The enclosed comments by the Department of State, on the report by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff entitled “Current Strategic Evaluation of
U.S. Security Needs in Japan” (NSC
49)1, are circulated
herewith at the request of the Acting Secretary of State for the
information, of the National Security Council.
[Enclosure]
Department of State Comments on NSC 49 (June 15, 1949)
top secret
[Washington,] September 30,
1949.
In the light of recent conversations with the British Foreign
Secretary and other developments bearing on policy toward Japan,
the Department of State offers the following comments on the
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding U.S. security needs
in Japan (NSC 49):
With respect to paragraph 5 of the JCS paper, the Department of State would add that,
from the political, as well as the military point of view, our
essential objectives with respect to Japan are its denial to the
Soviet Union and the maintenance of Japan’s orientation toward
the Western powers.
The Department of State would emphasize the inter-relation
between these two objectives. The denial of Japan to the USSR
depends not only on the military capabilities and intentions of
the U.S. but also on the attitude—the orientation—of the
Japanese people. The effectiveness, cost and duration of the
U.S. effort required to insure a denial of Japan to the USSR are
directly affected by the attitude of the Japanese.
The Department of State does not doubt that, in the event of an
overt Soviet attack on Japan in the foreseeable future—the
contingency which must necessarily be foremost in the thinking
of the JCS—the military effort
of the U.S. would be the decisive factor. The Department of
State believes that the JCS
would agree, however, that the degree of effort required of the
U.S. would be radically conditioned by the orientation of the
Japanese.
In the event that the present world situation continues much as
at present, the denial of Japan to the USSR constitutes a
problem of combatting, not overt attack and invasion, but
concealed aggression. The threat to Japan in these circumstances
comes from agitation, subversion and coup
d’état. The threat is that of a conspiracy inspired by
the Kremlin, but conducted by Japanese. It is essentially a
conspiracy from within—and whether it succeeds depends primarily
on the political, economic and social health of Japan itself. It
is these problems which are foremost in the thinking of the
Department of State in planning U.S. policy toward Japan for the
present—and the foreseeable future.
The orientation of any people toward a foreign country is a
subjective political-psychological condition. It is the product
of domestic political, economic and social factors, together
with the nature and quality of a nation’s relations with foreign
countries. This being the
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case, the U.S. can neither impose nor
enforce a pro-western orientation on any foreign people,
including the Japanese. We can contribute to such an orientation
only through (a) fostering in Japan, so
far as we are able, conditions conducive to a pro-western
orientation and (b) conducting our
relations with Japan in such a way that, in the developing scene
within Japan, we continue to be respected and, if possible,
regarded with favor.
A word of caution should be advanced at this point regarding
Japanese pro-western orientation. Such an orientation is, of
course, our optimum objective. There are, however, many
gradations between a pro-western orientation and the other
extreme—an anti-U.S. and pro-Soviet attitude. The history of
Japan and the ominous difficulties which lie before that country
cause the Department of State to question whether this optimum
objective can be realistically regarded as attainable. It is
suggested that we may eventually find it necessary, through
force of circumstances, to adopt the objective of a strongly
nationalist, anti-Soviet Japan which we would regard without
favor but as decidedly preferable to a Japan oriented toward the
USSR.
In the meantime, the Department of State concurs with the opinion
expressed by the JCS in
paragraph 8 of its paper that the U.S. should do everything
possible in an attempt to assure a continuance and development
of the present generally favorable attitude of Japan toward the
West. It is also in accord with the JCS conviction that Japanese internal security is
more important than ever and that Japan’s capacity for
self-defense must at the proper time be developed. It shares the
belief of the JCS that the
spreading chaos on the mainland of Asia* heightens the importance of Japan to
us.
The Department of State does not wholly concur with the opinion
of the JCS that
“a peace treaty would, at the present time, be premature
since the continuing Soviet policy of aggressive communist
expansion makes it essential that Japan’s democracy and
western orientation first be established beyond all
question, and since global developments are still in such a
state of flux that measures leading to the risk of loss of
control of any area might seriously affect our national
security.”
The Department of State dissents from this judgment and the first
of the two reasons advanced in support of it because they are,
in terms of political realities, mutually exclusive. The only
hope for the preservation and advancement of such democracy and
western orientation as now exist in Japan lies in the early
conclusion of a peace settlement
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with that country. From the political
point of view, the achievement of our objectives with respect to
Japan are now less likely to be thwarted by proceeding promptly
to a peace treaty than by continuance of the occupation regime,
provided that essential U.S. military needs in Japan are assured
in the treaty or other concurrent arrangements.
The problem before us, the Department of State would submit, is
to contribute through a peace treaty and a new relationship with
Japan to the development within that country of indigenous
resistance to Communism and of spontaneous orientation toward
the west, while at the same time making sure that our essential
military requirements with respect to Japan are provided for and
that the Japanese are given sufficient military strength of a
police nature to check infiltration and to withstand efforts of
Kremlin-inspired groups to seize power by force or
intimidation.
Secondary Comments
The Department of State is not persuaded by the argumentation in
paragraph 6–c relating to the disposition
of occupation forces throughout Japan. From the political point
of view, it is considered that, following a peace settlement,
the continued dispersal of American forces in many Japanese
cities and towns would constitute an irritating and not a
stabilizing influence on the Japanese population.
For reasons set forth in the body of this memorandum, the
Department of State dissents from the condition laid down in
paragraph 10-a as being politically
unrealistic.
The Department of State is in full accord with paragraph 10-b and would add that it has ever since
the issuance of NSC 13
persistently pressed for an expansion and strengthening of the
Japanese police establishment.
With respect to paragraphs 10-c and-d, the Department of State appreciates
and is in sympathy with the security needs for strengthening
Japan’s capacity to defend itself pari
passu with a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from the
islands.
