501.BC Indonesia/2–2649: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 1
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203. Gocus 603. After sending Gocus 601 and 602 yesterday,2 received Herremans his request. We exchanged ideas on documentation handed us each earlier in day by Schuurman. Herremans volunteered that Netherlands Government really offering Republic little concrete in exchange for requested agreement latter forego fulfillment SC resolution re restoration Jogja. [Stated?] Republicans would be reluctant proceed from confinement Bangka to conference Hague on short notice and without provisions SC resolution having been met. He hoped Beel would receive us soonest after return and would either make convincing approach directly Republicans or provide on occasion Saturday evening statement or through other documentation to UNCFI evidence good faith and determination transfer sovereignty in satisfactory manner.
At dinner I talked with Minister Leimena, ranking Republican Government official Batavia. I told him not informed what all Beel would announce Saturday evening but surmised statement might follow lines Maarseveen speech February 16 and possibly refuse restoration Jogja and offer conference elsewhere. Said we should all study statement carefully. Suggested Republicans make no reply either affirmative or negative to any proposals Netherlands might extend until they consult UNCFI members. I told Leimena Republicans had good record with SC. If Netherlands might now assume position which would request Republicans surrender or deviate from provisions established in their favor in SC resolution, they might have difficulty deciding or [Page 263] even desire leave matter to SC as to whether they should accept or refuse Netherlands alternative. I said Republicans themselves would, however, have to make decision whether reply at once to Netherlands or inform UNCFI of position and indicate readiness abide by SC decision as to what should be done.
Later in evening talked with Critchley. He was, of course, unaware documentation provided Herremans and me. He doubted Beel’s coming statement would relieve UNCFI necessity report noncompliance March 1. He said he regretted Netherlands not moving more helpfully. He appreciated unfavorable report involves risks. He said critical report and strong pressure by SC and Asiatics might move Netherlands to implement SC resolution and consummate really acceptable and final arrangement. On other hand, Netherlands might stubbornly refuse and then both Netherlands and Indonesia suffer from sanctions that might ensue. He thought therefore UNCFI should not discard summarily any proposal Beel offers. He thought we should study it carefully, see if we could encourage Republicans accept at least part of it, and then ourselves work toward supplementing that part with UNCFI material to form basis of plan for interim government, et cetera. I agreed we should study whatever proposed and ascertain Replicians’ ideas thereon but was more disposed refer matter if necessary back to SC in light very specific resolution adopted January 28 than have UNCFI itself now endeavor create plans its own divergent from both SC resolution and Beel plan.
Received 11 last night Usgoc 3033 which crossed Gocus 601 and 602. Department apparently had not been provided with second memorandum referred to in Gocus 601 which definitely rejects Republican restoration Jogja. While Van Kleffens claims one of virtues Netherlands plan to be that it does not require as condition precedent that guerrilla activities be stopped, I consider this weakness since feel SC would desire primarily stop bloodshed earliest possible moment.
Agree with Department as to urgency achieving settlement. Know directly from Netherlands Government Hague how seriously Netherlands effort bogging down militarily and financially. Cognizant deterioration position legitimate Republican leaders confined Bangka and out of contact with everyone except occasionally permitted Netherlands or UNCFI visitors. Department should not, however, minimize difficulty now reaching agreement through direct negotiations between Netherlands officials Batavia and Republicans Bangka on contentious point restoration Jogja. Drees did not even see ranking Republicans while in Java. Netherlands visitors Bangka have been military or Justice Department officials. There have been no talks between Netherlands [Page 264] Delegation and Republican Delegation toward any agreement since police action. Talks which Hague acclaims as desirable between Republicans and Federalists have never taken place beyond what might be called preliminary contacts.
Agree with Department every effort should be made prevent impasse on Jogja point. Netherlands will have to give convincing evidence, however, of bona fide intention early unconditional transfer sovereignty if this impasse to be avoided. Eagerly awaiting Beel statement on this point since explanations given me Hague and Batavia have to date been neither precise nor consistent nor convincing.
As Department knows, I had hoped Stikker might come Batavia shortly after my arrival and personally undertake resumption negotiations with Republicans and drawing in Federalists. His letter to me explains why this impossible and states clearly he can do nothing helpful unless Republicans accept Netherlands position on Jogja restoration and proceed Hague for round table conference. It may be that Republicans would be well advised accept this arrangement. If they do, they risk losing support military and other scattered leaders and suffering deep humiliation if Netherlands attitude does not improve over that demonstrated to Republicans and to world in past. Little can be done for Republicans in their present state of despair and isolation by UNCFI Batavia if Netherlands Government determined follow its own course irrespective SC resolution. If negotiations are moved Hague and leading Republicans such as Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, Leimena, Supomo, Hadji Salim, Roem, et al., participate therein, they will have opportunity make personal impression on Netherlands officials and foreign diplomats which I feel will be infinitely better than has been created for them from distance by unfavorable press, et cetera. Some important advantages would accrue through having negotiations removed from poisonous atmosphere Batavia where efforts Netherlands Ministers and political leaders from Hague to obtain genuine understanding situation and seek honorable arrangements have been frustrated by colonial die-hards and militarists. With UNCFI at Hague, difficulty of liaison with our respective Embassies which results from wide separation between capitals Hague and Batavia would be overcome. While UNCFI might be able contribute helpfully in Hague negotiations, still feel desired results will depend importantly upon diplomatic pressure from US and allied powers. Extent to which Netherlands now appealing to such powers as well as manner in which other powers pleading to us that all of group will be weakened unless settlement bearable to Netherlands reached would confirm this feeling.
As indicated in earlier telegrams on sketchily revealed Beel plan, I have feared it might be conceived to circumvent SC resolution in [Page 265] manner quickly to relieve Netherlands Government of direct responsibility and create weak USI which would flounder and at once look to us for support.
In going along with present Netherlands proposal, we risk seeing consummated quick but ineffective agreement. Separated for possibly months tedious arid trying Hague negotiations, Republican leaders may lose even more support of nationalist following Indonesia, Guerrilla and potential leftists may strengthen and “emergency government” Sumatra attempts seize leadership Republican elements. Unless Netherlands spirit undergoes genuine change, there is further possibility that once Republican leaders are at Hague Netherlands will use customary methods of documentary disclosures to weaken and even destroy Republican leaders such as Sukarno and Hatta whom, colonialists and militarists realize are ones most likely to achieve successful sovereignty. If therefore we encourage Republicans accept invitation, we should be conscious our own responsibility to see they get squarer deal Hague than they have received here.
Beel arrived Batavia 9 a. m. today. When he greeted me, he said he hoped see me Sunday. I said “Sooner better” and mentioned Herremans standing beside me was chairman. Beel then said he would have Schuurman let us know when he could receive us. Said, “Hope my mission has been successful.” Afterwards we asked Schuurman endeavor have meeting today prior 6 p. m. statement. Schuurman told me aside he had received word Van Kleffens considered US reaction Netherlands memorandum favorable. Asked if I had this impression. I replied had received cable (Usgoc 303) late last night asking my comments. I said I had secretly asked Leimena not let his people turn down any proposals without consulting UNCFI. Signed Cochran.