Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

501.BB/8–2649: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Ross) to the Secretary of State

secret

New York, August 26, 1949—7:59 p. m.

1001. For Hickerson.¹ Deptel 436, August 24. In view of information contained herein, Tsiang’s desire we hold information strict confidence which he repeated this morning, and risk premature disclosure, [it] seems best leave to your determination distribution this telegram in Department. Tsiang said he had discussed with Chauvel and Cadogan and mentioned to McNaughton,² but does not plan discuss with other delegations at least at this time.

1. I showed Cadogan and Chauvel copy Deptel 436 last night. Both have reported to their Governments Tsiang’s approach to them. Neither has yet received instructions. Both expressed personal reaction Department’s approach sound. Both emphasized importance working closely together, expressed appreciation our initiative consult with them, promised to inform us promptly on receipt instructions, requested we keep them informed developments.

2. I called on Tsiang this morning and gave him Department’s reaction along lines last half second paragraph Department’s reference telegram. He expressed appreciation our attitude, said he hoped we could work closely together. He went on to say this is question of China versus the Soviet Union, not the Chinese Nationalists versus the Chinese Communists.

3. With regard to nature and evidence of Chinese case he spoke first of evidence, referring to following specific points:

a. Dairen. He said National Government was guaranteed use of port under treaty. Soviets had vitiated guarantee by various obstructions. National Government consequently unable use port, forced to use other smaller, inadequate ports. Soviet obstruction in violation treaty very serious handicap to National Government in struggle against Communists. Tsiang seemed to think abundant evidence prove Chinese case this point.

b. Railways. Situation similar Dairen. No port of any use without railway connections hinterlands Soviet obstructionism in violation treaty effectively handicapped National Government in struggle against Communists. Seemed to feel in this case also evidence abundant.

c. Military aid to Communists. Tsiang said his government collecting evidence this point. Said he thought would be substantial. Although I did not ask him, he said he is not free indicate nature of this evidence at this time.

d. Mines and factories in Manchuria. Tsiang barely touched on this point, indicating case clear-cut.

e. Tsiang said “there may be other” cases of violation. They were looking into these.

4. Tsiang said he wanted to explain personally to me as friend in strict confidence their “ultimate objectives” in bringing case before Assembly. As general background Tsiang said within past year was strong sentiment within his Government to bring case to SC. He examined very carefully which article of Charter³ case might be brought under. Case warranted raising under Chapter VII of Charter but this would bring China up against veto, therefore impractical. To bring case under Chapter VI of Charter would be “too mild” a case not in keeping with circumstances. He ended up by being very skeptical about bringing case to SC and his Government decided not to. On other hand, if GA has anything at all to do with world peace it inescapably must deal with this question which is the most important one, if not in the whole world today, then certainly in Far East. In turn, if this case must be dealt with in Assembly then it should be China and no one else who should raise question.

5. Tsiang named following as specific objectives:

a. GA should find that Soviet Union has violated treaty.

b. GA should recommend that member states should abstain from recognizing Communist regime in China.

c. GA should recommend that member states should give moral and material aid to National Government.

6. Tsiang then went on to comment on these three objectives. He said he thought there should be no difficulty at all in getting Assembly agreement on first objective. He then asked me whether, speaking personally and between friends, I had any views on second and third. I told him that speaking quite frankly and honestly and without mental reservation I did not feel I knew enough about this whole situation to warrant my having valid opinions; therefore, I had no views to express.

7. Tsiang then discussed at some length second objective. He said that although he is aware of developments in our recognition policy, that non-recognition has been a very important part of historic American policy in Far East. Tone and context his remark implied his expectation USG would be able support China in second objective.

8. He then mentioned British Commonwealth and discussed their possible attitude concerning this second objective. He mentioned large British investments, much larger than ours he said, which he could understand British would not want to throw over. He said British business had been able to keep going on large scale despite civil war. He mentioned by name 8 or 10 types of British business and industry which had managed to do business on very substantial scale even during Japanese occupation, observing that attitude of many British was that if they Could do business under Japs they could do so under Communists. Foregoing, he said, was view British community China half year ago. Since then he feels there has been substantial change these views.

9. Tsiang went on to contrast local views with view of UK Government on basis overall world policy. This came up with immediate reference Hong Kong. National Government had gotten rid of all special rights and privileges foreigners in China with exception Hong Kong and Macao. Communists could not be less vigorous in eliminating foreign influence. They could not let Hong Kong as a liberal, constitutional, democratically governed area remain at their very doorstep. Furthermore, Hong Kong has historically been a center and a basis for revolutionary activity against governments China mainland and Communists could not tolerate its remaining in hands western imperialist power. Tsiang said 1 out of every 8 Chinese residents in Hong Kong is a Communist agent. Macao was virtually defenseless and would be over-ridden in matter of days.

10. Tsiang said similar considerations must be weighed by French Government, referring in this connection to Indo-China and Siam, saying there were 3 million Chinese residents in Siam including a very active Communist minority which was highly organized and “penetrative”.

11. Implying that for reasons he stated, there should be no difficulty about Assembly’s support for objective number 2, Tsiang said (I am not quite certain exact accuracy following quote but sense is accurate) “I am not so sure about Assembly’s support objective number 3”, and asked what I thought. I said it quite obvious to anyone who reads newspapers that question of material aid for National Government a matter of some domestic concern in this country. I added that whenever anyone raises question in Assembly of material aid in any connection, delegations tend to feel question is addressed to US but not to them.

Tsiang asked me to keep him posted on any new developments in our thinking and volunteered he would do likewise.

Does Department want me to discuss my conversation with Tsiang with Cadogan and Chauvel in order to keep them posted, or shall I wait until they receive instructions? French informed me today they do not expect receive instructions before Parodi⁴ and Margerie⁵ return to Paris about September 1. My advice would be we should wait a few days, particularly since Cadogan and Chauvel would want to know Department’s reaction to Tsiang’s comments.

Department will recall Smith⁶ (Canada) raised question with me 2 days ago. I would advise delaying discussion with Canadians until after we have got at least initial reactions from British and French. I would also advise against taking this subject up in course of general GA preparatory discussions with British and Canadians on Tuesday⁷ and Wednesday because premature and too many and not right people involved. I can handle this easily with Shone⁸ and Smith.

Ross

1. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.
2. Lt. Gen. Andrew G. L. McNaughton, Permanent Canadian Representative to the United Nations.
3. United Nations Charter signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; Department of State Treaty Series (TS) 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.
4. Alexandre Parodi, Secretary-General of the French Foreign Office.
5. Jacquin de Margerie, Director of Political Affairs of the French Foreign Office.
6. Arnold C. Smith, Alternate Canadian Delegate to the United Nations General Assembly.
7. August 30.
8. Sir Terence Shone, British Delegate to the United Nations General Assembly.