856d.00/6–1749: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 1
523. Deptel 512, June 14. Always possible some elements Netherlands Government might have alternate courses action in back of minds should Van Royen–Roem agreement prove abortive. However, Embassy believes leading cabinet figures such as Drees or Stikker intend fullest Netherlands effort to implement agreement, restoration law and order and Hague conference. This also holds true of Lovink in our opinion. Since departure of Sassen from Overseas Territories portfolio, [Page 444] that Ministry under Van Maarseveen seems to have pursued straight forward course and not endeavored to torpedo the course of Drees and Stikker as was Sassen’s habit. Lovink’s successor, Boon, is most decidedly taking every possible step to have SC instructions implemented. We have not in any of our contacts with government or Foreign Office officials encountered any indication Machiavellian plans.
The Embassy’s language in Embtel 491, June 9, was ambiguous. Reference clause was meant to mean Dutch were relinquishing part of their total worldwide sovereignty in giving sovereignty Indonesia. Frequent declarations have been made by Dutch officials that the Netherlands Government intends to hand over sovereignty to USI completely and unconditionally. (See Stikker’s remarks Embtel 510, June 16.2)
This is the first time Embassy has seen reference to “initial” restoration. We think that Netherlands Government went beyond SC instructions re restoration by including whole residency Djocja in a gesture of goodwill and with hope that this gesture would be recognized and might forestall wider demands that would jeopardize negotiations. However, we do not believe that Netherlands Government has contemplated that restoration of further territory to Republic would be necessary at present stage in solution Indonesian problem.
Re police equipment, Dutch are apparently exercising extreme caution perhaps too much for fear arms they turn over to Republic will encourage ambitious regain more dominant position by Republic regime. We do not recall that Dutch have ever been obligated to transfer sufficient police equipment for maintenance law and order beyond present contemplated Republic area. On other hand re hypothesis mentioned in Deptel, we know that Dutch are anxious that cease fire be effected and effective. Foreign Office feels that Soekarno–Hatta government must be strengthened and maintained else Communist government would be set up. (Embtel 440, May 19).
Netherlands Government and people have progressed very considerably in their attitudes towards the international reaction to Indonesian question as well as to their own thoughts about Indonesia. It has been drummed into them from every side that their actions have been stupid and arrogant, flouting as they have world public opinion. We believe that they are now sincerely anxious to rehabilitate themselves internationally. With respect to Indonesia, the Dutch have seen a steady drain on their resources, guerrilla warfare and no real progress made since the war ended. They have now resigned themselves [Page 445] to the inevitable and want the Indonesian question cleared up quickly.
If despite their best efforts, it is not settled—and some officials including Stikker are not entirely convinced that it will be—then the Dutch believe they can have clear conscience and stronger case before world if they should be confronted with possible alternative of complete retirement from Indonesia.