740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–249
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert A. Fearey, of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs1
Subject: General MacArthur’s Views on a Japanese Peace Treaty
| Participants: | Major General Carter B. Magruder, Chief, Civil Affairs Division |
| Col. C. Stanton Babcock, Member of General MacArthur’s Staff | |
| Lt. Col. J. J. Wagstaff, Plans and Operations Division | |
| Lt. Col. D. D. Dixon, Plans and Operations Division | |
| Mr. Butterworth–FE | |
| Mr. Hamilton–FE | |
| Mr. Allison–NA | |
| Mr. Howard–S | |
| Mr. Fearey–NA |
General Magruder, deputy to Mr. Voorhees for the Japanese peace treaty project, Colonel Babcock, Colonel Wagstaff, and Colonel Dixon called for the purpose of meeting Mr. Butterworth and members of FE working on the treaty. General Magruder suggested that Colonel Babcock, who had arrived a week or so ago as General MacArthur’s personal representative to assist in the treaty preparations, outline General MacArthur’s views on the treaty problem. Explaining that his remarks would be based on a number of conversations which he had had with General MacArthur regarding the treaty just before his departure from Tokyo, Colonel Babcock summarized General MacArthur’s views as follows:
1. Timing and Procedures
General MacArthur considers the treaty long overdue. He had wanted a treaty as early as 1947 but had not been too disappointed when we failed to achieve one at that time, the occupation having then lasted less than two years. It has now lasted four and a half years, however, and he believes it of the greatest importance that a treaty now be concluded.
General MacArthur fully approves the method for going forward with a peace treaty by endeavoring first to work out agreement with the British and other Commonwealth Governments. He thinks it important that voting at the peace conference be by two-thirds majority, preserving a democratic flavor, but that we must make certain, through prior commitments, that such a voting procedure does not prevent us from securing our essential requirements. He naturally considers procedural questions of this sort outside his field of competence or responsibility.
[Page 891]General MacArthur believes that a real effort should be made to secure the Soviet Union’s participation in the treaty. He feels that the Soviets have been considerably disturbed by their inability to influence the course of the occupation and that they strongly desire a treaty. He does not consider that we should sacrifice any of our desiderata to obtain Soviet participation. His point is simply that we should make a real effort to secure their participation and not merely a gesture.
2. Security
Neutrality—General MacArthur believes that unarmed neutrality, guaranteed by the great Powers, is from every point of view Japan’s most desirable course. Japan has renounced the right to bear arms in its new Constitution and General MacArthur considers that it would be highly undesirable for the Allies to require or suggest in the treaty that Japan should abandon this position. The result would be to confuse the Japanese and to put them in doubt regarding our entire reform program. General MacArthur fully recognizes, however, that a Soviet guarantee of Japanese neutrality could not now be relied upon, and that this will remain the case until the Soviets undergo a basic change of heart. Although he accordingly does not consider disarmed neutrality under a system of great Power guarantees to be a practical solution to Japan’s security problem at the present time, he continues to regard it as the optimum long-run solution when world conditions permit.
3. Basic Strategic Concept
With disarmed neutrality under a system of guarantees impractical for an indefinite period, General MacArthur’s basic strategic concept is for the U.S. to retain naval and air bases in Japan after a treaty for the primary purpose of making it unmistakably clear to the USSR that aggression against Japan will mean all-out war with the United States. He does not believe it necessary or advisable to supplement these bases with Japanese defense forces. If it is made clear that the result would be war with the U.S., General MacArthur believes there is little chance of the Soviets undertaking a local attack on Japan. If, on the other hand, the Soviets on the basis of their over-all strategic plans deliberately launch a general world war, any Japanese defense forces which might have been authorized would, in his view, be of almost negligible military value in denying Japan to the Soviets.
Colonel Babcock did not make clear whether General MacArthur believed that U.S. military strength in Japan should be maintained at a level which might offer some hope of holding Japan for the U.S. in the event of a general war. He did indicate, however, that under General MacArthur’s concept the U.S. would keep itself free to add to its military strength in Japan after the treaty to any extent it considered necessary and desirable.
[Page 892]U.S.–Japan Military Agreement—Colonel Babcock stated that General MacArthur believes that arrangements for U.S. bases in Japan after the treaty should be arrived at by negotiation on an equal basis with the Japanese, and should be incorporated in a separate U.S.–Japan agreement which would come into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the treaty. The latter document would leave the U.S. and Japan free to conclude such an agreement. The base areas, defined in the agreement, would be located at points of maximum strategic advantage and would be secured by the requisite number of U.S. forces. The bases would be self-supporting on a pay-as-you-go relationship with the Japanese, although the Japanese Government would be obligated to provide our forces, after proper payment, with resources required for the bases’ proper functioning. General MacArthur’s thought has been that the present occupation forces would be gradually reduced until at the time of coming into force of the treaty all surplus forces would have been withdrawn and the forces remaining would be established in the prescribed base areas. Asked how the number of our forces in Japan after the treaty might compare with the present number, Colonel Babcock stated that he had raised this question with General MacArthur but that the General had not attempted an estimate and thought the question should be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in light of our over-all strategic planning.
Although he had not discussed the point with General MacArthur, Colonel Babcock stated that the State Department position that U.S. forces retained in Japan after a treaty should be stationed in “remote” areas was unrealistic from a military point of view. He agreed with the State Department, and he was confident that General MacArthur also agreed, that our forces should not be scattered throughout Japan as at present. It was necessary, however, that they be adjacent to the base areas which they were assigned to protect, and these base areas were for military reasons usually near though not actually within population centers. The forces would have dependents with them, but Colonel Babcock did not think this would present a problem considering that all U.S. personnel would live in the base areas and that the burden of supporting them would not fall on the Japanese economy.
Japanese Defense Forces—General MacArthur’s opposition to the establishment of Japanese defense forces is based not only on the above-mentioned Constitutional provision and on his belief that such forces would serve no useful military purpose, but also on the fact that Japan will for some time to come be unable to afford their cost. Colonel Babcock stated that in his discussions with General MacArthur the General had made no reference to authorization of defense forces even at some future period. He believed, however, that General [Page 893] MacArthur would probably approve a treaty provision calling for reexamination of Japan’s security position five or ten years after the treaty. The General considers it important if and when the Japanese are permitted an army that it not be run by the “old crowd” and in the old way but that, as Colonel Babcock put it, it be a “democratic army.” Colonel Babcock stated that although some Japanese undoubtedly desire the reactivation of Japanese defense forces, most are at present thoroughly disillusioned with military methods and actively support a course of continued disarmament for Japan. He was confident that the great majority of Japanese would welcome a U.S.–Japan agreement providing for the retention of U.S. forces in Japan after the treaty.
4. Japanese Internal Security
General MacArthur believes that the Japanese should be permitted in the treaty to develop a constabulary armed with rifles and machine guns and other comparable equipment to enable the Japanese Government to deal with Communist or other internal attacks. He believes they should also be permitted an adequate coast guard. The treaty, in his view, should contain no reference to Japanese civil police forces, leaving the Japanese free to establish these forces at any strength they think wise.
5. Industrial Restrictions
General MacArthur believes that the treaty should impose no restrictions on industries not exclusively devoted to the production of armaments, so that Japan may have the largest possible opportunity to develop its peaceful economy. He does believe, however, that Japan should not be permitted civil aviation activities nor the right to manufacture aircraft. He feels that Japan should be permitted to develop its merchant shipping and merchant shipbuilding industries without limit as an important source of foreign exchange.
6. Post-Treaty Inspection
It is General MacArthur’s view that with Japan forbidden an army, navy, and air force, and with the retention of U.S. bases in Japan, any major violations of the treaty’s disarmament provisions would be apparent without need for a post-treaty inspection system within Japan.
7. The Reforms
General MacArthur believes that the various reforms introduced under the occupation have now won sufficient popular support so that they can be expected for the most part to stand on their own feet. In his opinion the treaty should either require the Japanese to preserve all the reforms or should make no mention of them at all. If the second course is followed, however, he believes it should be made clear to the [Page 894] Japanese that the Allies approve what has been done, so that the Japanese do not gain the impression that we are repudiating the reforms.
8. Formosa
General MacArthur considers it of the greatest importance that Formosa not fall under Communist control. He does not believe it essential that we control the island, but believes that “by hook or by crook” we must keep it out of Communist hands. When Mr. Butterworth observed that this view was widely shared but that the “hook or crook” was difficult to devise, Colonel Babcock stated that General MacArthur had no suggestions on this point. The General thought that, rather than permit Formosa to go to the Communists, it would be better to return it to Japan. He remains of the view that we should retain the Ryukyus as another essential link in the offshore island chain. Colonel Babcock mentioned that General MacArthur agreed with the JCS evaluation in NSC 492 of our security requirements with respect to Japan but had not yet seen the State Department’s comments on that paper in NSC 49/1.3
General Magruder indicated briefly that he and certain others in the Pentagon did not share General MacArthur’s view that reactivation of Japanese defense forces at this time was unnecessary and undesirable. This school of thought holds that Japanese ground forces could be of military value in the defense of Japan, and that their establishment would release U.S. forces for service in other areas where they would be badly needed in the event of war.
In closing his remarks, Colonel Babcock stated that the views which he had expressed were General MacArthur’s personal opinions, and that although he was confident that these opinions would be considered, the decision as to U.S. security requirements in a Japanese peace treaty would of course be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Butterworth thanked General Magruder and Colonel Babcock and stated that the State Department’s present thinking corresponded closely with General MacArthur’s.