501.BC Indonesia/3–2449
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Nolting)
Mr. Helb called at his request. He spoke of the Netherlands delegates’ reaction to the telegram dispatched by the President of the Security Council to UNCFI on March 23 and to various statements made by SC delegates at that time.1 Mr. Helb’s reaction to the telegram was that it might constitute an acceptable basis for proceeding with the preliminary discussions in Batavia, but that this was still contingent upon the Netherlands Cabinet’s reaction. He stated that Senator Austin’s remarks were helpful, but wished that they might have gone further in support of the “Beel plan”.
I replied that I trusted that the Netherlands Government would regard the telegram of instructions to UNCFI and the remarks of Senator Austin in the light in which they were designed—namely, to help overcome a difficult political situation in the Netherlands in a manner which would not prejudice the interests of either party and [Page 340] would, promote the prompt initiation of a preliminary conference leading to the round-table negotiations at The Hague.
Mr. Helb then told me the following:
(a) That his government had decided to send Mr. van Royen to Batavia to head the Netherlands’ delegation there; (b) That his government would be powerless to commence negotiations on the subject of restoration prior to Mr. Stikker’s return from Washington, after having seen the Secretary and having consulted with his Cabinet colleagues. Mr. Helb stated that Mr. van Royen expected to return to The Hague with Mr. Stikker in early April, there to help persuade the “Cabinet to implement the Security Council proposal, before proceeding to Batavia.
I expressed grave concern at the delay involved in this procedure, stressing not only the predictable adverse reaction in the Security Council, but the equally predictable adverse reaction in U.S. public and Congressional opinion. I said that in my opinion what was needed was some immediate tangible evidence of movement, that is, of progress toward implementation of the Security Council’s position which would be evidence of the desire of the parties to reach agreement. I said I felt that otherwise UNCFI would be compelled during the interim to issue a report of no progress. I suggested that perhaps Mr. van Royen might proceed immediately to Batavia, with the idea in view of arranging a preliminary caucus of Republican leaders, if they so desired, providing safe passage, transportation, etc., to a central meeting point, in order that the Republicans might be placed in a position to move forward in the preliminary negotiations at Batavia immediately upon their commencement. I also mentioned the fact that the longer the delay, the more difficult became the achievement of the real purpose of restoration—namely, the reestablishment of the authority of the Republican leaders over their adherents.
White admitting the awkwardness of the delay, Mr. Helb stuck doggedly to the contention that the Netherlands Government was powerless to move until after Stikker’s return from Washington. He requested specifically that Mr. Cochran be advised of the reasons for delay, in order that he might keep things on an even keel in UNCFI. I made no commitment in this regard.2
- For summary of SC discussion, March 21–23, see Department of State Bulletin, March 27, 1949, p. 382. For text of telegram, see SC, 4th yr., No. 24, p. 5; for vote on it, March 23, see ibid., pp. 25–26.↩
- In telegram 256, March 24, 8 p. m., to The Hague, the Department asked urgently for a report of “any info re Neth intention postpone implementation telegram SC President to UNCFI Mar 23.” (501.BC Indonesia/3–2349)↩