501.BC Indonesia/2–2749: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 1

secret   us urgent
niact

207. Gocus 607. Received alone by Beel, Koets and Schuurman this morning. Beel referred statement handed UNCFI last night. I said when in Washington had suggestion from Embassy Hague some short cut plan conceived. At Hague had sought details but told by Netherlands obtain them Batavia. Since arrival here had been informed Beel discussing his plan Hague with possibility revision there and must await revelation his return. I said long awaited statement issued last night disappointing in not giving more specific plan.

I referred documents handed Herremans and me (Gocus 6012). I said UNCFI should be provided therewith not only since Herremans and I embarrassed but principally because Netherlands case would be clarified and strengthened by official submission thereof UNCFI and thence SC. Beel agreed.

I advised group I had assumed responsibility obtaining fortnight postponement UNCFI report but this would have to be made March 1. I urged they give specific information as possible re plans and intentions. I said would be difficult convince Republicans they should give up SC resolution to accept new Netherlands plan. I said in Hague I argued it would not be worthwhile for me return Indonesia unless Netherlands willing release political leaders at once and permit UNCFI function. I had explained Stikker and others that upon arrival Batavia would see Republicans and ascertain their ideas on procedures necessary if further implementation SC resolution particularly re priority considerations, sequence and negotiations. Immediately after first and only contact with Republican leaders, I let Schuurman know they adamant restoration Jogja. I had not any place any time presumed oppose this or any provision SC resolution or excuse compliance with single Word. I said Republican leaders not yet released; invitation UNCFI does not assure us opportunity enjoy full authority and responsibility provided under SC resolution; and Netherlands only now approaching Republicans for way out present situation.

[Page 273]

Republican leaders would be informed by Koets tomorrow at liberty leave Bangka and return Batavia for instance whenever they wish. Koets stated invitation envisaged UNCFI as party to roundtable discussion Hague. He said his job sell Republicans confidence plan and asked my suggestions and help.

I said his plan different from SC resolution and initiative and responsibility rest with Netherlands. I said had already asked Leimena not let his people refuse any Netherlands proposal without consulting UNCFI members. This was my only contact with Republicans since Shuurman gave me advance information re plan. Koets said he would see Leimena this afternoon and endeavor convince him virtue of plan.

I asked whether Netherlands Government had definite plan in mind for presentation Hague Conference. They said nothing other than idea of early transfer sovereignty. To my further inquiry as to whether they would insist on BIO being basis negotiations they replied negatively. Said would take advantage any agreement in principle arrived at earlier conversations between Ministers and Republicans as on financial and economic matters. Would not revert to positions which they had maintained with respect authority HRC and control of military which had been stumbling blocks last autumn. They replied they would not now after military action request Republicans accept unconditionally points which Republicans had not agreed to previously. Wanted roundtable conference to begin from fresh start with no preconceived positions taken.

I argued their plan less satisfactory than SC resolution on point which they claim its fundamental virtue, that is, date sovereignty transfer. I said their plan leaves final transfer date unfixed and subject various conditions. I was sure they would have to remedy this before either Republicans or SC would find acceptable. They insisted plan was to transfer sovereignty soon as Netherlands chambers ratified agreements. Hoped latter would be reached by May 1 and thought ratification should not take more than four to six weeks. I foresaw further weakness their plan in drawing conservative Republican leaders away from Indonesia without giving them opportunity SC envisaged of appealing from seat of restored authority to followers to cease-fire. I said support might be lost and extremist elements gain strength while conservative group met at Hague. Stressed no matter how beautiful paper agreement drawn up, execution thereof might be impossible if conservative leaders lose following.

Response my query, informed Sukarno, Hatta could name delegation any size desired including anyone. Netherlands Government intends hold March 12 conference irrespective Republican reply. That is, they [Page 274] insist on setting up government to which sovereignty can be transferred soonest. I said SC resolution had virtue providing for carefully spaced stages which should give USI safer foundation which to build than will be given through hastily organized government taking over mass of military, financial and economic problems on short notice. They admitted idea interim government might be skipped entirely dependent upon will of roundtable conference. Said nine parliamentary leaders who have visited Indonesia in past and particularly interested this question would participate in roundtable. Thought this should facilitate ratification any plan reached. There would be three representatives of minorities in Indonesia, namely Arabs, Chinese, Eurasians. Group took pains endeavor assure me no hidden phases to plan and everything aboveboard in inviting us all Hague roundtable conference.

Beel referred Stikker’s letter to me (Gocus 601). I asked if Stikker would participate conference, mentioning he indicated readiness join if assistance needed, and also in final paragraph letter took position he had gone as far as he could and job was now up to me. Said I presumed Stikker’s English had not conveyed his exact ideas but I insisted job belonged Netherlands and not me. Beel said round-table would have Netherlands delegation from Hague presumably under chairmanship Overseas Minister and include either Stikker or other high representative from Foreign Office Finance Ministry and others high rank. I urged group have as much material as possible ready for UNCFI meeting would be forthright in stating position.

UNCFI group met with above trio at noon. Schuurman delivered formal memo providing almost verbatim copy memo to Ambassadors Hague and exact copy memo re Netherlands opposition restoration Jogja (Gocus 601). Beel asked Koets explain Netherlands Government position. Koets covered practically same ground as in earlier meeting including rather satisfactory answers to questions which I had posed. We three stressed our loyalty SC resolution but our desire see satisfactory settlement reached soonest and our noninterference with any direct negotiations between parties. Netherlands realized their task sell Republicans and Federals. Koets was to undertake former. We stressed importance Republicans attach restoration Jogja and definitive date for unconditional transfer sovereignty.

When we sought specific answers on prerogatives HRC in interim period and in emergency, Beel insisted on readiness Netherlands eliminate interim period entirely or shorten it to limit agreed upon by parties. Netherlands thought there should be no difficulty on economic and financial measures. Said willing approve Federal army under Indonesian command once sovereignty transferred and to withdraw [Page 275] Netherlands forces on agreed schedule. When we pointed out paragraph 10 memo of procedure would indicate more doubt than they now declare as to transfer sovereignty unconditionally, Beel again assured US government had taken definite decision transfer sovereignty soonest and will not place diffculties in way reaching clear cut agreement thereon.

Netherlands repeated invitation to UNCFI and assured us privilege participating general and committee discussions Hague with right advance suggestions and generally assist parties. Koets hedged slightly by stating Van Royen’s speech had contained some opposition to UNCFI and that government adhered this statement. Exchange ideas did not reveal prohibitions which should hinder our endeavoring assist.

When we complained lack details in Beel plan, Netherlands replied purposely leaving open forum Hague for presentation whatever plans parties agree upon but with genuine intention Netherlands side reach settlement by May 1 target date. We said Netherlands case would be more favorably understood by Indonesians, SC, UNCFI and public if more specific information, especially on points we had discussed, released by Netherlands Government. Koets promised be specific in talks with Republicans. We said could well utilize anything further they give us in writing prior submission our report. We argued this should be more helpful in presenting Netherlands case fairly and accurately to SC than depending upon Van Royen’s answering questions perhaps of embarrassing character that will be posed. They promised give us one or two additional documents but did not commit themselves to put in writing what they had said in meeting. It was understood we were available for consultation by Republicans and Federals but initiative was with Netherlands.

Talking later with Herremans and Critchley, they both agreed Netherlands has presented case poorly to public if their oral statements to us can be accepted face value. To me alone Herremans said thought SC resolution and tight fiinancial situation influencing Netherlands Government take sincere decision transfer sovereignty soonest.

Federal Malik talked with me. Said he hoped Republicans well as Federals would agree go Hague.

Received Leimena, Supomo, Pringgodigdo and Sudjono. Summarized discreetly developments to date that could be revealed in order they have background when and if called upon for advice by Republicans Bangka. We discussed disadvantages and advantages Netherlands plan. They thought leaders would not take decision without consulting UNCFI. I said UNCFI would not take initiative going Bangka but would accept invitation from Republicans after March 1. [Page 276] Explained we would proceed with March 1 report giving chronology events to date, including Beel plan submission and such later facts as available by closing hour report.

Response my query, Republicans doubted Bangka group would come Batavia or elsewhere to reside unless authority restored Jogja. Realize seriousness threatened impasse and promised think over possible way out. Signed Cochran.

Livengood
  1. Repeated in telegram 165, February 28, 6 p. m., to The Hague, and as 220 to Brussels.
  2. Telegram 196, February 25, p. 256.