894.00B/1–349: Telegram
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (sebald) to the Acting Secretary of State
2. For Lovett.2 Complying with instructions contained in Department’s telegram December 31,3 I have discussed the matter in reference with General MacArthur4 who has authorized me to transmit to you his general views as follows:
“From a political standpoint, I do not regard the immediately potential Communist threat to Japan as much more than a nuisance factor. The Communist representation in the National Diet must increase many fold before its voice in legislative affairs becomes politically effective, an increase not likely at least in the foreseeable future. Traditionally, the Japanese are conservative and they have long held the Russian, in dislike and the Chinese in contempt, and are not likely voluntarily to follow the ideological leadership of either. In addition, from a sociological standpoint, the threat of the spread of Communism through the farm masses, once hinging upon the feudalistic system of farm tenancy, has now been effectively removed through the land reforms which have elevated the individual farmer families to the dignity of proprietary ownership and worked out an effective system of farm cooperatives, leaving no fertile ground for the Communists to work upon in this large and powerful rural area of Japanese society comprising approximately one-half of the population. Other areas, save that of industrial labor, are similarly fortified against Communist invasion, either through natural and traditional conservatism or through advantages now held which stand up against anything which the Communists offer. With industrial labor, the situation is different. Its very immaturity in organized reform renders it easy prey to leadership which offers a wealth-sharing panacea to existing impoverishment, however unsound the promise. The potential danger to every other segment of Japanese society from a Communist-controlled [Page 602] labor movement would be very real and immediate. This is well known to the Communist Party which, as a result, has devoted almost its entire effort to its infiltration to a dominant position of labor leadership. The numerical weakness of the Communist membership does not permit even this effort to extend over a broad labor front, and as a consequence its tactic has been to concentrate upon those segments of labor most vital to political and economic stability. It thus sought to seize control of the two great government unions, communications and transportation, which would have permitted it almost at will to paralyze those vital arteries to Japanese life. This move was effectively blocked by action to place the public service on more stable ground through the enactment of laws prohibiting the strike and sharply restricting the right of collective bargaining. More recently, with the receipt here of the United States interim directive on rehabilitation of the Japanese economy, existing labor strife, then concentrated in the vital area of private industry covering coal and electrical energy production, was brought under control through the moral appeal to support the general welfare with, of course, the dominant influence which an occupation requirement and leadership exercises upon all phases of indigenous activity.
“I do not view with concern talk of a ‘popular front’ in Japan. So far such talk has been entirely confined to the Communist Party and its affiliates. A splinter group from the left wing of the Social Democratic Party may possibly join with the Communists in the course of or immediately following the coming election, as there is already great similarity in political philosophy and tactic, but the resulting coalition would be of little political consequence. On the other hand, such a move would leave the Social Democratic Party, cleansed of its most unruly and troublesome element, in an infinitely stronger position to contribute objectively to the country’s need, either as an opposition party or segment of a government coalition. This party should more properly be named as the ‘Labor Party’, as organized and led by outstanding labor leaders and finding most of its support in the ranks of labor, its advocacy of Socialism is at most a long range advocacy and its immediate purpose is to support legislation of direct labor interest. Apart from its radical left wing mentioned, it is fundamentally more conservative than conventional Socialism and is openly opposed to the extreme of either the right or the left.
“The greatest boost for the spread of Communism in Japan lies in the ammunition which from time to time is supplied its local leadership through thoughtless and irresponsible press statements emanating largely from Washington correspondents which instill doubt in the Japanese mind that Washington official opinion is in harmony with occupation objectives and action. Such statements, usually ascribed to anonymous official sources frequently give real encouragement to the local Communist leaders and bewilder the Japanese masses. Intentionally or not, they are not infrequently timed and phrased to checkmate local efforts to ensure the vigorous implementation by the Japanese of American policy and almost invariably lend aid to the Communist propaganda effort. I am only now bringing a glaring example of this condition to the attention of the Department of the Army by radio C–66781 of January 3. In addition, such items of manifest discrimination as the area restrictions placed upon Japanese [Page 603] deep sea fishing in the Pacific, in contravention of the explicit provisions of the Potsdam declaration, well known to the Japanese, with respect to access to raw materials and the fact that approximately four times as much per capita aid is being given to the German people than to the Japanese provides the Communist Party with the ammunition it needs to support the racial solidarity concept it advocates to gain adherents within Japan.
“There is little that should be done [not] now being done here to check the advance of Communism, but should the threat in future become greatly aggravated or should such a common front become a threatening reality, I should, of course, search for a legal means to apply direct pressure which I have heretofore avoided as inadvisable and unnecessary. In final analysis, were injudicious statements in Washington, oft-times made to woo American pressure groups avoided and a more positive show of support given the occupation, overwhelming of the Communist movement in Japan through its complete repudiation by the Japanese people would be rendered infinitely easier.”
Information to Department of Army.