851G.01/6–1349: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
2430. Department’s Instruction 289, June 6. The following are my considered views. We are unanimous in thinking it would be a serious [Page 46] mistake to deliver Department’s memorandum. The Secretary has read both the memorandum and my reply which follows and concurs with us that the delivery of such views as expressed by the Department would at this time be inappropriate.
Embassy has attentively and exhaustively considered memorandum enclosed Department’s instruction 289 and has reached conclusion that while it is an excellent summary of Department’s thinking on latter-day aspects of colonial problem and its relationship both to strong current of nationalism in SEA and to latter’s tragic corollary of Communism, its presentation to French officials at this time would impede rather than encourage achievement by French of Department’s desiderata.
Members of Cabinet and other French officials concerned with formulation of Indochina policy are battered and bruised by the long struggle against prejudice, self-interest and political opportunism from which they have emerged with a partial triumph embodied in March 8 agreements and passage of Cochin-China bill. While many of them have their doubts, as has the Department, as to whether the March 8 agreements are entirely adequate or whether Bao Dai has astuteness and ability necessary for success, they are equally aware that there is no present alternative to them and that they must live with the document and with the man throughout the early phases of the experiment. In their eyes Department’s memorandum would constitute not only a discouraging document in that it unfavorably prejudges outcome of an experiment which has not yet got off to fair start and implies that US will support it only in unlikely event that it succeeds, but also an unrealistic document in that its references to further concessions suggests that March 8 agreements be renegotiated. (In this connection please see Embtel 2189, May 30 explaining why March 8 agreements cannot be renegotiated.) Under the circumstances effect produced on these officials would be opposite of constructive at time when their best efforts are required to help Bao Dai experiment succeed.
For the above reasons I strongly urge that I be authorized to give the French orally a resume of the Department’s general views on problem as a whole as contained in first four and half pages of Department’s memorandum and simultaneously continue to urge the adoption of a liberal interpretation and loyal implementation of the agreements already reached and a similarly generous attitude in the negotiations still to be conducted.
At same time I am hopeful that Department is giving sympathetic consideration to suggestions advanced in mytels 2258, June 2 and 2309, June 7.1
- Latter not printed.↩