740.00119–P.W./1–2549
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Bishop) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
Subject: SCAP’s Latest Reparations Wire.
There follows a summary-analysis of SCAP’s C 67249, January 21, replying to the list of questions in War’s 82448, January 7, sent by Colonel Lincoln.1 Copies of the two wires are attached.2
- A
-
- (1)
- Of the total quantity of primary war facilities in Japan, valued by OCI at 1,470,000,000 1939 yen or 370 million dollars (rate of 4 to 1), SCAP states that approximately 22 per cent, valued at 80 million dollars, is now engaged in production. The various types of production (for the occupation forces, for export and for domestic consumption) are indicated in the first sizeable paragraph in his wire.
- (2)
- SCAP states that approximately 44 per cent of the primary war facilities in Japan can be expected to be in production by 1953. Presumably the remaining 56 per cent would be idle.
- (3)
- SCAP reiterates his view that removal of any further reparations, except facilities presently being processed for removal under the Advance Transfer Program, would seriously affect the stabilization program.
- B
-
- (1)
- SCAP states it would cost 33.8 billion present day yen (125 million dollars) to remove all primary war facilities for reparations. This is about one-third of the value of the facilities (370 million dollars). He says it would take 18 months to complete the operation.
- (2)
- The cost of completing removal of reparations presently being processed would be about 850,000 dollars, over a 5-month period.
- C
-
- (1)
-
SCAP states that the weight of all primary war facilities, packed and crated, would be 1,202,634 metric tons. The weight of facilities presently being processed would be 7782 metric tons. The figures in long tons of shipping are, respectively, 1,182,890 and 7,664.
[Page 626]SCAP reiterates in strongest terms his previously stated position that no further reparations should be removed from Japan. The data which he presents contain nothing which would invalidate this position, but E may be expected to emphasize his statement that 56 per cent of the primary war facilities in Japan will still be idle in 1953.
Nothing in this wire detracts from but rather actually strongly supports our expressed views.