890.00/6–1449
The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 27.]
No. 201
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department’s Instruction No. 27 of April 22, 1949, which has recently been received, transmitting a copy of a memorandum on Southeast Asia dated April 2, 1949, left with the Secretary by the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Ernest Bevin, during his recent visit to the United States.1
I have read the British memorandum with great interest. I believe that the analysis of the situation contained therein is sound and that the British approach to this problem as outlined in the memorandum displays a clear appreciation of the dangers of the spread of Communism throughout Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the suggestions advanced to contain Communism in this part of the world appear to me to be thoroughly realistic. I might mention that the views expressed by the British Government closely parallel our own estimate of the situation of which the Department has been made cognizant through our despatches, policy suggestions, and telegrams.
There are two points made in the British memorandum which I feel are vital to this whole problem and which I am therefore commenting upon at the risk of being repetitious. I have reference firstly to the statement appearing in the opening paragraph of the British memorandum that if the general impression prevails in Southeast Asia that the Western powers are both unwilling and unable to assist in resisting Soviet pressure, the psychological effect may be that local resistance [Page 51] is weakened with the result that the undermining of the Governments of that region will succeed and that eventually the whole of Southeast Asia will fall a victim to the Communist advance, thus coming under Russian domination without any military effort on the part of Russia. The significance of this statement regarding the psychological attitude and feeling on the part of the peoples of Southeast Asia generally, and of Thailand in particular, is constantly being impressed upon me and my staff. With the sweep of Communist forces through China and their rapid approach to the southern borders of that country, government officials and educated Thai have become increasingly uneasy over the future of their country. Many of them unfortunately do not have any very clear conception of the ruthless policies and objectives of Communism or what this would mean to Thailand and the Thai people if a Communist regime were to be established here. There is great need to bring home to the people the dangers of Communism. As reported to the Department from time to time there is among some Thai a feeling of fatalism and a resignation to the fact that Thailand in the not too distant future will be confronted by a powerful force which she alone is unable to cope with. In these circumstances there is a natural disposition and tendency for the Thai people to look to the Western powers, particularly the United States and Great Britain, whom they know are opposed to the spread of militant Communism, for help and assistance. It is for this reason that any statements or developments concerning the Far East and this part of the world are examined and weighed rather seriously by influential Thai. What they have thus far observed has not reassured them but, on the contrary, has caused them to believe that the United States in particular is not seriously interested in the future of Thailand. I have reference to the following series of events, namely, the statements attributed to former Secretary of War, Mr. Royall,2 at Tokyo; the lack of serious United States interest in Southeast Asia as reported by Prince Wan, the Thai Ambassador at Washington, to the Government and the Thai Army General Staff, upon his return to this country early this year, and the Secretary’s recent statement regarding a Pacific Pact.3 While we have done what we could to counter this general impression of lack of United States interest in the fate of Thailand because of our preoccupation with the European situation, we have not been in a position to point either privately or publicly to any specific statement of policy with regard to this part of the world, to any authorized official approach to the Thai Government concerning [Page 52] the problem of Communism and ways and means of meeting that problem, or to any concrete measures of technical or other assistance actually extended to the Thai people. The psychological effect of the ominous developments in China coupled with our seeming unwillingness and/or inability to assist the Thai people at this critical juncture in their history, is, I fear, likely to have precisely the reaction foreseen and to result in the commencement of a process of weakening the will of the Government and people to resist.
It can be argued that the Thai, in full realization of the dangers of Communism to the liberties of their people and the freedom and sovereign integrity of their country, should depend upon themselves and their own resources to resist the menace which threatens them. I believe that to a certain extent the Thai people can and will resist the seizure of their country by the Communists but historically and by tempera ment they have tended to bow to force which they regard as overwhelming and against which they feel they cannot count on outside aid and assistance. I think I can safely say, therefore, in the absence of either a policy statement regarding Southeast Asia or some concrete evidence of our intention to assist the Siamese that psychologically they are allowing themselves to think in terms of acquiescence to Communism when serious pressure is applied.
The second point in the British memorandum which I feel deserves special comment, has reference to the desirability of taking steps to “stiffen the will to resist” on the part of Southeast Asian countries, simultaneously with our efforts to strengthen the defensive position of Europe and the Middle East. This is precisely in line with our thinking as set forth in various telegrams and our Despatch No. 35 of February 10, 1949,4 forwarding certain policy suggestions regarding Thailand which were prepared for the Foreign Service Regional Conference held in April of this year at New Delhi.
I feel that the phrase “to stiffen the will to resist” very aptly and accurately describes precisely what I believe we should seek to achieve without too deeply committing ourselves politically or financially. It is obvious that we do not, at this juncture, wish to bind ourselves by an agreement which would commit us to defend Thailand from a Communist attack and guarantee the sovereignty and independence of the country. I do not believe that such extensive commitments are necessary. I believe that the issuance of a carefully worded policy statement clearly emphasizing our desire to assist in the problems of rehabilitation which face the country in order that Thailand might achieve both economic and political strength sufficient to ward off the dangers of Communism or other threats to her sovereignty and independence, would have a very beneficial effect upon the general morale of the Government [Page 53] and people and would in effect “stiffen the will to resist”. Such a statement, perhaps made in conjunction with the British, should enumerate the aid we propose to extend in the technical fields, the supply of a modest amount of military aid and equipment and the implementation of the other recommendations set forth in our despatch No. 35 of February 10, 1949. I believe such a statement would create in the minds of the Thai people the reassuring feeling that they are not without outside friends to give them some measure of support against the powerful menace of Communism.
Finally, may I say that while our commitments designed to stem Communism in Europe and the Middle East are tremendous, we cannot afford to close our eyes to the equally tremendous gains made by Communism in China and the Far East or to the fact that a wholly Communist dominated Asia constitutes an extremely serious threat to the economy of Europe, our peace and the peace of the world. The grouping together of the nations of Southern and Southeastern Asia in a common and solid front against Communism, as hoped for by the British, would be a most desirable development. However, such a development is problematical and not likely in the immediate future. The only desirable alternative is the adoption by these countries, on an individual basis, of measures to resist Communist pressure. We can, and I believe we should, encourage the adoption of such measures by judicious extension of modest aid particularly to a small country such as Thailand which looks for reassurance from the friendly powers that in standing against Communism it is not standing alone. I believe further that in extending aid to Thailand there is reasonable prospect of such aid achieving what we hope it will achieve and that the withholding of aid is likely to have only one result—namely, a fatalistic acquiescence to Communist domination.
Respectfully yours,
- Instruction No. 27 is not printed; the enclosure, dated April 2, is scheduled for publication in part 2 of the pre sent volume.↩
- Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall was on a visit to Japan in February.↩
- For Secretary Acheson’s statement of May 18, see Department of State Bulletin, May 29, 1949, p. 696.↩
- Not printed.↩