740.00119 Control (Japan)/7–2649
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
top secret
[Received August 2.]
Dear Walt: Having arrived in Yokohama during the morning of July 23, I later telephoned for an appointment with General Mac-Arthur. His Aide set the time at 6:00 p. m., but called later and said that the General would like to see me at 1:15 p. m., if convenient. I accordingly called on the General and spent approximately two hours with him. You will undoubtedly be interested in some of the main points of this conversation—both from the viewpoint of what I told the General and with regard to his comments.
[Page 809]First of all, I extended the Secretary’s personal greetings to the General and said that I had conveyed the latter’s invitation to the Secretary for a visit to Japan, that the Secretary said this would be most difficult but, if possible, would like to make such a visit this fall. General MacArthur said that he appreciated how difficult it is for the Secretary to leave Washington but he hopes that the visit can eventuate, as United States prestige in Japan would be raised immeasurably and public opinion in the entire Far East would react favorably towards such an important visit.
The General asked me regarding the general attitude of the Department towards the Occupation. I told the General that my principal reaction could be summed up in a few words, namely, that the Department is highly disappointed at the apparent failure of SCAP to implement the Various provisions of United States foreign policy as set forth in NSC 13/3. For example, I said, everyone feels that the Occupation should stop attempting to operate the Japanese Government; that there are too many Americans concerned with the minutiae of government; and that it is high time that the Occupation be placed solely on a policy level with an attendant radical reduction in the number of personnel involved.
The General said that he has already given instructions regarding reduction in personnel and that approximately one thousand people will be off the rolls by the end of fiscal year 1951. I said that in my opinion this is not enough to satisfy Washington. The General then asked what the people in the State Department think would be a reasonable number with which to carry on the Occupation. I said, “About 200.” After a moment’s reflection the General said that he saw no reason why the civilian end of the Occupation could not be carried on by 200 people, provided such personnel were of sufficiently high caliber and competence to act and operate on a policy level. He said it took almost two and one-half years to obtain a financial expert of Mr. Dodge’s standing and he therefore wondered how many years it would take before he could have sufficient experts capable of formulating and making policy decisions. He admitted that there might be “some water which could be squeezed out of the Headquarters” but, all in all, he felt that with present directives (especially the nine-point economic program) it would be impossible radically to reduce personnel at the present time. He is, however, continuing his efforts wherever possible to cut down and to take the Occupation out of operating procedures.
With regard to the purge, the General said that he could not understand why Washington insists that he act contrary to the FEC policy decision on this subject. I explained to him the reasons, but his attitude convinced me that the time was inopportune to press the subject. [Page 810] (I made a mental note to return to this subject when I discuss my letter to him written in the Department—this letter was not mentioned.)
It was at this point that I casually mentioned the Siamese gold problem and the probability that a communication of some sort on this subject would be received shortly. I have already covered this aspect of our conversation in my letter of July 25.
I told the General that one thought in the Department is along the line of establishing a civilian deputy under the Supreme Commander, with broad powers separate and distinct from the military. The General immediately asked, “who would this gem of a person be?” I said that Joe Dodge’s name had been mentioned but the General said he was convinced in his own mind that Dodge would not accept. In any event, he said that he would not be party to an arrangement whereby he, General MacArthur, would be expected to sit idly by and let someone else run the Occupation for him. He then spoke at length and with some bitterness on the difficulties which he has had in keeping high-caliber people on the job here. He mentioned several names, including Dodge, as examples of what happens: the experts come to Japan, recommend a plan which is set in motion, and then promptly depart for the United States, leaving SCAP to hold the bag. He said that the present difficult economic situation in Japan is the direct result of Dodge’s recommendations and that Dodge should be here to provide further guidance and direction. In other words, the experts should see it through, for two years if necessary.
With regard to the impact of the Occupation upon the Japanese people, the General said that his statement of May 3, 1949,1 has set the pattern for a rapid return to the Japanese of many functions previously directly controlled by the Occupation. He said that wherever possible, jurisdiction is being returned to the Japanese and that in consequence, more and more authority is being assumed by the Japanese Government. He felt, however, that it could not be Washington’s desire that United States troop strength in Japan be further reduced and he is accordingly working on the premise that the Eighth Army should gradually revert to a tactical force in garrison status. He pointed out the complex problem which faces United States policy in Japan by demanding on the one hand that the impact of the Occupation be minimized, and on the other, that strategic protection be given to United States interests in the Far East.
General MacArthur apparently still feels that a treaty of peace should be negotiated at the earliest possible moment with the proviso, however, that United States troops remain here until such time when their withdrawal becomes feasible. He realizes the dilemma in which we would be placed were such a decision to be made, but hopes that [Page 811] efforts towards a peace treaty will continue, especially as he feels that we are losing the good will of the Japanese by seemingly holding out against a treaty.
On the matter of sufficiency of Japanese police forces, the General said that the military have been ordered to refrain from interference in all cases, except when a situation has patently grown out of hand. He believes that the Japanese police forces have been vastly improved in discipline and morale and are fully capable of handling problems which would normally fall to a police force. He thinks it unreasonable to expect the Japanese police to act as a constabulary as obviously they are not armed beyond pistols nor trained as troops.
The General asked me whether consideration is being given to a change in the regime of control of Japan. I replied that I was unable to discover any definitive thought on this subject; that people in the Department realize and appreciate the excellent job which he has done in Japan, and that, barring a treaty of peace, I very much doubted that the regime of control would be changed. On the other hand, I said that the Department is strongly of the view that SCAP, being an officer of the United States appointed by the President, is subject to orders from the United States Government, and could be replaced by the President without great difficulty. The General took exception to this view on the ground that the Moscow Agreement specifically states that he is the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers and that appointment of a new SCAP would be subject to agreement among the major Allied Powers. I said that his view does not conform with that held by the policy makers in Washington. I closed this part of the discussion by recounting a rumor which I had heard on fairly good authority regarding the acceptance of General Clay’s resignation by the President,2 presumably because of his failure to carry out United States policy. This interested the General greatly and later when I accompanied him to his car he said that the Clay resignation was a most interesting bit of news. I particularly stressed to the General the fact that my information was based on a casual conversation and that I could not, of course, vouch for it. The General said he believes the story and that it makes sense in the light of other factors.
I told the General that I was greatly impressed by the earnestness with which all levels in the Department strive to meet and reconcile SCAPS’s views with realities of the situation in Washington. I assured him that when his views are received they are given most careful study and consideration by everyone concerned although at times it is impossible to adopt his views in toto and that compromise solutions are often the only possible ones consistent with practicality.
[Page 812]The General seemed to be genuinely glad to welcome me back to Japan and invited me to come to see him as often as I wish if there are any other matters that I would like to bring to his attention. He said that he is desirous of doing every thing possible to assist in carrying out United States foreign policy. When I suggested to him that one school of thought in the Department of the Army felt that the State Department alone should formulate all policy (except purely military matters) for Japan, the General said that such an arrangement would be an improvement over the present confusing procedure.
In summary, it is my conclusion that the General is prepared to go along with the Department’s policies in most cases. He still feels strongly about the purge (probably as a result of Whitney’s advice), but even on this subject I have hopes of some amelioration. In my meeting with him I sensed a new willingness to “play ball”, an attitude which contrasts favorably with his former criticisms of the Department, particularly of the working levels. While the battle is far from won, I was also impressed in a later conversation by the attitude of Major General E. M. Almond, Chief of Staff, regarding efforts being made to cut down Occupation controls, reduce personnel, eliminate evidences of military overlordship, and in general to meeting the underlying philosophy of NSC 13/3. I will keep you advised from time to time of progress made in this connection by personal letters or appropriate official communications.
Sincerely yours,