/11–1849
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State
You may wish to keep in mind the possibility that Australia may try to obtain a US security guarantee in return for concurring generally in the substance of our proposals for a Japanese peace settlement.
That Australia may try to obtain a price for its concurrence is suggested by Australia’s general attitude toward Pacific questions since 1945. Dening’s discussion of the Japanese peace settlement at Canberra following the recent Singapore conference and the circulation of rumors that the peace conference will meet in Canberra are all straws in the wind. That Australia may seek a security guarantee is suggested by Australia’s emphasis in the past on the dangers of a resurgent Japan as a reason for opposing proposals directed toward Japan’s economic recovery or the improvement of Japan’s international status.
The guarantee sought, while ostensibly directed against Japan and inspired by Australia’s narrow escape from Japanese invasion in World War II, would under existing conditions be in fact directed against attack by the USSR, directly or indirectly.
An Australian request would attract requests from the Philippines, Korea and other quarters and revive discussion of a possible Pacific Pact modeled on the Atlantic Pact.
There are strong reasons against undertaking a general security guarantee in the Pacific either through a Pacific Pact or independent of such a pact. We cannot give extensive additional military commitments without seriously diluting the effectiveness of those already given. Such commitments moreover reduce the flexibility of our foreign policy. The USSR operating both in European and Far Eastern areas is in position to take advantage of loss of policy maneuverability on our part through an over-extension of commitments. A US guarantee would also be likely to retard assumption of reasonable defense responsibilities by Australia and other states in position to contribute substantially.
There are also strong reasons against extending US security guarantees through a Pacific pact especially during the formative period of a Pacific association of states. The association would be transformed [Page 902] from an organ for political, economic and social cooperation—as now contemplated—into an anti-Communist alliance. Such an alliance at the present moment would almost certainly be unacceptable to India, Burma and Indonesia and probably some other states. The effect of a US security guarantee would accordingly be divisive rather than cohesive.
There is, of course, serious question whether the Pacific states concerned will be able to build and maintain an effective union even for the limited purposes now under contemplation. If, however, we are now to assume failure on their part in advance and to consider building up a restricted union on a defensive basis among Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand with a few possible additions, we must face the implication that these are the states we intend to defend and that the rest are being abandoned. I do not believe that the time has come when we should draw such a dividing line in the Pacific, even if we had the disposable forces to back a guarantee.
For the above reasons I feel that we should not accede to any request from Australia at this time to provide a security guarantee.
The problem is, of course, complicated by the probability that no effective UN forces will be available in the foreseeable future. We have, however, made our defensive intent clear by bases in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines and by the extension of aid in various forms to other areas, without being tied by security commitments.
We might accordingly meet the Australian request under present conditions by taking the position that so long as we retain bases in Japan, there need be no fear of Japan’s military resurgence or Soviet occupation of Japan; that at such time as we withdraw our forces from Japan, the security problem so far as it relates to Japan will naturally be reconsidered; and that the security problem so far as it relates to the Pacific area generally is a separate issue not involved in the Japanese peace settlement.