IO Files: US/A/C.1/1661
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward Freers, Adviser, United States Delegation
Subject: Substitute for the Soviet Resolution.
| Participants: | Dr. Jose Arce—Argentine Delegation |
| Ambassador Fernand van Langenhove—Belgian Delegation | |
| Ambassador Gyro de Freitas-Valle—Brazilian Delegation | |
| Mr. Paul J. Martin1—Canadian Delegation | |
| Ambassador Hernan Santa Cruz2—Chilean Delegation | |
| Ambassador Henrik Kauffmann—Danish Delegation | |
| Ambassador Jean Chauvel—French Delegation | |
| Sir Benegal N. Rau3—Indian Delegation | |
| Dr. Charles Malik4—Lebanese Delegation | |
| Mr. Terje Wold5—Norwegian Delegation | |
| Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan6—Pakistani Delegation | |
| Mr. Hector McNeil—United Kingdom Delegation | |
| Ambassador W. R. Austin—USDel | |
| Mr. John Hickerson—USDel | |
| Mr. Hayden Raynor—USDel | |
| Mr. C. P. Noyes—USDel | |
| Mr. Harley Notter—USDel | |
| Mr. John Dreier—USDel | |
| Mr. Porter McKeever—USDel | |
| Mr. Edward Freers—USDel |
The above were present at a dinner given by Ambassador Austin for the purpose of enlisting the cooperation and support of the above key delegations in bringing about the successful handling of the Soviet proposal. Copies of the latest draft resolution7 to be sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom were circulated, in strict confidence, to form the basis of the discussion. The dinner was marked by a high degree of cordiality and a spirit of willingness on the part of all those present to cooperate fully to overwhelm the Soviets in this attempt of theirs to attack the United Kingdom and the United States.
Ambassador Austin opened the discussion with a statement of our shock and surprise at the fact that the Soviet Union had passed beyond its charges against ruling circles in the United States and United Kingdom and had now made an attempt to brand these countries by name as instigators of a new war. He remarked that such friends of our two countries as Romulo and others had immediately offered to work on substitute resolutions but it immediately became clear to us that as the attacked parties we should meet this problem head on and sponsor a resolution of our own. This resolution would set forth the fundamentals of peace as we saw them rather than represent an endeavor to engage in counter propaganda with the Russians. He observed however that we had no pride of authorship and that all those present were sincerely and strongly invited to make any comments or suggestions that might come to them. This was real consultation and the opinions of all were welcomed. He mentioned that the draft resolution circulated was to be considered secret in order that there would be no leaks to the public which might have an unfortunate tactical effect.
Mr. McNeil, in discussing tactics, pointed out that we should hear what Vishinsky has to say first and then have our resolution come as a full surprise to him.
Mr. Chauvel stated that he wanted the group to know that the only reason that France was not a co-sponsor of the resolution was the fact that France had not been attacked by name as had the United States and the United Kingdom. However he would take full part in the debate and France would support the whole or any part of this resolution.
Mr. Freitas-Valle observed that the issue should be put in a very clear-cut manner to the Assembly. The issue before it should be a judgment on two resolutions—a judgment as to which was wrong and which was right. Nothing should be introduced to confuse the issue. Everyone present should engage fully in the debate.
[Page 118]Sir Zafrulla suggested that our resolution should be put in just before we speak and that the tactic should be to smash Vishinsky’s proposal in our speech and then develop the points in our own proposal.
Dr. Arce mentioned the fact that at the very beginning he had drawn up a draft resolution which he thought would serve the cause of getting the two sides together in a peaceful way after they had been attacked by each other. He said that he was keeping this draft resolution ready for presentation but did not know for sure whether he would submit it. He said that he would listen for a while and then consult Dr. Munoz, his adviser, and decide whether or not it should be presented. He felt that we really could not tell what Vishinsky’s proposal would be. It might be a case of the mountain laboring and bringing forth a mouse or it might bring forth a tiger. He felt that the section in the resolution devoted to religious freedom and political liberties might be dropped since it would call forth a long debate on something that has been continually debated in the Assembly.
Dr. Malik suggested that our attack should be concentrated on the weaknesses of the Soviet regime and Communism—that is, the basic philosophical contradictions and violations of human rights. He agreed with Mr. Freitas-Valle that there should be only two resolutions submitted and that the issue between the two opposing sides should be kept very clear.
Mr. Freitas-Valle suggested that our campaign be concentrated on an elaboration of the duties of individuals and their rights. It should go fully into the matter of the relation between the individual and the state.
Mr. Martin remarked that his delegation had also worked on another resolution but had come to the conclusion that it was not desirable to have competing resolutions. The objective was an overwhelming defeat of the Russian resolution and since the United States and the United Kingdom were specifically attacked, it was appropriate for them to sponsor their own resolution in reply. Mr. Martin said that the question of individual rights raised by Mr. Freitas-Valle was implicitly treated in several sections of the resolution, but he did think that a rephrasing of the sentence in the preamble containing the words “lays down the basic principles necessary for an enduring peace” would be required. He felt that the word “the” was exclusive and meant to embrace all the principles which was somewhat inaccurate and presumptuous. He also stated that the Canadian Delegation would welcome some direction on the matter of the discussion of atomic energy, that is, how it should be approached in debate on the Soviet and our own resolutions in view of the exhaustive discussion of this subject in the Ad Hoc Committee.
[Page 119]Mr. McNeil remarked that it appeared desirable to look at the question of “all the principles” for peace again. He also pointed out that he had originally suggested the transfer of the atomic energy paragraph of the Soviet resolution to the Ad Hoc Committee but had not received any support on this proposal from the other delegations present. He felt that the question of the voluntary surrender of a portion of national sovereignty should be given full attention in the debate since it apparently meets an expanding desire on the part of many delegations.
Sir Zafrulla suggested that any modifications which might seem desirable in the resolution be accomplished “behind the scenes” and not take the form of amendments or compromises in the debate. He believed that it was very important for the debate to be centered around the two resolutions only in order to oblige the Assembly to choose between one and the other and obviate the possibility that the Soviets could claim whatever resulted as a victory for their item.
Mr. Freitas-Valle remarked that what was really called for was a motion of for or against the countries attacked.
Mr. Kauffmann stated that he was seeing the text of our resolution for the first time but wanted those present to know that Denmark would support the resolution without reservation as it stands. He said he would inform Mr. Raynor of any ideas which might occur to him after he has studied the text. He supported Mr. Freitas-Valle in the thought that there should be only two resolutions.
Sir Benegal said that the instructions he had received from his Government made it possible for him to support our draft resolution in substance. Now that he had this new text in his possession he would give the matter further thought and might have some minor recommendations with regard to changes in it.
Dr. Malik said that he felt that very strong and deep consideration should be given to the speeches in this debate. He felt that the matter should not be left just to diplomats and politicians but that we should consult the serious thinkers of our respective countries for the purpose of having our statements go to the root of the basic fallacies of Communism and Soviet Marxist theory. He recommended submitting drafts of our speeches to such persons as Arnold Toynbee.8 He said that this campaign against Communism should be very well planned and that the debate should be a wholesale attack on the Soviet resolution.
Mr. Santa Cruz supported the idea of two resolutions only. He suggested that our resolution not be presented until after Vishinsky speaks because it is impossible to forecast in advance with certainty just what Vishinsky will say. He concurred in the remarks of Martin and [Page 120] Freitas-Valle on the necessity of laying emphasis on individual rights in the debate and felt that much of the material in the declaration on human rights would be very useful. There should be full development of the question of the rights of individual people as against the state.
Mr. van Langenhove declared that public opinion in Belgium would be much more impressed and much more interested in any concrete facts which could be brought forth in the debate rather than declarations of principle. He thought that it was important that our resolution and Ambassador Austin’s speech be presented immediately after Vishinsky speaks which would center the discussion around the two resolutions from the very beginning rather than allowing the propaganda in connection with the Soviet resolution to get sole early dissemination.
Justice Wold observed that the Norwegian Delegation had seen and discussed early drafts of the resolution and would vote for it as it stands. He declared that for propaganda purposes it would be important to avoid any amendments and also important that only two proposals be presented. On the content of the resolution however he suggested that it be made as concrete as possible and he viewed it as a measure to counteract directly the Soviet resolution. He said that the first paragraph of the Soviet resolution was full of concrete charges against the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus in the first paragraph they wished to condemn these countries. In the second they charged them with destroying the hope of controlling atomic energy. In the third they put forward a solution for peace. Justice Wold said that other countries not mentioned felt themselves attacked just as much as the United States and the United Kingdom. He wondered whether the preamble was concrete enough. He said that it might not be necessary to say “notes with regret” but that the same general line of thinking should be adopted and specific points mentioned. He pointed out that actually in other situations this has occurred. For example, in the Security Council report on the reduction of armaments there has been incorporated a statement to the effect that the Council regrets that nothing has been done with regard to this subject or with regard to the formation of a military force under Article 43 because of the obstruction of certain members. Thus the subject was not avoided there. Justice Wold mentioned the heavy burden on all countries due to military expenditures, the necessity of forming defensive blocs et cetera, and the state of tension prevailing and said that in the debate it should be pointed out why this situation exists by referring to specific points such as the absence of peace treaties, the absence of Article 43 forces, the absence of international control of atomic energy and of agreement regarding arms reductions. [Page 121] It should be brought out that regional armaments have been necessary in self-defense because countries are afraid of the Soviet Union. It is not necessary to quote “note with regret” but just to state facts and call upon members to take those steps necessary to decrease tension. He said he spoke for all the Scandinavian countries in their support for the resolution and said that the discussion in the debate was of extreme importance. The main roles would of course be played by the United States and the United Kingdom but the others would then all join in.
Mr. McNeil suggested that the non-Soviet delegations should work up a pattern for debate similar to that followed by the Soviets. He said it would seem wise for him to speak after Ambassador Austin with some of the other delegations talking in between. He suggested, for example, that Dr. Malik should start off with a talk dealing with the philosophical and religious aspect of the question. He invited someone to take charge of organizing the preparation of a program for the various talks. He suggested that perhaps Denmark and maybe Norway could speak on military budgets and also that the Scandinavian countries were well qualified to deal with the question of provocation and the growth of fear.
Mr. Santa Cruz remarked that he had always felt the existence of a lack of coordination among the friendly non-Communist countries and Dr. Malik seconded him with a “hear, hear”. Mr. Santa Cruz said that whenever Chile made a strong speech he felt that they were alone—that they were something like a small dog harrying a big beast. He said that the six Soviet bloc nations work much better than the fifty other nations not only in the Assembly but in ECOSOC as well. He volunteered to serve as a soldier in the campaign and to give a short talk of ten minutes or so on anything that might be given to him. He said although the resolution is very important, the statements made in the debate are also extremely important and that the first objective is the complete defeat of the Soviet Union.
Mr. McNeil suggested the appointment of a “whip” who would organize the speakers. In a jesting tone he suggested that Dr. Arce might speak on the colonial question as it involved the Soviet Union if, of course, he would avoid mention of the Falkland Islands. Dr. Arce countered with the statement that he would not be able to say anything before he defeated Mr. McNeil on the Italian Colonies question. Mr. McNeil then replied that he wanted to make clear that he was talking about the Soviet Union when he mentioned the matter of colonies.
Ambassador Austin observed that this gathering was proceeding in a most congenial and successful manner and pointed out that the delegations invited had been very carefully selected. It seemed to him that this new group organization was something the United Nations had never seen before.
[Page 122]Mr. Martin said the idea of the “whip” seemed pretty good to him although it was only something he read about because his party had never had one. He observed that Mr. Raynor would be a good “whip” because he was apparently functioning as one already and this would make official what he was doing unofficially.
Mr. McNeil commented on the views set forth by Justice Wold as to a need for making the preamble of the resolution more concrete and wondered if there were any other delegations who shared that opinion. He asked whether a phrase such as “since tension has grown because of failure on Article 43, lack of arms reduction, lack of verification procedure, and failure to implement the majority report on atomic energy” would place any delegation in a vulnerable position. He referred to India which was opposing the majority plan on atomic energy.
Ambassador Kauffmann indicated that he felt that the resolution must pass without amendment and without a great deal of discussion as to changes. He said his delegation had thought much about the wording of the resolution but had been led not to introduce any suggestions of a controversial nature in order that there might be full agreement on a definite text.
Mr. McNeil remarked that that was of course Ambassador Austin’s view and that he had disagreed in the beginning but was somewhat reconciled now.
Sir Benegal thought that it was important that the resolution should not be drafted in a vein of “you’re another” with reference to making countercharges against the Soviet Union.
Ambassador Austin pointed out that the countercharges would be dealt with in the speeches in the discussion.
Ambassador van Langenhove observed that very few people read General Assembly resolutions but that people as a whole are interested in and impressed by the speeches made in the debate.
Mr. Freitas-Valle complained that the American press gives a great deal more space to the Soviet attacks than it does to the statements made by the non-Soviet delegations. Someone remarked that this was because of their news value.
Dr. Arce stressed the necessity for making the resolution a short one.
There was general discussion as to when debate on the Soviet resolution would begin and as to the possibility of moving up the schedule for Plenary sessions. Mr. Freitas-Valle suggested that Plenaries be held on the coming Saturday and Sunday and Mr. McNeil took up this cause with much zeal. It was finally agreed generally however that an effort would be made to have Plenaries called for November 11, 12 and 14 which would tend to bring the Soviet resolution up on Tuesday, the 15th, rather than the forecast date of Friday, the 18th.
[Page 123]Ambassador Austin stated that he would get an organizing campaign underway the first thing in the morning. He would contact people by telephone and inform them of developments. He remarked that while there appeared to be general agreement on the substance of the resolution, everyone still had a chance to tear it to pieces. However they should bear in mind whether such a thing would be wise under the circumstances and pointed out that the draft was the result of long and patient negotiation and that the suggestions of many delegations had been fully considered in putting it into shape. He expressed gratitude for the concession by Mr. McNeil on important portions of the preamble.
Mr. Santa Cruz and Dr. Malik suggested the holding of another meeting this week. Invitations were extended both by Mr. Santa Cruz and Dr. Arce for dinner meetings. However, Mr. McNeil was fully taken up for dinner the rest of the week so an agreement was made on meeting for breakfast at Essex House at eight a.m. on Thursday, November 10, with McNeil as host. Dr. Malik promised to inform Sir Zafrulla, who had left early in the evening to fulfill another engagement.
- Member of the Canadian Delegation; Canadian Minister of National Health and Welfare.↩
- Chairman of the Chilean Delegation; Permanent Chilean Representative at the United Nations.↩
- Chairman of the Indian Delegation; Permanent Indian Representative at the United Nations.↩
- Chairman of the Lebanese Delegation; Lebanese Minister in the United States.↩
- Member of the Norwegian Delegation; Judge of the Norwegian Supreme Court.↩
- Chairman of the Pakistani Delegation; Pakistani Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩
- US/A/C.1/1586/Rev. 1, November 7, not printed; for the text of the resolution actually submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom at the 325th Meeting of the First Committee, November 14, and ultimately approved by the General Assembly as Resolution 290 (IV), December 1, see p. 143.↩
- Prof. Arnold J. Toynbee, British historian.↩