Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 1

501.BC Indonesia/2–949: Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

secret   urgent

Brussels, February 9, 1949—5 p. m.

213. From Cochran: Left Washington night February 2. Visited Palar, New York, February 3. He concerned over New York Times story regarding US going easy with Netherlands on meeting SC Resolution. Disabused his mind in accord with Jessup and I telephoned Butterworth regarding need press statement and contact with SC colleagues on this point. Palar stressed futility Netherlands trying get agreement unless all Republican leaders freely participate negotiations. Gave names military leaders who would be useful calling off guerrillas. I argued need for Sjahrir and Leimena in Batavia and opposed continuing SC debate on Indonesia before Netherlands have chance reveal plans implement resolution. He agreed their remaining Indonesia help negotiate and set up provisional government unless and until developments warrant coming Lake Success.

After mechanical and weather difficulties, reached Brussels via London afternoon February 5. In London, brought Dickover¹ to date. He confirmed British embarrassment as result Netherlands handling Indonesia. He thought Netherlands would go ahead their own way giving sovereignty Indonesia but that our difficulty might come from Republican intransigence and desire let SC fight their battle.

Ambassador Kirk took me morning 6th see Spaak. I gave details situation prior police action and reason my return US. Also discussed SC Resolution and US seriousness regarding Netherlands compliance. Spaak doubted Netherlands willingness include Soekarno and Hatta in Interim Government preferring work with Sjahrir and questioned feasibility restoration Republic. I argued need for broad cross section Republican leaders for effective call to guerrillas lay down arms and for participation in Interim Government if it to have confidence support all Indonesians. Notwithstanding exceptions which might be taken to individual leaders records I insisted these men have earned their positions as champions of Nationalist movement and are heroes to its followers. I thought folly attempt eliminate any these in negotiations. On contrary said effort should be made bring in Republican leaders scattered in Sumatra and outlying districts Java.

Without taking initiative had opportunity suggest Spaak difficulty would be experienced in having any agreement accepted by Republicans and carried out with confidence so long as Beel and Spoor remain. When Spaak asked regarding Van Mook,² I said latter had been confused at end his stay Indonesia and could not contribute progress if returned. I thought Spoor’s chief of staff would be acceptable commanding officer. Reviewing visits of Netherlands Ministers to Indonesia, I praised Stikker’s efforts and said he was only one who had gained confidence Republicans. I said agreement entirely beneficial to Netherlands could have been achieved on Stikker’s first visit had he been permitted remain few weeks longer and enjoy full support his government. I thought best step would still be return Stikker to Batavia for negotiations preferably with full power. Spaak distressed over Netherlands situation and admitted lack quick success in achieving complete military control in Indonesia confirmed police action unwise. Spaak asked me call on return to Brussels after visit Hague.

Arrived Hague February 6, 3 p. m. Visited Stikker alone 4 to 7 p. m. He sought details of negotiations GOC and myself with Netherlands and Republican officials immediately prior police action. I told him I reported I could be of little assistance Batavia following such action and that Department ordered me home for consultation. Said I had not participated discussions Lake Success but had conferred in Department with Jessup and visited him and Palar in New York on departure and Spaak in Brussels. I said would follow entirely his ideas as to whom I should see in Hague. We agreed on no information to press during Hague stay other than I was paying respects while returning my post.

Stikker reminded me how he endeavored prevent police action. He genuinely aware serious international situation into which Netherlands has come as result thereof. He insisted Netherlands political situation makes impossible full acceptance SC Resolution by present government. He said government would fall if attempted take this entirely. I analyzed resolution endeavoring ease his mind on certain points which he exaggerated. I emphasized, however, there should be no misunderstanding US loyalty to support this resolution. Stikker thought we should all agree that achieving common objective is real purpose irrespective methods. Said Republicans and Federalists without Netherlands meeting that day in Bangka to see if they could get together on ideas constitution and authority Interim Government to be set up soonest. Anything negotiated successfully between groups at Bangka would then have to be considered by Netherlands and agreement sought. Setting up of Interim Government would be followed by negotiations between Interim and Netherlands Governments on three major points of finance and economic arrangements, military agreement and union statutes. Idea is, however, to plan Interim Government as simply as possible and have it last briefly perhaps not more than two or three months with sovereignty thereafter turned over to strictly Indonesian Government. Elections and constitutional assembly would come thereafter. Stikker asked my ideas which I gave frankly and are set forth later in this message.

Stikker admitted Netherlands in critical situation. Said might not be able carry on military operations beyond another five or six months because of cost thereof. Admitted guerrilla activity serious and that military mistakes had been made particularly in occupation certain important cities such as Madiun. He spoke unhappily of many incidents attributed to Batavia authorities which have embarrassed Netherlands Government. At same time he insisted Beel could not be fired. He said Schuurman would be replaced on Netherlands Delegation possibly by Netherlands Ambassador Lamping from New Delhi. He thought this wise in view Lamping familiarity with Eastern question. (From other sources, including Spaak, I learn Lamping stiff negotiator).

Dined with Ambassador, Steere and Coe³ to bring them to date with respect visits Department, Palar, Spaak and Stikker.

Conferred two hours morning February 7 with Blom and Boon.⁴ Blom went over plan Stikker had described and also let me know there had been alternative considered of having Interim Government to be arrived at through Bangka conversations merely body to negotiate with Netherlands for turning over sovereignty at later date. That is, this group would not be given operational authority until it became the government of planned “Republic of Federal or US of Indonesia” which it was hoped could be created before July 1, 1949. I learned from Blom that there was also some idea of not passing complete sovereignty on that date but only conditional sovereignty leaving period of perhaps one year to see how things went in Indonesia as to law and order, etc. I posed certain questions on this plan as I had to Stikker. Blom expressed surprise I hesitated fall in with idea such early settlement of question. Boon urged I talk frankly with Cabinet members on SC Resolution, he pleading that Ministry Foreign Affairs understood my position clearly and needed no argument to convince it what should be done.

At instance Her Majesty Queen Juliana, drove to Soesdijk afternoon February 7, had tea and visited with Her Majesty 1¼ hours. Her Majesty expressed warm appreciation US assistance to Netherlands during and since war. Recalled long established close ties and friendship between our countries. Introducing discussion Indonesian situation, revealed intimate knowledge events and personalities.

Asked my opinion Hatta and Sjahrir. I answered with respect Republican leaders manner above described in talk with Spaak. Her Majesty asked why I stood up for Republican leaders rather than Federalist leaders who represented majority. I explained GOC terms of reference envisaged extending Good Offices only between Netherlands and Republican, Governments and that we purposely had reframed from having official contact with Federalist leaders. I made point, however, that I had suggested inclusion in present SC Resolution of authority for UNCI contact and work with Federalists as well as Republican and Netherlands leaders. I said I had been well impressed by Federalist leaders whom I had seen and realized entirely need for bringing two groups together and consolidating their desires and efforts for achieving Nationalist aims.

I assured Her Majesty that it should be possible under present resolution for UNCI work effectively toward bringing all elements into Interim Government. Her Majesty asked how we would handle “wild boys”. I said I favored widest possible Federalist leadership in discussions and in setting up Interim Government in order this can make effective appeal to armed forces to lay down arms. Her Majesty was critical of position Australia has taken in premises and of casting lot with Asiatic countries.

Her Majesty asked specifically what should be done. We agreed Solomon was required. Her Majesty said would like turn question over to him. I hinted Her Majesty give me chance do something. I said fundamental requirement is for Netherlands Government convince world it intends accept and abide by SC Resolution to fullest extent reasonably possible. I said I could not outline complete plans before returning Batavia and consulting Republican leaders whom I have not seen since before police action. I said immediately necessary Netherlands Government follow SC Resolution in appeasing Republican leaders and in permitting UNCI function in contacting Republicans and Federalists and assisting in plans leading to Interim Government. I said I was to talk further with Stikker, Drees and Sassen.⁵ Would give them any ideas I had.

Recalled pleasure I had experienced years before in cooperating with Netherlands officials such as Colijn and Trip and of my genuine desire be helpful in Indonesia in achieving workable solution that will preserve beneficial interests of Netherlands in Indonesia. In respect to Her Majesty’s inquiry, I said I might see Spaak on return Brussels. Her Majesty expressed highest regard for his statesmanship.

Dined Stikker’s night February 7 where other guests: Drees and Sassen. Stikker asked me repeat for colleagues statement I made him previous evening. I explained that upon return US, I had volunteered step aside if Department found my work Indonesia unsatisfactory or if of opinion someone else could serve more helpfully in future. Department led me understand there might be another assignment in view for me but that it desired I continue on present job until finished. I recalled that it had envisaged my being last US representative on GOC. I said I had volunteered idea returning Indonesia by Hague in order let my friends here see there had been no bitterness whatever on my part although great disappointment over our failure prevent police action. I stressed American desire assist old friend and ally get out of present difficult situation. I spared no details in picturing how bad their predicament was and how much worse it might become unless Netherlands Government implemented SC Resolution. I recalled I had sent personal wire Lisle few days ago suggesting Netherlands Government would require some time to adjust its operations to SC Resolution. I emphasized, however, no intent to delay compliance therewith or for USDel to take any position different from that envisaged by entire SC group.

I explained resolution was not US measure but represented consolidation ideas contributed by representatives several countries and final compromise thereof. Recalled that Delhi conference had passed resolution⁶ along somewhat similar lines and assured them tone of latter had been kept comparatively moderate only through exceptionally skillful diplomacy on part of American Ambassador Delhi. I said I found American public and Congressional opinion keenly critical of Netherlands position and Department making great efforts protect ally. I specifically mentioned hearings on ECA aid and expressed intentions of certain Congressmen to question extension ECA aid to Netherlands if not assured such funds not employed in supporting military action against Indonesia. I said noncompliance by Netherlands now with SC Resolution would give press and Congress added reason for attack and for suggesting cutting off all funds. I insisted I was speaking entirely personally and not bringing any threat from my Department that ECA aid would be stopped. I was simply saying frankly as a friend that whatever might be attitude of Department of State such danger would be risked if behavior of Netherlands is such as to warrant SC calling it before its tribunal again on handling of Indonesian question. I reminded them that I had sought influence Palar, and I thought successfully, not to endeavor revive Indonesian debate unless real need develops after reasonable period.

Regarding plan outlined to me by Stikker I expressed two fundamental ideas (1) I was convinced neither SC nor public would accept with full confidence any decisions reached by Republicans and Federalists towards setting up Interim Government if conversations take place while Republicans in custody Netherlands Military Forces. I expressed entire agreement with idea that two groups should be brought together but reminded Ministers they had not yet complied with original or repeated requests of S’C that Republican leaders be liberated; (2) I pointed out that UNCI is not permitted participate in present Indonesian conversations and that as far as I had learned from my talks to date with them there appeared no intention on their part permit UNCI play any role in negotiations toward setting up Interim Government. They responded that they, themselves, were not represented in present conversations, preferring give two groups privacy in settling their own problem. I said Republicans have in past indicated preference having third party, namely agency SC, present when consummating agreement with Netherlands. I felt strongly Netherlands should abide SC Resolution and permit UNCI assist immediately in any conversations following Bangka meeting. I said this not only required to meet SC desires but should also facilitate results.

Stikker stated I had presented SC and Republican views. He and associates would present Hague and Batavia side. He emphasized political difficulty for coalition Netherlands Government accept detailed resolution adopted by SC. While Netherlands Government had indicated willingness set up Interim Government, have elections and transfer sovereignty within certain periods, SC apparently had not taken their word and insisted on specific dates. Government had been embarrassed by constant flow of GOC reports. Furthermore, Critchley had gone to NEI Government few hours after adoption SC Resolution to inquire what had been done to implement it and UNCI had continued harass government with questions thereon. I said SC had adopted general date schedule offered by Netherlands and had gone slightly further in making specific appreciating value of fixed date to Indonesian psychological situation. While SC Resolution calls for thorough reporting job, I was confident UNCI would be reasonable once Netherlands Government gives some sign inclination comply with resolution.

Drees expressed unhappiness over extent to which he felt SC Resolution interferes with Netherlands sovereignty in Indonesia in political, military and economic fields. He mentioned new provision in SC Resolution regarding UNCI contacting Federalists. He said various provisions give such extensive powers towards moving troops and requiring economic aid for Republicans that Netherlands Government must yield much authority while retaining heavy responsibility. I said I had personally recommended inclusion privilege UNCI contacting Federalists freely. Federalists endeavored come to me frequently seeking ideas on eventual association with Republicans. After police action, requests had increased. I felt UNCI could be genuinely useful in bringing these, leaders together with Republicans and Netherlands. In economic field, I said resolution calls for not much, if any, outlay beyond that which Netherlands is probably making at present. I said idea was primarily to make sure Republican leaders would be taken care of upon return Jogja. Even now Netherlands Government has responsibility their maintenance.

I told Drees that he exaggerated complications of resolution. Stikker said I should frankly know, as I would be sure learn on returning Batavia, that they are in serious difficulties and pan only carry on with present schedule for few months. I said we had anticipated this in our aide-mémoire of 7 December⁷ and are anxious help Netherlands get out of difficulty but can only succeed if Netherlands Government accepts and implements SC Resolution. Sassen endeavored justify police action. Said his government had taken steps with view combat Communism in Indonesia and assist in preserving rights Western peoples in Far East. I replied Netherlands military action had exactly opposite effect. First it had upset truly conservative Republican Government which with own leaders and resources had successfully put down Communist uprising few weeks earlier and had demonstrated to world its faith in democracy. Degrading policy pursued in taking Republican leaders into custody and continuing to hold them inevitably weakens their influence on followers. It will make more difficult any attempts influence guerrillas lay down arms and threatens destruction conservative [nucleus] leaders which I thought Netherlands Government considered as did my own best available group about which an Interim Government and finally a USI could be constituted. Secondly, police action had set off resentment in all of Asia with resultant New Delhi conference where only efforts of American Ambassador had been able to restrain delegates from adopting almost violent resolution. Netherlands action had thus given incentive to first actual steps toward constituting Asiatic bloc which may conceivably develop further and establish line of demarkation if not opposition to Western group.

Stikker asked if I offered objection to changing head Netherlands Delegation Schuurman and perhaps his assistants. I thought these men were worn out from long stay on difficult task and perhaps better results might be achieved by replacements. I had taken no initiative on this point and assured group I had gotten on with Netherlands Delegation personally although problems involved many tense situations. I said I had no suggestions to make with respect other officials at Batavia but assumed Netherlands Government must have some worries thereover as result recent incidents.

I told group I hoped I had been able convince them need for compliance with SC Resolution and for immediate commencement implementation thereof through first steps of releasing Republican civil leaders and permitting UNCI function. I said that unless this was envisaged there was no use my spending government money returning to Batavia or UNCI endeavoring be of assistance. Drees assured me he had desired place leaders at liberty but some Cabinet colleagues objected on fear some Republicans might scatter to otherwise peaceful areas in Indonesia and start trouble. I said such chance would have to be taken sooner or later and that I personally thought there would be no danger whatever from this source. I said it was much to interest these leaders continue contacts now commenced with Federalists, be in touch with UNCI and consummate negotiations for Interim Government. I added UNCI would, of course, use its influence if such might be necessary to see that no untoward acts taken by Republican leaders when once given complete freedom. Drees said there might have to be some fixing of residence although there would be no stipulation that Republicans must refrain from political activities when liberated. He promised move in this direction soonest. Group thought there should be no difficulty UNCI having contact with Republican leaders pointing out visits already permitted. I said not satisfactory if UNCI obliged require permits to see Republicans and to travel various parts Indonesia this purpose. I said I was not at all sure I could see fit undertake exercising Good Offices with Republicans as long as I have to ascertain visiting days from Schuurman and fly various localities to find them and then talk with them under surveillance. Cabinet officers promised remedy this situation and let me understand UNCI would be permitted function.

In our conversations, group mentioned idea bringing Interim Government delegation to Hague after Provisional Government set up to negotiate for USI arrangements. They said negotiations in Hague with Federalists had been much easier than if held in Indonesia and thought results could be achieved more satisfactorily in present case. I hoped that treatment of Indonesians from now on be such that they would have faith in undertakings Netherlands Government and would not fear their leaders subject to duress if brought Hague for final arrangements. I argued again as I had with Stikker that date of final transfer sovereignty to USI should be fixed and not postponed or conditioned. When I left 11 p. m., group remained to consider policy to be followed on SC Resolution in Tuesday Cabinet meeting.

Spent entire forenoon 8th talking with Blom and Boon, Foreign Office. They assured me I did not need convince Stikker or them of my position or my genuine desire to help. They said great need was to make Sassen and other Cabinet Ministers comprehend serious international political situation Indonesian problem has brought Netherlands. They asked what I had accomplished “trio” previous evening. I summarized conversations. We then went over SC Resolution, paragraph by paragraph, since they sought my explanation thereof. I gave them my ideas but waived any responsibility for interpretation emphasizing this could be done by SC alone. I stressed to them as I had to Cabinet Ministers absolute necessity compliance with resolution and endeavored disabuse their minds any intention of US helping them to evade consequences of resolution. On other hand, I showed wherein I thought they exaggerated implications of resolution and argued they should depend on reasonableness of UNCI in using discretion granted by resolution in helping implementation once Netherlands begins cooperating. They endeavored argue SC action had thwarted Netherlands efforts settle Indonesian problem and was endangering success military undertaking. I made point Netherlands Government had not yet done anything SC had requested arid latter surely could not be blamed for any failure Netherlands Government suffered through measures violating international undertaking. They said they meant Republican intransigeance strengthened by knowledge SC taking action. I reminded them Indonesian question has been on SC agenda long time and both parties must expect SC interest continuing therein. Doubted guerrillas much influenced by SC Resolution. May not even know of it since I just read report Republican leaders had not yet seen it. To Foreign Office, as to Ministers, I gave our arguments that SC does not recognize that police action has eliminated Republican as one party to dispute before it.

Told friends that when conferring with Ministers had inquired whether UNCI would be brought Hague for negotiations here. They said this could be decided later. I had reminded them that Renville Agreements gave either party privilege insist on continuation UN agency until actual transfer sovereignty. Blom and Boon seemed much relieved by my explanation certain points on resolution. They gave interesting details confidentially on various communications exchanged with GOC when I was at Batavia and placed blame for some of most unhelpful correspondence on officials at Batavia. They insisted Stikker should be sent Batavia with full powers to negotiate.

My friends sought my advice since they were preparing statements to be used by Cabinet at Chamber session 9th when Indonesian question would be debated and Ministers likely be questioned extent SC Resolution would be followed. I said I had not anticipated any reply to resolution beyond Van Royen’s last speech. I suggested this speech be quoted by Ministers in Chamber debate as indicating Netherlands official position. I said it would be most helpful and I thought extremely wise if Ministers could follow up by stating steps being taken to give Republican leaders same freedom enjoyed Indonesia by any other civilians and that cooperation of UNCI in negotiations towards setting up Interim Government would be welcomed by Netherlands. I thought that more positive statement could be made along lines showing compliance with SC Resolution more beneficial in effect.

I said there should be absolutely no reservations other than those contained in Van Royen’s speech on willingness Netherlands Government accept and comply with resolution. Friends inquired regarding possibility US giving financial aid soonest if sovereignty transferred. I pictured our dilemma if we try envisage with Congress and financial agencies new funds for Indonesia while Netherlands behavior is such that direct help to Indonesia is now suspended and Congress faced with measure to stop any funds to Netherlands. All of this comes at time ECA hearings on new appropriations.

At noon brought Ambassador Baruch to date. Received Labor Party leaders: Van der Goes Van Naters and Logmann in hotel room for half hour their request. They recalled conversations with me at Hague last July and discussed subsequent developments. They endeavored justify military action although they said they had consistently opposed it. I answered questions thereon and defended GOC and SC positions. They said mistakes had undoubtedly been made and they now desired know what I thought should be done toward righting situation. They agreed entirely with my idea that Republican leaders should be immediately liberated, UNCI permitted to function, and no defiance made of SC Resolution. They asked I convey their greetings to Sjahrir and other Republican leaders.

Motored Brussels afternoon 8th with Steere. Spaak received Ambassador and me 6 p. m. I summarized conversations with Queen and Netherlands officials. Emphasized extent Netherlands floundering in military and financial difficulties but religious factions in coalition government hesitating take broad view Indonesian problem and still working as if local issue. I said Stikker understood situation and I thought was one individual who had some chance negotiating agreement with Indonesia. I said I had not presumed make suggestion to Queen although had praised Stikker’s efforts at negotiation in Java to Her Majesty. Likewise had felt should not as American representative advance to Netherlands Prime Minister suggestion on such delicate subject as Stikker proceeding Indonesia when Sassen opposes Stikker so strongly. I said I knew confidentially from Stikker that he would be willing depart on day’s notice for Batavia if given full powers negotiation. I said his ranking assistants had volunteered to me idea Stikker should be so sent. Spaak stated he had been convinced my objectivity On previous talk and bad thereafter given ideas to Netherlands Ambassador Brussels oh handling Indonesian situation. He said he would now undertake advancing suggestion of sending Stikker Batavia with full powers and would decide whether to do this directly to Drees or through Netherlands Ambassador. He thought I had done correctly in not myself making this suggestion to any Netherlands officials. I spoke of press story just announcing introduction measure by Senator Brewster⁸ toward stopping ECA aid to Netherlands. I insisted Netherlands situation serious and that failure commence sincere compliance with SC Resolution would risk incurring further action on part SC as well as American legislative body. Hoped Prime Minister could act promptly since critical debate might develop Netherlands Chamber 9th and that any official statement made therein indicating lack of Netherlands willingness endeavor comply with SC Resolution might react most unfavorably.

My reception by Netherlands entirely cordial. Made no statements to press. Made no commitments to Netherlands beyond voluntary promise endeavor have UNCI decisions unanimous and recommendations reasonable. Refrained from approving Netherlands short-cut plan presently undertaken Bangka. Said up to SC itself eventually to decide whether Netherlands meets resolution satisfactorily. Said I could make no more comments before meeting interested parties again in Indonesia. While Netherlands Government genuinely Worried, must await Chamber debates and results of Bangka meeting and of Spaak approach before can report what course will be followed by Netherlands and what representations may be required on our part.

Pan American air flight from Brussels delayed until 10th. Due Bangkok [Bangka] 13th and Batavia 14th.

Copy to Hague by courier. Department please summarize to Batavia.

Sent Department; pouched Hague. [Cochran.]

Kirk

1. Erle R. Dickover, Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom.
2. Dr. Hubertus J. van Mook, former Lieutenant-Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies.
3. Loyd V. Steere, Counselor for Economic Affairs of the Embassy in the Netherlands, and Robert D. Coe, Counselor of the Embassy.
4. Dr. Nico S. Blom and Dr. H. N. Boon were high officers in the Netherlands Foreign Office.
5. E. J. M. A. Sassen, Netherlands Minister for Overseas Territories.
6. For text of resolution adopted January 23 at New Delhi conference, see New York Times, January 24 reprint, in Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950, p. 567. For Prime Minister Nehru’s telegram of January 23 to UN SC President, with text of the New Delhi conference resolution, see SC, 4th yr., Suppl. (Jan.), pp. 56–59.
7. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, p. 531.
8. Senator Owen Brewster, of Maine, on February 7 introduced S. Res. 56. On February 25 the Department informed the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Connally) that it “considers that unilateral action by the United States along the lines suggested in the Resolution would be untimely and inappropriate.” (501.BC Indonesia/2–1149)