Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 1

501.BC Indonesia/1–649: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

confidential

Washington, January 6, 1949—7 p. m.

7. For Jessup: In the event that we are called upon to speak during the Council meeting on Friday you may want to cover some or all of the following points. These have not been finally cleared in Dept. The Dept considers that your speech on Friday should be framed within your previous instructions and follow line of your initial statement in Paris. Dept does not desire you introduce any new resolution on Friday for reasons explained by Rusk.

1. The US Government can find no adequate justification for the military action taken by the Netherlands. The reasons put forth by the Netherlands representative at the meeting of the Security Council on the 22nd are not supported by Reports from the GOC. In our view the Netherlands action is in conflict with the Renville agreement¹ and the Security Council resolutions of August 1, 1947 and November 1, 1947.

2. The continuance of the military action after the Security Council resolution of December 24 is an act of defiance of that resolution on the part of the Netherlands. Continuance of military action until all military objectives have been taken cannot be regarded as compliance with the cease fire order; furthermore no satisfactory report has been received in respect of the release of political prisoners called for under the Security Council resolution of December 24, 1948.

3. From a purely pragmatic point of view it should be pointed out that the quick military successes of the Netherlands forces will not constitute a solution of the problem. The Indonesian situation cannot be solved by force. A solution of this problem remains matter of international concern with which the Council must continue to deal. The United States Government cannot associate itself with any aspect of the recent Netherlands military action.

4. In considering the laborious efforts made to get a peaceful settlement and the culmination of these efforts in the Dutch military action, the U.S. Govt must state clearly that the Netherlands did not exhaust the methods of peaceful settlement available to them.

5. The Netherlands followed a course of action after the signing of the Renville agreement which did little to reduce the atmosphere of tension and this in fact sorely strained the truce, making the completion of political negotiation for a final settlement with the Republic most difficult.

6. My Government is convinced that the Indonesian problem can only be solved when a political settlement between the Netherlands and the peoples of Indonesia has been reached on a basis of bona fide negotiation.

7. My Government can only consider such a settlement valid if all elements of coercion and duress are removed and if it is conducted on the basis of the free and democratic procedures as reflected in the principles set forth in the Linggadjati and Renville agreements.²

Lovett

1. Signed January 17, 1948; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1948, p. 334.
2. For statement by Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, Deputy U. S. Representative in the UN Security Council, made on January 11 and released to the press the same day at New York, see Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1949, pp. 91–95. For letter of January 3 by the Acting Secretary of State to President Philip Murray of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, released to the press on January 6, ibid., January 16, 1949, pp. 81–82. Mr. Murray’s letter of December 23, 1948, is printed ibid., p. 82. For UN SC minutes, see United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, No. 1, pp. 3–34. (Hereafter cited as SC, 4th yr., No. 1.)