851G.01/6–2949: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
2709. I had long conversation with Schuman yesterday re Indochina. After giving him in detail views contained in first four and half pages of Department’s memo (Depins 289, June 6), I went on to say that in case of Vietnam, US Government, without at this time offering comment on March 8 agreements, believes Vietnamese would commit serious mistake should they reject possibility of solution offered by those agreements and give their support not to government formed under them but to so-called Democratic Republic Vietnam.
In furtherance this view US has given public welcome to formation new unified Vietnamese state and has expressed hope March 8 agreements would form basis for early realization legitimate aspirations Vietnamese people. I told Schuman US is, however, of firm opinion realization these goals would be most difficult of accomplishment in association with French Union should government-envisaged March 8 agreements fail to obtain support of truly national elements Vietnam. Our recent experience in China had given us abundant proof of fact no amount of moral and material aid can save government isolated from contact with its people and enjoying little popular support. US Government, therefore, of opinion that in absence definite schedule outlining successive steps of Vietnam’s evolution towards independence, ability of new Vietnamese Government to attract popular support will, in overwhelming measure, depend on most liberal interpretation and implementation of agreements already reached and on similarly generous attitude in negotiation of various agreements remaining to be completed.
Insofar as success of government formed under March 8 agreemnts related to extent international support which it receives, US considers determining factor will be attitude towards new Vietnamese Government adopted by other nations SEA, many of which have, themselves, only recently emerged as independent states and who, if persuaded Vietnamese people will be given full measure self-government in near future, will be inclined not only grant new government moral status which in Asian eyes cannot be achieved by Western recognition alone, but also to enter into fruitful association with it, looking forward to solution grim common problem now facing all South Asian Governments.
I informed Schuman that in light foregoing, US feels that its future attitude must depend largely on those developments Vietnam which will determine popular support and authority of new Vietnamese Government and on standing it achieves with neighboring [Page 66] governments. US of opinion attitude adopted by French Government will be major controlling factor this development and therefore urges bold and rapid implementation and interpretation March 8 agreements with view affording new Vietnamese Government maximum possibilities for realization of legitimate aspirations Vietnamese populations.
In conversation which followed I emphasized that there appeared to be two major elements essential to success Bao Dai experiment. First was internal and involved assuring new Vietnamese Government maximum opportunities obtain popular support. This was directly dependent on liberal and enlightened French policy in rapid implementation of March 8 agreements. Second was external and depended largely on attitude which neighboring governments in SEA adopted towards new Vietnamese Government. Schuman replied that Assembly debates on Indochina and March 8 agreements marked successful realization of great step forward in evolution French policy in Indochina and assured me that French Government would implement this policy by most liberal interpretation and implementation of agreements. In this connection he remarked that for execution of its policy, France had in Pignon very able man of liberal school and moreover, General Revers had informed him—Schuman—that he had given categoric instructions to French military authorities in Indochina to give Pignon their full cooperation and support. Re neighboring countries SEA, he said he had instituted and was personally supervising program of information and interpretation. Foreign Office had already furnished text March 8 agreements to their representatives and would call them in to give them a full explanation French intentions and significance March 8 agreements.
I observed that of those countries, India seemed by far most important and our information indicated that GOI, while so far not publicly indicating hostile attitude, was in fact most skeptical of French intentions Indochina. Schuman expressed surprise, saying that in his conversations with Indian representatives here, he had received impression GOI was favorably disposed towards Bao Dai solution. In view our information, he would personally see to it that French intentions were made clear to GOI.
Sent Department 2709, repeated London 458, Saigon 99, New Delhi 12.1
- Repeated by the Department in telegram 375, June 30, 5 p. m., to Bangkok.↩