501.BB/10–649: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
Delga 67. I talked with Romulo, Padilla Nervo and McNeil today in that order, re Soviet “peace pact” resolution, leaving with each of them a list of the points included in the draft resolution contained in Delga 62.1
I told Romulo that I felt personally that the Soviet maneuver should be denounced as a fraud and completely expunged, but that I was aware of the necessity of the GA doing something on the subject of peace which would be of a constructive character and hold the standard high. I stressed that this could not be done if we should merely amend the Soviet resolution under its existing title. Romulo agreed that it was important to handle the resolution in such a way that no basis would exist for the Soviet Union to claim that their resolution had been adopted by the GA. He felt that a separate resolution under a different title should be offered as a substitute. He agreed that it was really the US which was the target of the Soviet’s resolution and assured me of his loyalty to the US and his desire to protect and promote its policies for peace. Romulo and I agreed to have a further conversation after he has talked again with Padilla Nervo and after I have had further instructions.
Padilla Nervo stated that he had talked only with Romulo on this subject, on the latter’s initiative, and that Romulo had asked him if [Page 99] he did not believe that the strength of the GA would be united under a resolution introduced by Padilla Nervo as a further step in the movement undertaken by Nervo at the last assembly session. He said that one of the merits of this course would be to divert the action of the GA from a bitter fight over the terms of a resolution which could be criticized as a charge against the US and UK and as an action in approval of the Soviet Union. Padilla Nervo indicated that if the US should approve of his presenting a resolution, he would be glad to do so; but that he would like to have us feel free to take any other course which we felt to be necessary or wise. I told Padilla Nervo that I would ascertain my government’s position and inform him. He will make no arrangements with Romulo without first consulting us in regard to both the substance of the resolution and the procedure for its introduction.
McNeil noted that our exchange of views was undertaken without any commitments and on a purely personal basis. He was extremely doubtful that either Padilla Nervo or Romulo, if left to initiate a substitute resolution, would make it sufficiently strong to meet the requirements of the situation. He thought the “peace assembly” idea of Romulo, and the original Mexican proposal of Padilla Nervo, were not adequate to destroy the effect of “condemnation of preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five power pact for the strengthening of peace.” He said that if that is to be defeated by flank attack, the substitute resolution would have to be a better and stronger one in order to attract the necessary votes, and that paragraph 3 of the Soviet proposition would collect many votes if it were amended slightly. McNeil expressed approval of the points included in our draft and thought that a resolution should include them and perhaps others. He did not like the phrase “indirect aggression” but stated that “infiltration” and “civil war” were substitutes for “indirect aggression” which might overcome his objections.
As regards the initiative, McNeil’s first impression is that we who are under attack should take the initiative and not leave it to others. I called attention to the idea expressed by Nervo that the members of the assembly other than the Big Five had a stake which justified their intervention and that we might encounter this expressed in more than one way: that, therefore, it is important for us to move with full understanding among all of us. McNeil agreed and said that he would talk this matter over with his delegation and his government and see me again soon.