IO Files: US/A/1601

Summary of Discussions on Agenda Items of the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly Between Members of the United States, British, and Canadian Governments, New York, August 30–31, 19491

secret

[Here follow a list of persons present and an account of the discussion of various subjects on August 30.]

August 31, 1949, 10:00 a. m.

possible soviet strategy and tactics in general assembly

Sir Terence Shone,2 referring to the discussion of the previous day, during which several estimates had been hazarded regarding the possible [Page 84] Soviet strategy and tactics in the General Assembly, read to the group a semi-official letter, dated August 9, from the British Chancery at Moscow, regarding possible Russian action at the General Assembly.

The letter stated that there was no evidence that there was an important change in Soviet attitude toward the United Nations. They would continue to use it as a sounding board for their propaganda, and to oppose and hamper those UN bodies with which they disagreed. It noted that the Soviet press had talked of the increasing aggressiveness of the capitalistic countries in contrast to the search for peace by the Soviet States and the peoples of other States as opposed to their governments. It speculated that the sharpness of the attack on this point might well be intensified. The West might be accused of moving from war-mongering to a greater aggressiveness, as exemplified by the North Atlantic Pact, the Military Assistance Program and the recent visit of the U.S. Joint Chiefs to Europe.

The letter quoted from an August 5 article in Trud, which stated that the AEC and CCA had been sabotaged by the Anglo-American Bloc because the North Atlantic military bloc was engaged in an arms race which showed a growing aggressiveness from the war-mongering stage. Such a course was opposed by the masses, who desired peace. A great defense of peace was being carried on by the people.

The letter continued that the “Peace Rally” in Mexico might have been timed to coincide with the opening of the Fourth Assembly. It might well be a heavy attack on the imperialists for sabotaging the United Nations and attempting to dispense with it. The Soviet Union would allege it had to defend vigorously the integrity of the UN. The North Atlantic Pact would be called contrary to the Charter. The letter noted that a Pravda article in July had attacked Senator Vandenberg’s3 description of the North Atlantic Pact as a regional agreement. It also attacked Secretary Bevin’s4 statement that the Pact was collective self-defense. Pravda had said that this was obviously not true since the threat of aggression was non-existent. Therefore, the purpose of the Pact was the opposite of the Charter’s purpose of preserving peace. The British Embassy speculated that, since Pravda was so vigorous in attacking the North Atlantic Pact, the Russians might submit a resolution to the effect that the Pact was contrary to the Charter.

The letter further referred to an article in Pravda of July 5, alleging that the imperialists were trying to pack the UN with additional [Page 85] members. It further alleged that the Italian Colonies had been divided in accordance with the strategic plans of the Anglo-American Bloc, which then sought to secure approval of an arrangement made outside the UN by the mechanical voting majority. The CCA’s plan was described as an effort to enable the American Intelligence Service to collect data on the Soviet Union. With respect to the Pacific Trust Territories, it was alleged that the United States wished to use these islands for bases, and had not fulfilled its Charter responsibilities toward the dependent populations.

The British Chancery speculated that all of these points might be raised by the Soviets. They thought that, on the whole, the Soviet line would be an intensified attack, stepping up from war-mongering to allegations of sabotaging the UN. Soviet speeches in the General Assembly might be backed by well-organized peace rallies.

Mr. Hickerson5 read excerpts from a memorandum prepared by the Department in large part on the basis of comments from the American Embassy in Moscow.6 It suggested that the American business recession might enter heavily into Soviet thinking regarding UN tactics. The brick-bats recently exchanged between the US and UK press would add further to this tendency. If the Soviets believed that economic conditions were worsening, they might mark time at the General Assembly and not do anything drastic because of a feeling that matters were going their way. Thus they might pull their punches in the propaganda field. Mr. Hickerson remarked that he personally thought it possible the Soviets might take quite an opposite line on the same reasoning, and be more aggressive. He observed that it was very hard to predict what the Soviet line would be. It was all a matter of guess work. However, it appeared very probable that the Soviet line would be to continue the “peace offensive” with the allegations that the Soviets were supporting the interests of the common man and the U.S. and U.K. were against him. Certainly the North Atlantic Pact would be attacked, although it was doubted that it would be an agenda item. Sir Terence said that he shared this doubt. The Military Assistance Program would be cited as a further evidence of the aggressive intentions of the U.S., and the Point 4 Technical Assistance Program would be attacked as evidence of U.S. imperialism.

Mr. Hickerson observed that there was little point in trying to predict accurately the Soviet line on General Assembly items, since the Soviets could reverse their field whenever it suited their purpose. [Page 86] Mr. Mayrand7 observed that the foregoing analysis seemed likely; although the Soviet goal never changed, the line was adapted to the particular needs of the moment. He thought that the North Atlantic Pact and Recession themes were the most likely to be followed up. Mr. Smith8 observed that the Soviets had never followed the let-well-enough-alone line and that they would have been much more dangerous if they had done so.

Mr. Hickerson, speaking personally, said that we were very fortunate the Politburo did not have a hard-headed non-Communist adviser on tactics vis-à-vis the West. If they had, we all could have been ruined very easily. However, the Soviets have played all their cards the wrong way. If they had wished to pursue their goal, which we assume was the domination of the world, they should have let us destroy our military power as we were rapidly doing. It was only the Soviet activity which stopped us. Had they lulled us into a sense of false security for a few years, they could easily have ruined us.

Mr. Smith observed that it was now late for the Soviets to adopt the soft policy, and therefore there was not so great a danger. However, the possibility of it should not be ignored.

Mr. Ross inquired whether there might possibly be a Soviet shift to an economic approach, with a peace-through-trade argument. He thought that, if the Soviets were really smart, they would exploit such an argument. They could refer to the UK-U.S.-Canadian financial talks in Washington as another attempt to by-pass the UN, and suggest that a world economic conference be held to handle these matters. They could put emphasis on the economic difficulties of the rest of the world. Mr. Hickerson observed that, if the Soviets had any sense, they would accept the majority plan of the AEC. This would frighten us terribly, for no one could assume that they would carry it out in good faith. He observed that we would have more trouble with our Senate if the Soviets accepted the majority plan, for it would be assumed that there would be a joker in it that only the Russians saw, or that the Russians would not carry it out. If Mr. Tsarapkin,9 in the current AEC discussions, would suddenly announce that he accepted the majority plan, Mr. Hickerson said he would be most alarmed. General McNaughton10 concurred. He observed that the majority [Page 87] plan was the one that would have to be adopted some day, but he was concerned how it could be adopted with an assurance that it would be carried out in good faith by the Soviets.

Mr. Smith observed that the deduction from Mr. Hickerson’s statement was that the Soviets should not be pressed to come into the Specialized Agencies and otherwise cooperate with the rest of the world. He asked whether Western opinion had yet come to the conclusion that two worlds were better than one; to accept that and try to disintegrate the Soviet world by peaceful means. He doubted that this view had been accepted although it was his personal view. Mr. Hickerson said that he personally agreed with Mr. Smith, but he also doubted that the idea was yet accepted by public opinion.

General McNaughton said that he thought public opinion would eventually come to the conclusion that we should take the offensive and make it difficult for the Soviets to have their say in the Specialized Agencies and elsewhere. He said people are still trying to draw the Soviets into the family and persuade them, by argument and example, to conform to the West. He thought the West had exposed itself so many times and given the Soviets so many opportunities to lull it to sleep—all of which opportunities the Soviets had missed—that it was unlikely that they were going to change now. Moreover, he thought it would be impossible for them to make a switch without giving some advance warning, which no one had discovered to date. They simply could not hide their intentions so completely that we would have no wind of them. He commented that the Russians in the current Six Power AEC talks were only engaging in parliamentary maneuvers and reoutlining their previous arguments. He observed that they were being encouraged by people like Blackett,11 who had written up their arguments better than they. He characterized Mr. Blackett as a very useful person because he encouraged the Soviets in a policy that would never get them anywhere.

Mr. Ross suggested that the Delegations present should coordinate a counter-attack in preparing the initial speeches in the Assembly, so that the respective chief delegates would not need to cover all the same points. Thus they could hit harder than with a shotgun approach. Sir Terence agreed that this was a very good suggestion, but doubted whether it was feasible at this late date before the Fourth Assembly. Mr. Hickerson suggested that, during the Assembly, if such coordination could be undertaken, it would be quite useful. Sir Terence also observed that opening speeches were often designed for home consumption, [Page 88] so that there might be difficulty in arranging a division of labor. However, he said he was only thinking aloud.

Mr. Smith suggested that, in coordinating the attack, thought be given to the goal to be sought one or two years ahead.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

  1. This summary was drafted by Thomas F. Power, Jr., Deputy Secretary-General of the United States Mission at the United Nations; the section dealing with regulation of armaments is included in volume i . Additional information on these tripartite discussions is provided in an editorial note on p. 244.
  2. Deputy to the Permanent United Kingdom Representative at the United Nations; Alternate Member of the United Kingdom Delegation to the 4th Session of the General Assembly.
  3. Arthur H. Vandenberg, United States Senator from Michigan; ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
  4. Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation to the 4th Session of the General Assembly.
  5. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; Alternate Member of the United States Delegation to the 4th Session of the General Assembly.
  6. The memorandum has not been identified; for comments from the United States Embassy in the Soviet Union, see telegram 2019, August 12, p. 80.
  7. Leon Mayrand, Canadian Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs; Alternate Member of the Canadian Delegation to the 4th Session of the General Assembly.
  8. Arnold C. Smith, Principal Adviser, Permanent Canadian Delegation to the United Nations.
  9. Semyon K. Tsarapkin, Alternate Soviet Representative to the Security Council and Atomic Energy Commission; Member of the Soviet Delegation to the 4th Session of the General Assembly.
  10. General A. G. L. McNaughton, Permanent Canadian Representative at the United Nations; Member of the Canadian Delegation to the 4th Session of the General Assembly.
  11. Professor P. M. S. Blackett, British author of Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy (London: Turnstile Press, 1048) and Fear, War, and the Bomb (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949).