740.00119 Control (Japan)/6–1649
The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 1
My Dear General MacArthur: Your letter of June 16, 1949 was, as I said in my brief acknowledgment, both timely and welcome. Problems of our policy in the Far East are taking a large part of our thought. I have asked Ambassador Jessup, Dr. Raymond Fosdick and President Case of Colgate to assist Mr. Butterworth and me in a thorough review and reappraisal of our actions and objectives throughout the Far East as a preparation for consideration and recommendations to the President by the National Security Council.2 So I was particularly happy to have your letter.
First, may I allay the concern expressed in the opening sentence of your letter. You say, “I have been rather disturbed recently over recurrent Washington datelined dispatches reflecting a trend of thought in official circles that a change in the regime of control in Japan, patterned after the plan now being implemented for the United States Zone of Germany, would not only be a desirable development but susceptible of accomplishment with no less difficulty”.
I remember seeing some newspaper stories along these lines. But so far as I know they do not reflect any trend of thought in official circles—certainly not in the Department of State.
As you very correctly state, the situation in Germany was and is very different from that in Japan. In Germany the country was divided into four zones, in each of which the only government was that provided [Page 851] by the forces of the occupying power. The machinery for providing central and unifying control by the four military commanders broke down completely. So the evolutionary process of creating a German area sufficient to attempt economic recovery and a German government to administer that area, under Allied control, began by the fusion of the British and United States Zones; then progressed to the inclusion of the French Zone; and is now coming to the creation of a German government for this area. This Government must function under the control of a tripartite High Commission—even then the Russian Zone remains separate and inaccessible.
Japan, as you say, fortunately is united and administered by a Japanese government. The regime of control is not centered in a commission, but in the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
Equally fortunately, the preeminence of United States interests has been recognized and maintained in this regime of control.
The United States, as you know, can if its interests so require, veto any undesirable policy proposal in the FEC, prevent the FEC from adversely reviewing any action of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and on matters of urgency issue an interim directive to the Supreme Commander. The purely American as well as the international character of the Supreme Commander was explicity recognized in the Moscow decision which provided that the Supreme Commander (or his Deputy) should be the Chairman “and United States member” of the Allied Council. The terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission also provide that the Commission “will respect existing control machinery in Japan, including the chain of command from the United States Government to the Supreme Commander …”3 This position was further strengthened by the Far Eastern Commission as late as June 1947, when it adopted the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (FEC–014/10) which provides inter-alia that the United States alone, and without the concurrence of any other government, may appoint the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. These facts taken together with the recognition in the Moscow Agreement of 1945 of the broad powers of the Supreme Commander as the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan place the United States in a peculiarly favorable position.
In a situation so different from that in Germany and so much more favorable from the point of view of accomplishment of United States policy, no one in a position of responsibility would, I think, find developments in Germany a pattern. These newspaper stories to the contrary were what newspapermen call “think pieces”—with little or no stress on the “think”.
[Page 852]Second, what has been occupying our thoughts, as I know it has been occupying yours, is to find the true path of progress toward a Japan firmly attached to American interests in peace, security and freedom from Communist domination in the Far East.
It seems to me that here there is not a dichotomy between a peace treaty and occupation. Both might well be used to accomplish the same purpose.
The great problem about a peace treaty is that we are not alone in negotiating it. The Russians raised the matter of a Japanese treaty in the Paris meeting. Their plainly stated position was that by the Potsdam Agreement the Council of Foreign Ministers plus China was the instrumentality required to prepare the treaty. Neither the British, French nor our Government would even consider such a proposal, utterly without legal foundation as it was. Whether any other possible procedure, especially one which did not give the United States a veto, would operate to our benefit is a moot question. Perhaps the whole question of a veto is academic in view of the right of every nation participating in a peace conference to accept or reject any treaty drafted by the conference.
At any rate we now have this treaty question under active consideration. It seems not at all improbable that it will prove impossible to draft a treaty acceptable to us and to all of the other interested powers. Certainly this possibility must be contemplated. In this event certain very clear questions arise as to our course. Before long I should like to send one of our most trusted officers to discuss some of these questions with you, in the highly probable event that I cannot get away from Washington myself. He can bring me your views in more satisfactory detail than correspondence permits.
Finally, pending a treaty, the present policy of the occupation of training the Japanese to responsibility under free government by giving them increasing responsibility can continue and perhaps be accentuated. This, as I understand it, was the thought underlying NSC 13/3, to the formulation of which you contributed so helpfully. Here, again, we in the Department of State would be greatly helped by a thorough talk with you. (In this connection I am conscious of a defect, without being able to suggest a remedy, in the liaison with you.)
I am sorry to inflict upon you so long a letter. I have written it myself to share with you personal rather than institutional thoughts. Your own kindness in giving me your own reflections, as well as your thoughtful invitation to come and see for myself, I most deeply appreciate.
Most sincerely yours,