Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 1

851G.00/12–1149: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

Paris, December 11, 1948—2 p. m.

5197. For the Secretary from Bruce: ReDeptel 4633, December 1.

1. In my view the Indochina problem should be considered by the US in a completely cold-blooded fashion. If as some observers contend, it is a matter of indifference to American security and political interests whether or not that country falls completely under Communist domination, then we are wasting our time in reflecting upon possible courses of action calculated to compress and suppress Communism there. If, however, as I personally believe very strongly, we as a nation have a vital interest in the establishment and maintenance in Indochina of a non-Communist government, we must reconcile ourselves to the necessity of adopting such practical measures as might at least give us an expectancy of bringing about this condition.

2. I assume that no responsible American official believes that we can afford to take a chance that Asiatic Communism will in a reasonable future become a national Communism more friendly to US than to the USSR or that a round-table conference at which Bao Dai and Ho Chi Minh would sit as equals could result at best in more than a dangerous stalemate or, more probably, in the victory of the latter.

3. Let us first examine from the standpoint of realistic French politics what cannot and what can be done by the French Government in this matter.

(a) On the negative side, no French Cabinet would survive the running of the Parliamentary gauntlet if it suggested the withdrawal at present or in the near future of French troops from Indochina. Such above besides the powerful opposition to it generated by considerations of national pride and prestige, of financial commitments and of sentimental ties would probably result in the massacre of tens of thousands of French civilians and anti-Communist Vietnamese as well as severe military losses to the troops covering evacuation. Shipping is not available in sufficient tonnage even to begin an operation of such magnitude whose only possible success would depend upon its being carried out with great speed. Other logistical considerations would be equally adverse.

(b) At present no French Government could remain in power that advocated complete independence either now or in the future for Indochina, if by complete independence we mean that the country would not form a portion of the French Union. Public opinion in France is unalterable on this point and only the Communists and some left-wing Socialists would give support to such a notion. The French profess their willingness to abandon colonialism in all its forms as rapidly as is consistent with security, and feel that March 8 agreements are already a pledge of their good faith in that connection, but they sincerely believe and I agree that the maintenance of Vietnam in the union is the only present method by which Communism can be contained and a stable state created. Also, it should be observed that the parable of the mote applies to the French as well as to other nations. They do not feel any consciousness of having on balance grievously oppressed the native population or exploited it for their own exclusive benefit; on the contrary they take pride in having by their own account led with a vast expenditure of effort, blood and treasure a congeries of backward and ignorant peoples toward a state of enlightenment where they are sensible of nationhood and are demanding the rights of self government. Bigoted as many foreigners may think this attitude to be, nevertheless it exists and is an element in the situation which must not be disregarded.

4. The fact remains that there will be at the end of this year in Indochina almost one hundred and fifty thousand regular French and African troops, well equipped judged by Asiatic standards, and it is these and not any native forces which have prevented the country from having long ago fallen a prey to Ho Chi Minh and his Communist associates and followers. Naturally, there are in France and in the overseas territories from which these soldiers derive a multitude of families who would rather have these men at home than dying under the stinking circumstances of jungle warfare many thousand miles away. But the necessity for such service is almost universally understood by those upon whom it imposes the heaviest sacrifices. In addition great as is the financial burden heaped upon the French nation by this thankless war, which swallowed up this year about half a billion dollars in expenses none of which will ever be recuperated, an amount which represents approximately the deficit in the national budget and is deadly to sound fiscality, there is no intention in the French Parliament, contentious though the subject be, of laying down this task and abandoning the conflict there. All this is a sentiment deep rooted in the national consciousness, despite the fact that while the best troops are engaged in these border skirmishes a far mightier enemy threatens, her Rhine borders stripped of men than otherwise would help in their defense.

The above are not mere conjectures; they represent the practicalities of politics.

5. I agree of course with the Department’s basic thesis of necessity wider popular support Bao Dai regime and important part played by widespread distrust of French as barrier to attainment of this popular support. I am convinced that there is no chance of French Government accepting the time table idea or the offer of international supervision, and that submission by US of these proposals which French Government could not possibly accept in view domestic political realities this subject would seriously prejudice the adoption of the program recommended below. In French view March 8 agreements supplemented by conventions now being negotiated at Saigon confer independence on Vietnam within French Union. Such limitations on sovereignty as will exist upon conclusion signing these agreements can gradually be removed when peaceful conditions restored and functioning non-Communist Viet government in control until something approaching or even exceeding dominion status is attained. As long as presence French Army, a certain number of trained French civil servants, and French financial support absolutely indispensable to maintenance non-Communist regime Indochina, a declaration of “complete independence for Vietnam at fixed future date” is out of question. I likewise believe that there is no chance of French accepting international supervision plan any more than the British would if it were suggested for Malaya. In addition factors national pride involved, almost universal revolt in French official and political life against what are considered unrealistic UN solutions of such problems as Italian colonies and UN attempt confer upon Trusteeship Council broader investigatory powers in French dependent areas would render acceptance such a scheme impossible and might prejudice ratification agreements now pending. Also, even broadminded and liberal Frenchmen question necessity international supervision negotiations between partners, for it is as partners in struggle against Communist domination Indochina that French officials view Bao Dai and themselves. There is no parallel to Indonesian case. Some of the vitriolic native critics of the French, their freedom of speech and safety of person guaranteed by French bayonets, would cry lustily and despairingly if they were deprived of the military protection, the administrative assistance, and the subsidized economy which now defends them against terror, chaos and inflation. If there were deadlock between French and Bao Dai and latter requested international supervision, matter would be placed on different basis but in absence such request by Bao Dai average Frenchman would consider suggestion by US as gratuitous and offering opportunity much mischief making (for instance by present Indian Consul General) in already complex enough situation in Saigon.

6. Since the French will neither leave Indochina lock, stock and barrel nor grant fuller independence to Vietnam than is consistent with membership in French Union, what can be done to further our objective of halting Communist expansion at the Tonkinese border. If that is not done, Burma and Siam will fall like overripe apples and the British, as MacDonald has warned, will be forced to reconsider the tenability of their position in Malaya.

7. I shall outline below maximum program which we in Embassy, after mature reflection and discreet consultation with leading French official and political figures, believe feasible. This program falls considerably short of what we should like to see accomplished but is necessarily adapted to actual public opinion in France, the capabilities of a government operating with a slim Parliamentary majority and to other factors too well known to the Department to require comment here.

8. Program for French action should be:

(a) Immediate ratification of Auriol–Bao Dai, Franco-Cambodian and Franco-Laotian agreements. As previously reported, decision to submit them to Parliamentary approval has already been taken.

(b) Immediately thereafter transfer of Indochina affairs from Ministry Overseas France to another government department. This principle accepted by Cabinet but majority government thinking now appears against transfer to Foreign Office and in favor creation Ministry French Union on pattern British Commonwealth Office.

(c) Completion and signing supplementary accords Saigon and turning over powers to Viet authorities in picturesque ceremony attended by Pignon and Bao Dai in which former either makes or reiterates (according to timing see point (d) below) declaration of evolutionary principle characterizing Franco-Viet relations.

(d) A statement by the French Government as clear, dramatic and sweeping as possible made before, during or after the ratification debates to the effect that the March agreements represent only one step in an evolutionary program, that they are not intended permanently to define the status of Vietnam within the French Union and that the final treaty defining that status will be concluded with a duly elected Vietnamese Government as soon as conditions in Indochina permit the normal operation of democratic processes and the establishment of definitive constitutional institutions.

9. As heretofore outlined, I consider that this program is the best that the French can be expected to consider at this time.

10. To increase chances success this policy and our objective, I believe foregoing French action should be supplemented by the following:

(a) Recognition of Bao Dai Government by US and UK and as many other states, particularly, in neighboring areas, as can be induced follow us.

(b) Recognition of Bao Dai to precede or to be simultaneous with recognition of Mao Tse-tung.

(c) The latter recognition to be accompanied by statement to Chinese Communist regime that the UK, US and such other powers, including India and SEA countries, as care to join would take grave view of any attempt by China or [of] any pretext to extend her authority south of Tonkinese frontier.

(d) Direct ECA financing in Indochina (Department will recall that we are practically committed to this if French request it.)

(e) Consideration of extending aid to Vietnam from special 75 million dollar fund provided by MDAP law to be distributed at discretion President to stop Communists in China and neighboring areas.

If the Department favors this program, it might consider the desirability of discussing it with the British and, if agreed, its presentation should be accompanied by a conditional offer of action by the United States and United Kingdom of the points in paragraph 10. This presentation should be made quickly and should be designed to elicit support if possible from Asian states. It may fail to achieve results for various reasons such as internal Indochinese complications or a decision by Mao Tse-tung for direct military invasion of the peninsula. At present we are almost in a stalemate. We are waiting for the French to act, the French are hoping that help from us may make their internal political problem easier. Bao Dai has improved his chances and has gathered increased strength but is waiting for both of us. Any course of action we may decide upon involves some risks but the greatest risk and one certain to precipitate failure is that consequent upon continued inaction. A view that Ho Chi Minh will inevitably take over Indochina is dangerous and defeatist. We should act courageously and speedily within the limits of the possible. If the above program is carried out, I believe it will promote American security interests.

Bruce