740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–2949
Memorandum by Mr. Marshall Green, of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
Views of Other Countries Toward a Japanese Peace Settlement
i. introduction
The following discussion of the views of the various FEC countries toward the timing, procedure and content of a peace treaty for Japan is based on a variety of official and nonofficial documents. The views attributed to these countries may not always reflect current thinking since they are based to some extent on information that may now be out of date. Only through direct diplomatic talks with these countries will it be possible to gain any authoritative picture of their thinking on all these matters.
This discussion is confined to the views of the FEC countries. It may be reasonably assumed that the Latin American Republics will generally support the U.S. position at the treaty; that the Arab world [Page 820] will be prone to follow the leadership of Pakistan and India, Pakistan opinion on this subject being clearly sallied to Indian; that non-FEC European thinking will be divided by the Iron Curtain between support for the USSR position on the one hand and a tendency to support the British and/or U.S. position on the other.
ii. timing and procedure of a peace settlement
All of the FEC countries, except India and possibly France, favor a Japanese peace settlement as soon as possible. India fears the risks involved in any U.S. withdrawal from Japan at a time of rapid Communism expansion in Asia. There has been no recent indication of official French thinking on the subject. While the Kremlin presumably recognizes that a prolonged U.S. occupation will tend increasingly to antagonize the Japanese, it is possible that the present Soviet line favoring an early peace settlement is based on more than propaganda designed to curry favor with the Japanese. Moscow may estimate that, with China passing under Communist domination, a Japan freed from occupation control would be more pliable than at present to pressure from Communist Asia.
As for peace treaty procedure, the U.K. and the British Commonwealth countries still support the Canberra Conference decision in favor of voting by a two-thirds majority of all FEC countries, none of them having the power of veto. If the four Great Powers insisted on a veto, the British Commonwealth would probably not object, provided a British Commonwealth representative were also given the power of veto in the name of Australia, New Zealand, India and Canada. In the last analysis these countries might even accept the FEC voting procedure proposed by China in 1947. The Netherlands and France would tend to follow the lead of the U.S. on this matter. The USSR might modify its present demand that the treaty be initially considered by the CFM but would probably insist on having the right of veto at any peace conference.
The Netherlands, U.K. and Philippines appear prepared to conclude a treaty with or without Soviet participation. Australia and New Zealand have expressed the view that Soviet participation is important. Heretofore China has been reluctant to antagonize the USSR or give it a pretext for abrogating the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty. At this stage of developments in China, the Chinese Government would probably not refuse to participate in a conference without the USSR.
In the absence of a peace treaty, the U.S. would presumably proceed with its present policy of restoring to Japan increasing responsibility over its international relations. All of the other FEC countries have taken the view that this is a matter for the FEC, not SCAP, to determine. India and the Netherlands sympathize with the principle underlying this U.S. policy. The U.K. is resisting any attempt to go [Page 821] too fast during the transition period; whereas the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and France are reluctant to see Japan attain a position approaching equality with other nations prior to a peace settlement.
iii. content of a peace settlement
Australia
Despite Communist-inspired unrest in populous Southeast Asia and despite expanding Soviet influence in Northeast Asia, Australia has clung to the belief that the principal threat to its security comes from a revived Japan rather than from a Communist Asia backed by the Soviet Union. There has been a tendency in Australia to avoid the realities of the Far Eastern situation in the knowledge that the U.S. will, as before, “bail them out” of any military crisis. By the same token Australia is anxious to see the U.S. military position in the Western Pacific strengthened. It favors a U.S. strategic trusteeship for the Bonins, the Ryukyus and perhaps for Quelpart (Cheju, now held by Korea). Presumably it would not oppose U.S. bases in Japan, being disposed to favor any increase of U.S. commitments in the Western Pacific. If the U.S. underwrote a Pacific counterpart to the North Atlantic Pact, Australia could be expected to moderate its previous position demanding that Japan remain completely disarmed and demilitarized for decades hence. Present Australian thinking would favor treaty terms extending Allied supervision over Japan in the form of an inspection of strategic industries and a regulation of imports. Australian officials are sympathetic to the view that reparations be relatively small. Australia may be expected to propose the inclusion of treaty clauses guaranteeing the perpetuation of labor reforms and the decartelization of industry.
Canada
The Canadian position on major policy issues arising at the peace conference will be in general accord with that of the U.S. However, in deference to its Commonwealth ties, Canada may support the views of the other Dominions on minor issues if such support does not lead to serious conflict with U.S. views.
Kuomintang China
(If a Communist Government in China has been internationally recognized when the peace conference convenes, the Chinese position will follow the lead of the USSR on most, if not all, questions.)
Chinese public opinion has continually clamored for a “hard” policy toward Japan, an attitude which presages popular Chinese desire for strict peace treaty terms. Officials of the Chinese Foreign Office have been more moderate in their viewpoint; and recently the Acting Foreign Minister, Mr. Yeh, informed the American Embassy office in [Page 822] Canton that China had “revised its policy with respect to Japan” and would support American policy in Japan. It would be unrealistic to suppose, on the basis of Mr. Yeh’s statement, that China would give unqualified support to the U.S. position at the peace conference. It would demand a price for so doing, perhaps a “Pacific Pact” the terms of which pledged assistance to Kuomintang China. In response to public opinion and for bargaining purposes, China is likely at the peace conference initially to press its claims for the Ryukyu Islands. It will insist on the retention of Formosa. Chinese officials will be torn between the need to follow U.S. leadership and popular pressures in China for post-treaty controls, sizeable amounts of reparations, and long-term guarantees of Japanese disarmament and demilitarization.
France
France generally desires to maintain a common non-Communist front in Japanese treaty negotiations. Hence it will incline toward the U.S. point of view on questions where only the USSR is in opposition. Should a peace conference for Japan precede one for Germany, French desire to avoid taking positions that they would wish to reverse with regard to Germany may bring them into opposition to American views on the level of industry in Japan and on the amount and allocation of reparations.
India
India’s attitude toward Japan is largely conditioned by a desire to restore its profitable pre-war trade with Japan and by a fear lest Japan fall under Communist influence. It will oppose the imposition of any serious or complicated post-treaty controls and will favor U.S. plans for a liberal treaty settlement, especially in economic matters. Indian opinion thus far has not criticized the U.S. cancellation of reparations from Japan. India’s probable policy toward territorial questions will be to oppose outright annexation of any former Japanese territory by a Western power including the USSR and to advocate extension of TRUSTCO authority over Pacific Island holdings. Consistent with India’s view that Japan should be restored as master in its own house, India would probably support a proposal for limited Japanese rearmament.
Netherlands
With its far-flung crumbling Empire directly in the path of Communist advance, the Netherlands has every reason to support treaty terms designed to promote a strong U.S. position in the Western Pacific and a friendly Japan. Reparations is likely to remain an outstanding point of issue between the Netherlands and the U.S.
[Page 823]New Zealand
New Zealand’s attitude toward the peace treaty is similar to that of Australia, except that, lacking commercial rivalry with Japan, New Zealand has less interest in imposing restrictions on Japanese industry and shipping. Of significance in any peace negotiation is New Zealand’s resentment of Dr. Evatt’s self-appointed role as spokesman both for Australia and New Zealand.
Philippines
The widest divergence between the Philippine and U.S. positions at a peace treaty is apt to occur over the reparations issue and over measures to prevent the growth of Japanese war potential. On other matters affecting Japan, the official attitude of the Philippine Government has long been more conciliatory to U.S. wishes than the strong anti-Japanese sentiment of the Filipino public. However, with the approach of the national elections in November, 1949, the administration will be under some political pressure to take a strong anti-Japanese stand. Whether Quirino or Laurel is elected to the presidency, the Philippines could not afford, in the final peace treaty negotiations, to oppose the general peace terms proposed by the U.S. as they provided for a strong U.S. military position in the Western Pacific.
USSR
The USSR has become increasingly sensitive to the possibility that the U.S. intends to rearm Japan and use it as an anti-Soviet bastion in the Far East. A primary objective of USSR policy now and at the peace treaty will be to increase Soviet-Communist influence in Japan and to prevent the U.S. from acquiring base rights or any other special privileges in Japan or the Ryukyus. The USSR is likely to take a literal interpretation of the Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam delimitations on Japanese territory, in order to retain all the Kurile Islands and to support Chinese claims, if a Chinese Communist Government has been recognized, for the Ryukyus. If a Chinese Communist regime has not been recognized, the USSR might suggest a trusteeship arrangement over the islands in which the USSR would participate or, as a propaganda gesture, the return of the islands to Japan.
The USSR has good reason to avoid the imposition of severe treaty terms on Japan, particularly limitations on Japanese industry. Soviet espousal of such a policy would alienate Japanese opinion from the USSR and might interfere with Soviet plans for building up Communist East Asia. Nevertheless, for purposes of extending its influence in Japan, the USSR will probably advocate continuation of the purge and the maintaining of certain post-treaty controls over Japan in which the USSR would actively participate.
[Page 824]United Kingdom
Largely dependent on the U.S. for maintaining its security interests in the Pacific, the U.K. has reason not to oppose important U.S. recommendations on the peace settlement. A departure from this policy may occur on questions that engage the commercial interests of Britain. Thus the U.K. has favored prohibitions on Japanese aircraft manufacture and long-term limitations on the speed and size of Japanese ships and on its shipbuilding capacity. Largely because of fear of cheap labor competition from Japan, the U.K. would certainly seek ways of ensuring as far as possible the development of a lasting strong trade union movement in Japan. Whereas British thinking at the Canberra Conference envisaged a post-treaty Allied control body in Tokyo and an Allied inspectorate system for enforcing control at key points in the Japanese economic system, this may no longer represent the official U.K. viewpoint. The U.K. has indicated informally, but at a high official level, the support of any U.S. proposal to establish bases on Japan or the Ryukyus.
iv. conclusions
Communist successes in China and Communist threats to other parts of the Far East have caused a decisive shift over the past two years in the positions of the FEC powers on substantive questions affecting the treaty. In the eyes of most of the FEC powers, Japan is no longer the principal threat to their security. This in turn has occasioned a softening of their attitudes toward Japan and a tendency to support in principle the main objectives of current U.S. policy toward Japan. Should the U.S. be willing to assume long-term responsibility for the security of the Western Pacific through a “Pacific Pact” or some other security arrangement, it is not impossible that the softening process now apparent would, if preceded by sufficient diplomatic spadework, culminate in a willingness to follow the U.S. in a conference without the USSR (and Communist China, if then recognized) or to support the U.S. on all major issues should the USSR and Communist China participate at least initially in a conference. For different reasons and with opposing intentions, the USSR has likewise moved away from the idea of a harsh peace for Japan. On the basis of the foregoing generalizations, it could be argued that the chances for peace conference adoption of a treaty acceptable to the U.S. have substantially improved since 1947.
On the other hand, Communist successes in Asia have made it essential to U.S. security that there be no treaty with Japan unless that treaty provides for, or does not preclude, arrangements for adequately protecting U.S. strategic interests in Japan, the Ryukyus and elsewhere in the Western Pacific. The major objective of the Soviet Union at a peace conference, however, will be precisely the opposite: namely, [Page 825] to prevent arrangements which might perpetuate U.S. influence in Japan and which might facilitate the use of Japan or the Ryukyus as a base for U.S. military operations. These diametrically opposing objectives would make it almost impossible for the U.S. and the USSR now to agree on treaty terms.