501.BC Indonesia/2–1849: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 1
182. Gocus 592. UNCFI spent February 17 Bangka visiting Sukarno, Hatta and other Republic leaders including Batavia group. I gave high points my trip. Stressed US continuing interest seeing Indonesia question settled fairly. Made point SC did not require formal statement acceptance from Netherlands or Republic of January 28 resolution. Compliance of course expected. UNCFI charged with duty reporting extent resolution implemented. SC then to decide what if any further action necessary its part.
In Hague I had impression impossible in present political crisis government make statement conceding complete acceptance resolution or going much beyond Van Royen’s statement. I urged necessity both parties stop quibbling and debating and show actual readiness to implement.
Set fourth two points I had emphasized Hague, namely, freedom for political prisoners and utilization UNCFI. Explained US behind entire SC resolution and my emphasizing these two points in no way indicated deviation from UN on other points. Republicans agreed two essential but do not consider they would have genuine freedom unless and until restored to authority in Jogja as provided by resolution. I said I had not tried envisage either in Washington or Hague step by step procedures that should be followed other than on two points above mentioned until I might have opportunity return Batavia and find how Republicans view situation. They replied they would abide by resolution although some parts perhaps not entirely to their liking and would insist upon carrying out resolution on point of reestablishment at Jogja.
Hatta and Sukarno explained any appeal by them to their followers to lay down arms would be futile and disregarded unless they speak freely and with authority from their own capital. They said military action scattered their leaders and continued delay will make more difficult [Page 240] task calling them in Jogja and convincing them of good faith Dutch and wisdom accepting arrangement under SC. I requested advice as to how they thought return to Jogja could be effected. I said we put certain provisions in resolution to assure freedom of communication and economic support but I was not sure what measures could be taken which would guarantee security for persons of Republic leaders which we urgently desire. Republicans referred to plan for utilization Sultan Jogja for purpose reestablishing Republic civil authority as set forth Bangka meeting with UNCFI February 12 (Usgoc [Gocus] 5872).
I stressed our interest seeing Republicans entirely at liberty consult UNCFI and Dutch and opposition any arrangement involved in move to Jogja likely restrict contact and opportunity for exchange of views and quick negotiations.
Above discussions at round table. Republicans took definite position they would not consider themselves free to reach official decisions or negotiations with anyone until returned Jogja. I stressed desirability Republicans establishing more contact with Federalists. Republicans willing only have informal talks until resolution point on reestablishment Jogja implemented. When I mentioned short-cut plan with early transfer sovereignty, Republicans asked how much sovereignty? While satisfied with SC resolution timetable, they perhaps not opposed to early grant sovereignty provided plan laid squarely before them and transfer sovereignty unconditional at fixed date. Furthermore they will participate in no negotiations with Netherlands either for interim government or transfer sovereignty unless UNCFI present. They withheld comment on idea I reported from Hague of possibly having negotiations there after setup of interim government. This connection noted Hague Chamber debate indicated UNCFI would be asked assist in negotiations envisaged at Hague. From pararagraph 23 my 213 from Brussels3 will be recalled I was given no definite answer this point by Netherlands Ministers. Had opportunity long talk with Sukarno alone and then with Hatta. Both thanked me warmly for what they felt I had been doing. I said I was not sure how successful we might be but thought everything possible done by US in Washington, Lake Success and Hague to work out of present situation into fair solution for Indonesia. I said much depended on outcome present political debate and crisis Hague. Explained UNCFI withheld February 15 report to SC on my recommendation since I feared it might upset government and result in lengthy period in which nothing constructive could be expected. Insisted to both I was here to support [Page 241] resolution in its entirety but had assured Dutch I would try be practical and reasonable. Republicans assured me in turn they would be reasonable. Said I felt reestablishment Jogja should be considered as means permitting Republic authorities draw in leaders from all areas in order that consultation and agreement may be achieved and effective call for laying down arms made. Thought this should be emphasized rather than any attempt rebuild Republic to former proportions. Made point however that SC did not recognize Netherlands military action as eliminating one party to dispute on its calendar. I let two leaders know secretly my thought Stikker if given full powers negotiate would have best chance achieving early agreement between parties. I said no certainty this will result but we should be patient few days until outcome Hague crisis seen. Republicans in good health and comparatively good spirits considering circumstances.
I feel more than ever Hatta, Sukarno, Leimena group must be looked upon as nucleus Republic movement and permitted draw in other leaders without any being eliminated by Dutch choice. This group fears some adherents in outlying areas may veer leftist unless early settlement achieved. They definitely desire early settlement and not continuation guerrilla warfare which they realize would destroy country. Their one request of UNCFI was that it assist them establish contact with emergency government Sumatra. Chairman Critchley expressed uncertainty as to how this could be done. Republicans will write letter setting forth request and suggesting means.
Before our departure Sukarno received letter from BFO indicating delay in proposed visit Bangka presumably result postponement plenary meeting BFO until February 21. Republicans will then welcome BFO’s for informal talks but not negotiations. To Hatta and Sukarno I emphasized need for them go as far as possible with Federalists and demonstrate to world they have qualities of leadership essential to participating importantly in eventual Indonesian Government.
Upon return Batavia found Usgoc 2964 re British memorandum on Beel plan. Bevin and Department point out obvious weaknesses therein. British Consulate General Batavia had visited me evening February 16 setting forth advantages that plan and referring aide-mémoire given me February 15. Stating he found me “skeptical,” Consulate General admitted plan not sufficiently precise or convincing as presented to date to warrant Republic accepting it over SC resolution. He thought essential however Republicans and Federalists get together. I said convinced Indonesia’s share nationalist aspirations and consolidated plan could be worked out easily if Netherlands Government would only show honest intent and effort achieve transfer [Page 242] sovereignty and would act in manner and-through representatives in Batavia capable commanding confidence.
Feel SC debate on UNCFI non-submission February 15 report was beneficial. Netherlands should see from this continuing interest SC in early and full compliance with resolution and should understand impossibility UNCFI postponing beyond March 1 report in premises irrespective circumstances that may then obtain.
In summary convinced Republicans will not move beyond informal talks with Federalists or negotiate with Netherlands on any basis until reestablished Jogja and assured negotiations will be in presence UNCFI. Furthermore am convinced their situation such they could not do their part in implementing SC resolution without this condition being met. Once Republicans given freedom and authority in Jogja, am confident UNCFI can have useful influence and assist materially toward solution provided only Netherlands show good faith. I emphasized to Republicans as I had to Dutch that responsibility for agreement is primarily theirs and that I feel UNCFI should assist and not dictate.
Visited Schuurman this morning. Told him high points talk with Republicans. Told him I considered it absolutely essential Republicans’ request and resolution provision for restoration Jogja be met if we are to make any progress. I let him know Lisle leaving about March 3 to be succeeded by Tuthill5 as my assistant. I did not go beyond Department’s statement re my new appointment to effect I would remain Indonesia while conditions warrant. Signed Cochran.