Office of the Historian

Lot 65 D 238: Box 1 of 1: Folder “Memoranda of Conversation with the President 1949.”

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

confidential
[Washington,] September 16, 1949.

Discussion With the President

Item 3. Japanese Peace Treaty1

After the Cabinet meeting I outlined to the President and Mr. Early,2 who was representing Mr. Johnson, the thoughts which had been going through our minds and which we had discussed with Mr. Bevin as to a possible procedure for going forward with the Japanese peace treaty, stressing the fact that these were purely exploratory discussions and that nothing had been or would be agreed to until, with proper staff work, it had gone to the President for his approval.

I said that as a first step we were going to ask the NME to ask the Joint Chiefs to advise us on the essential security requirements from the United States point of view and that my talk this morning was merely an explanation of the reasons for that request. Mr. Early said that the matter would be given prompt attention. It was understood that if we wrote a letter, it would contain merely the request for advice. Mr. Early thought it was unnecessary to write, but the President was inclined to believe that the question might be sharpened for consideration if it were reduced to writing and that it might be useful to have a record of the request.3

  1. Topics unrelated to Japan are omitted. Item 3 was marked for the attention of Mr. Rusk and Mr. Butterworth.↩
  2. Stephen T. Early, Deputy Secretary of Defense.↩

  3. In a letter of October 3, 1949, to Secretary Johnson, Under Secretary Webb summarized this discussion with the President and solicited the advice of the Defense Department “… with respect to our essential security requirements should we, in the near future, attempt to negotiate a peace settlement with Japan.” Mr. Webb continued in part:

    “Mr. Early has doubtless informed you of the circumstances which render our studies of the problem of a Japanese peace treaty of considerable urgency. Mr. Bevin informed Mr. Acheson during their recent conversations that if the United States Government would submit a draft of a Japanese treaty to the U.K. Government for consideration in advance of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Conference in January, he would, assuming the draft were acceptable to the U.K., endeavor at the Commonwealth Conference to enlist the support of the Commonwealth Governments for the draft. To provide such a draft in time, our two Departments would probably have to agree on its provisions by mid-November, so that the draft, as approved by the NSC and the President, might be presented to the British in early December.” (711.94/10–349)

    Enclosed with Mr. Webb’s letter was a copy of the enclosure to the note by Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, to the Council, October 4, 1949, p. 870.

    ↩